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3ABSTRACT
Based on three years participation in an attempt to establish a social 
centre in an abandoned building in New Cross, this thesis explores 
the forms of commoning practiced as part of that process. The commons 
here concern forms of interrelationships between beings (human and 
nonhuman) that cannot be appropriately understood through the 
idioms of narrowly defined economistic logics, such as extraction, 
resources, management, production, utility and exchange. Rather, 
the commons constitutes a radically democratic, or transversal, site 
of encounter with difference, uncommonalities, and other beings. In 
the cosmopolitical modalities of interrelation that the commons and 
commoning constitute and seek to explore care and communication play 
a fundamental roles. The modalities of care and communication that 
commoning explores and creates function as existentially constitutive 
gestures that define the interrelationships of beings brought together 
through commoning. Care, as such is not only people caring for one 
another, or their environment, but more intrinsically is a mode of 
relating to, and communicating with, difference and others. Commoning 
is found to be a process which starts from difference and creates further 
difference, revealing the uncommons as both the possibility and limit 
of the commons. 
Research for this thesis was funded by an AHRC CHASE Consortium 
Doctoral Scholarship
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INTRODUCTION
11
No future.  A small standing clock, black, the face inscribed with 
roman numerals and the hands set to 8 minutes to two, next to a hang-
ing clock—faceless with a green A drawn in its centre. Said the bourgeois 
bitch as she counted the day’s takings. An unidentified mobile phone 
number written in green
07815635982
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marked only by a large red encircled 23. PUNK ROCKER—a profile 
of a mohawked person raising their middle figure below.  To the left of 
the figure,
BLEACH
Coffee
Milk x 4
T-BAGS
BAKERS D/food
Bog Rolls
RiZLA
Vimto
a shopping list, in black marker, framed by a stepped black outer 
line. Why  xxx xxx xx  sack in? the second, third and fourth words of 
the question blocked out in the same marker pen used to write them. 
More phone numbers, incomplete and lost with the peeling wallpaper 
on which they were written. A front on portrait of Predator from the 1987 
Schwarzenegger film of the same name, black with red eyes. Smearings 
of what looks like human excrement in one corner. War. Hate & War. 
 These markings covered the interior walls of the building, lined 
with damaged, peeling, dirty yellow wallpaper, the kind of luminous yel-
low with which children often draw or paint the sun.
12
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 By the time the first three people entered the building on Queens 
Road that would become The Field in 2014, its state of disrepair was be-
yond habitation and instead what was found were traces such as these. 
The building had been squatted for many years, but over the course of 
time it had fallen into an unusable state—half of the roof had collapsed, 
most of the floor boards had given way to rot, the piping between drain 
and toilet were backed up to the point of overspill, windows smashed, 
pieces of a used chemistry set were found scattered across the back room.
 Areas of the garden were almost head height with waste. White 
goods, bicycle parts, more chemistry equipment, a toy train set and used 
syringes were found amongst the discarded items. About halfway down 
the garden a tent had been put together in a valley formed between two 
mounds of rubbish using an old tarpaulin and rope. The traces of human 
inhabitation had entered decay, giving way to new non-human bacterial 
and fungal ecologies.
 These traces were the latest expressions of material histories that 
had become layered on the space, layers that both formed surfaces and 
were formed upon them; lines, threads and traces that woven together 
formed surfaces (Ingold 2007). And the threads that formed these sur-
faces ran off in different directions, now returning upon themselves to 
inscribe the surfaces that they formed, now shooting off to become entan-
gled and knotted elsewhere. Lines interrupted other lines, surfaces broke 
off into their constituent threads, traces led to other traces.
 The building itself sits to one side of a line. The road on which it 
sits forms a psychogeographic fault line. The front of the building faces 
the slopes of Telegraph Hill, populated by Victorian terraced houses built 
by the Worshipful Company of Haberdashers from 1871 onwards. That 
company continues to support the school which sits at the base and sum-
mit of the hill. It’s motto—serve and obey—can still be seen inscribed 
in Latin on the boards of the school. Walking up the hill, with my back 
turned to the building in which these traces were found, I pass through 
streets lined by plane trees and populated by large houses built of Lon-
don stock brick until I arrive at the park which sits atop Telegraph Hill. 
Stood here, on a clear day, one can see far across the city. The tall glass 
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skyscrapers in and around the City of London shoot up from the lower 
cityscape, reaching towards the skies. There is a calm and spaciousness to 
be experienced sat in this park, and the traffic surrounding it is few and 
slow moving.
 Travelling in the opposite direction from the building is a different 
story. Turning left as I leave, I come towards the intersection of Queens 
Road and that part of the A2 named New Cross Road. Once the site of the 
New Cross Turnpike, the barrier that leaves its trace in the name of the 
nearby station New Cross Gate, this intersection is fast moving. The traf-
fic rushes past, and countless buses pass by on their way from the nearby 
bus depot and on towards their destinations across London. Walking 
along New Cross Road, which cuts diagonally behind the building, it 
soon gives way to the Old Kent Road, one of the cheapest brown tiles on 
the Monopoly board. The road is lined with retail parks and commercial 
shop fronts, and behind these is found a mixture of housing estates and 
industrial centres, timbre yards, and the local waste disposal centre. The 
experience of this side of the fault line is quite different. There are no clear 
views across the city here.
 The building sits between these two urban spaces, complimenta-
ry, connected and separate, which merge and face one another at Queens 
Road. These urban spaces interrupt one another, fold into one another. 
The road which runs between them, and which marks the base of the hill, 
appears to attempt to separate them, but never entirely successfully. It is 
a threshold (Stavrides 2010; 2016), which both separates and connects, 
offering possibilities for invitation and inclusion. And it is on this thresh-
old, this shifting and transient boundary between inside and outside, that 
the building sits. It is already in some senses a commons—a site of inter-
section between differences and encounters between uncommonalities, a 
knot of entanglement. 
 It was this building, this entanglement of lines and histories, some 
hidden, some revealed, some awaiting discovery, that became the site of 
an attempt to put the theories of the commons into practice. The Field was 
the name given to the project, partly in reference to the open field system 
of the old English commons, partly in reference to the open-ended and 
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contingent nature of fieldwork, and partly due to the romantic imaginary 
of the freedom of country fields. The process brought various individuals 
and collectives together in an attempt to establish a self-organised neigh-
bourhood resource, and it is my engagement with this process that is the 
subject of this thesis. It comes at a time when political realities appear 
uncertain and unstable, where the future of the current global system it-
self appears increasingly under question, for better or worse, and also at 
a time when the discourses on the commons have become greatly popu-
larised within and beyond academia. The political moment in which my 
fieldwork began was quite different to the one we find ourselves in now, 
the prospect of a Trump presidency was unimaginable, Jeremy Corbyn 
was still a little-known radical backbencher, and Brexit was generally 
considered an improbable event only really supported by the more tradi-
tional elements of the Conservative party and UKIP. I will return to these 
transformations which occurred during my research in the conclusion, 
but now I will attempt to briefly situate the political moment from which 
The Field emerged.
 Since the Thatcher-Regan axis of the 1980s deregulation and the 
expansion of private markets has been the hegemonic form of political 
economy.  During this period, the post-war settlement between labour 
and capital was dismantled, and public provision of services increasingly 
became framed in terms of burdens to the free-flowing operation of mar-
kets. Thatcher’s famous declaration that there is no such thing as society, 
but only individuals and families, opened the way for a deconstruction of 
the position of the state as a pastoral carer in relation to a broader society 
to which it had responsibilities and duties. The public provision of utili-
ties such as gas, water and electricity, and key services such as housing, 
education and healthcare that had been a key component of the post-war 
settlement came under increasing scrutiny and neoliberal programs of 
privatisation and deregulation became the norm. This period also wit-
nessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end international compe-
tition between capitalist and socialist world orders. Another of Thatcher’s 
famous pronouncements, that there is no alternative to market led soci-
eties, embodied what Francis Fukuyama referred to as The End of His-
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tory (2012) whereby market societies coupled with liberal democracy 
appeared to have emerged victorious over planned economies and state 
socialism. Marx, it seemed, had misrecognised the solution to the riddle 
of history which appeared not as the withering of the state into commu-
nism, but rather in the state’s dismantlement and the dominance of the 
free market. Western economies became increasingly financialised as the 
financial sector, freed from the regulations that separated retail and spec-
ulative banking, developed new derivative markets capable of produc-
ing huge amounts of wealth through complex manipulations of market 
transactions.
 Throughout this period, enabling market expansion became the 
hegemonic modus operandi of Western governments. Sectors that had 
previously been considered as of a different order of value, such as hous-
ing, education and healthcare, and thus protected from market specula-
tion by the state, became open to commodification and market expansion 
through privatisation. With Tony Blair’s New Labour government, which 
came to power in Britain in 1997, this process continued. Tuition fees were 
introduced and subsequently increased for higher education, and main-
tenance grants were replaced with loans, whilst various private finance 
initiatives introduced markets into state education and healthcare. The 
traditional public-private split, where the state tempered the market and 
provided that which could not operate according to profit motives, be-
came increasingly weighted towards privatisation. It was also during this 
period that social enterprise legislation, establishing a new form of com-
pany structure known as the Community Interest Company, was intro-
duced. It was, under this legislation that The Field initially formed itself 
as a legal entity. 
 From 2007 to 2008 these ongoing processes of deregulation and 
financialisation led towards the greatest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. The collapse of the collateralised debt obligation market 
in 2008 triggered the bankruptcy of several key US financial organisa-
tions, such as Lehman Brothers and the American International Group, 
leading to a domino effect across the world. The bubble of the financial 
derivative market appeared to have burst with states having to step in 
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with a series of vast bail outs. The hegemony of neoliberal privatisation 
and financialisation, however, remained strong. Rather than triggering 
a questioning of the validity of neoliberal theory and political economy, 
the crisis appeared to consolidate its position as the only alternative even 
further (Mirowski 2014). In popular political discourse the causes of the 
crisis increasingly appeared to shift from risky speculative markets and 
financial malpractice by large corporations, to financial mismanagement 
by governments. The proponents of neoliberalism doubled down declar-
ing that the problem was not deregulation, but that markets had not been 
deregulated enough. 
 In 2010, the New Labour government now led by Gordon Brown 
lost the general election after emerging tarnished and bruised from a cam-
paign that identified their government as financially incompetent over-
spenders who had constructed a bloated state and were in a large part 
responsible for the crisis. They were replaced by a coalition government 
formed of the Conservative party led by David Cameron and the Liberal 
Democrats led by Nick Clegg. With this government came a new series of 
terms within mainstream political discourse, most notably the introduc-
tion of a program of austerity whereby public spending was increasingly 
cut in order to close the deficit that skyrocketed after the financial crisis. 
Cuts to almost all areas of public spending followed, coupled by continu-
ing and increased privatisation of state provided services in an explicit 
effort to reduce the size of the state. 
 The Coalition Government coupled these policies with the ‘Big 
Society’ program.  A bloated state was to be replaced by the very entity 
Thatcher declared to be non-existent, “’Big Government’ must give way 
to ‘Big Society’” (Seymour 2010: 74). However, as critical political com-
menters have argued, far from being a departure from Thatcherism, the 
Big Society was its continuation and served as a cover for ongoing pri-
vatisation and the continuation of policies that found their roots in the 
Thatcher government (Tuckett 2017: 24). The Big Society program pro-
moted a model “in which all the world is a market and all the men and women 
merely consumers” (Seymour 2010: 74 emphasis original). Through priva-
tisation and withdrawal of the state, new markets were to be created for 
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business and social enterprise. The Big Society promised “the voluntary 
running of public services in theory, with Serco or Capita running public 
services in practice” (Hatherly 2012: xviii). Whilst localism and commu-
nity empowerment were the promise, the extension of privatisation and 
profit-making appeared to be the reality.
 These conditions created a paradoxical situation in which the 
withdrawal of the state under the cover of austerity economics opened 
possibilities for both privatisation and resistive forms of self-organisation, 
with the line between the two often being unclear. A “politics of abandon-
ment” (Tonkiss 2013: 314 emphasis original) opened possibilities for forms 
of self-organisation to emerge in the cracks left by the receding state. In 
New Cross, for example, the library was due for closure and sale under a 
round of public spending cuts in 2011. After a series of protests and occu-
pations, however, it was kept open as a volunteer run organisation initial-
ly known as New Cross People’s Library, and subsequently New Cross 
Learning. On the one hand, such an introduction of volunteerism where 
there had previously been state supported service provision appears as a 
manifestation of the ‘Big Society’, but on the other it was a form of antago-
nism towards neoliberal austerity politics. To borrow Owen Hatherly’s 
subtitle, which carries with it echoes of Pierre Clastres’ Society Against the 
State (2007), it is “Society against the Big Society” (Hatherly 2012: xxiii em-
phasis original). In becoming a volunteer run organisation the library was 
afforded a level of autonomy in relation to state bureaucracy, autonomy 
that would allow it to organise events that were antagonistic towards the 
politics of austerity. It was at New Cross Learning that the New Cross 
Commoners, a collective which fore-ran The Field, would first meet. 
 What is highlighted here is how transformations within main-
stream political discourse and policy, bring with them transformations in 
forms of resistance. As Foucauldians have long maintained, transforma-
tions in the practices of power bring about transformation in modes of 
counter-power and resistance. Within six months of the rise of austerity 
politics in Britain a wave of protests and occupations sprung up. In Oc-
tober 2010 UK Uncut was set up to protest austerity measures and cor-
porate tax avoidance, engaging in its first direct action campaign against 
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Vodafone, who had been reported to have a large unpaid tax bill (Mason 
2012: 54). This began an ongoing series of actions targeting organisation 
identified as engaged in tax avoidance such as Topshop, Boots and Fort-
num and Masons, as well as various protest events and actions against 
cuts to public services. 
 Alongside the Big Society and austerity narratives and policy pro-
grams the coalition government began the process of raising the cap on 
university tuition fees from £3,000 to £9,000 in spite of the fact that the 
Liberal Democrats, who had enjoyed a surge of support from young vot-
ers in the election, had stood on a manifesto promising to abolish them. 
University budgets were also cut, along with maintenance grants for 
poorer students. In November 2010 the first of a series of demonstrations 
took place in central London, jointly organised by the National Union of 
Students and the University and College Union. The action began with a 
march of 30,000 - 50,000 people through central London. Around 200 stu-
dents broke away from the march and forced their way into Conservative 
Party HQ at Millbank Tower, briefly occupying the building (ibid: 43). 
This event began a wave of student protests which continued into March 
2011, as well as a series of occupations at 40 UK Universities (Ibrahim 
2014). New political realities were compelling students and protestors to 
adopt new tactics.
  It was during this period that I first met several of the founding 
members of The Field. In 2010 Matt, Jane and Hiro, of whom we shall 
hear more of later, as well as myself, were undergraduate anthropology 
students at Goldsmiths. We were each engaged, in different capacities, 
in the ongoing protests as well as the occupation of the library which 
took place in December of that year. The occupations that we visited fur-
thered our engagement with the forms of political organisation which 
were rising in prominence at the time. Strategies which had been devel-
oped through the anti-globalisation movements in the 1990s, such as the 
appropriation of space, consensus decision making, horizontalism and 
self-organisation, general assemblies, working groups, and spontaneous 
swarm and hive tactics, were quickly becoming the norm for resistive ac-
tions and occupations, “protest methods once known to a committed few 
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were adopted by the uncommitted mass” (Mason 2012: 62). Such constel-
lations of strategies and tactics were fast emerging as what Srnicek and 
Williams have since referred to as the folk political common sense of to-
day’s left (2015). These tactics placed emphasis on the localised autonomy 
of a group, collective or occupation, as well as on non-hierarchical means 
of organisation through general assemblies, direct democracy, working 
groups and consensus decision making, many of which continued in the 
organisational structures of The Field. In addition, there was no overarch-
ing ideology directing these actions, but rather attempts to open spaces 
of discussion and negotiation through which different orientations and 
world views could be brought together. 
 The student protests and occupations also brought together trade 
unions with school, college and university students, and the dispossessed 
youth of London, who participated in the marches that took place during 
this period. Paul Mason identifies this as one of the key political phenom-
enon of the period, “the presence of youth: banlieue-style youth from plac-
es like Croydon and Peckham, or the council estates of Camden, Islington 
and Hackney” (2012: 49). It was a similar demographic, young people of 
colour from impoverished urban centres, that would be the driving force 
behind the riots of 2011 which broke out from August 6-11th in 30 towns 
and cities in the UK following the shooting of Mark Duggan by police in 
Tottenham. 
 Events in the UK had not been occurring in isolation. Austerity 
programs across Europe had been met with resistance. Since 2008 pro-
tests against the financial sector had been growing in Iceland leading to a 
referendum on a new constitution in 2012. In Greece, anti-austerity move-
ments had been underway since May 2010, leading to the emergence of 
the ‘Indignant Citizens Movement’ in 2011 which sought to join with 
parallel movements in Spain, known as 15-M movement or the Indigna-
gos. In addition, the Arab Spring, which started in 2010, led to the over-
throw of the governments of Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and Lybia, as well 
as major government changes in other nations and the outbreak of civil 
wars in Syria and Iraq. There appeared to be the possibility of a “rebirth 
of History… whose aim is to make a genuine exit from the established 
21
order.” (Badiou 2012: 15). Whilst all diverse and heterogeneous move-
ments, horizontalism and the occupation of space for collective decision 
making featured as key strategies, as well as the use of digital media to 
establish networks of resistance (Gerbaudo 2012). Activists from Britain, 
Spain, Greece, Egypt and America were connecting and sharing stories 
and tactics in unprecedented ways (Graeber 2013a).  New forms of resist-
ance were emerging and taking hold across networks that were capable 
of expanding at previously unthinkable speeds. 
 In 2011, Occupy London set up camp outside St Paul’s Cathedral 
in solidarity with Occupy Wall Street and with support from the London 
branch of Spain’s 15-M movement and UK Uncut. Movements across the 
world appeared to be linking up through “the widespread adoption of a 
common territorial form which allowed for disparate and distant events 
to be narrated and understood as a connected global phenomenon.” 
(Matthews 2018: 127). Again, many of the people who would go on to 
form members of The Field’s collectives, including myself, participated in 
these occupations, attending general assemblies, joining working groups 
or visiting free schools, teach-outs and sites for alternative education that 
emerged during this period. As with the student occupations, Occupy 
did not have an overarching ideology or single set of aims or demands, 
although many of its tactics and strategies had anarchist-tinted tenden-
cies. Rather, Occupy attempted to open spaces of negotiation and debate, 
“a genuine popular assembly, a new agora, based on direct democracy 
principles” (Graeber 2013a). The assemblies and occupations were them-
selves the demand and message, the opening of a space of communica-
tion through which alternative political possibilities could be explored. 
By the summer of 2012, all the camps of Occupy London had been evict-
ed, but the political horizons and forms of organisation that had emerged 
in the preceding years and crystallised through Occupy continued. 
 Many of the practices which became prominent forms of politi-
cal action during this period were carried forward into The Field. The 
discourses on the commons intersected well with the strategies of direct 
democracy, prefigurative politics, horizontal organisation and the occu-
pation of space that had spread in the social movements following the 
22
2008 crisis, as well as offering a resistive counterpoint to the Big Society 
narrative of the coalition government. I recall in one of The Field’s meet-
ing, a couple of years later, a member of Mad Pride declaring: “they talk 
about the Big Society—let’s give them a Big Society they didn’t expect!”. 
The ideas of commoning offered means of continuing the exploration of 
the political horizons that opened and expanded during this period, and 
it is not incidental that these ideas rose to prominence alongside the tac-
tics, events and practices described above. Whilst having a history1 which 
vastly predates the 2008 crisis, as well as the emergence of austerity eco-
nomics and the spread of horizontalist strategies in broader social move-
ments, the practices of commoning that form the subject of this thesis take 
on a particular shade in the light of these developments, and it is along-
side these developments that the rise in prominence of the discourses on 
the commons can be better understood.
 It is now half a century since Garrett Hardin published The Trag-
edy of the Commons (1968). That article continued a long history of theoreti-
cally convincing justifications for enclosure and privatisation, a history 
that can be said to include the likes of John Locke (1988) and Thomas 
Malthus (2008) amongst its most prominent representatives. This history 
asserts clearly, with the unquestionable authority of rationality, that what 
is in the best interests of the population, what will bring about the great-
est good for the greatest number, to adopt the language of Bentham’s 
principle of utility (2007), is the protection of private property and the 
enclosure of commons.  In short, it is in the interest of the common good 
that the commons be enclosed and portioned off into private property, 
for “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968: 1244). Here 
is the tragedy—people do not know the collective ruin that their actions 
are leading them towards. They do not know what’s good for them. An 
intervention is required. The commons must be enclosed, given over to 
either state or market. There is a form of intellectual vanguardism here, 
one which determines a form of life as best and asserts that it must be 
1 There is a long history of the commons and English common land which, 
whilst significant, will not be substantially addressed by this thesis. Readers who are 
interested in this history may wish to turn to some of the relevant historical litera-
ture (e.g. Neeson 1993; Federici 2014; Linebaugh 2008)
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imposed on others who are incapable of recognising that it is in their best 
interests. Such a form of theoretical imposition is one that anthropologists 
have regularly been suspicious of, preferring to examine how people ac-
tually organise themselves, create values and make sense of their worlds, 
rather than relying on the distanced assertions of Enlightenment rational-
ity. 
 Two decades after Hardin laid out the inevitable ruin of the com-
mons, Elinor Ostrom enacted a supremely anthropological gesture. She 
took the claims of the inevitable tragic demise of the commons to task by 
paying attention to specific, grounded, empirical examples. One of the 
peculiarities of Hardin’s original article was that in-spite being published 
in Science, it contained no empirical material. Elinor Ostrom’s Governing 
the Commons (1990)2  took up the theoretical claims of the tragedy of the 
commons and subjected them to empirical scrutiny through studies of 
‘common pool resources’ such as fisheries, forestries and shared pastures. 
What she found was that sometimes the tragedy could be observed, but 
often it could not. Another highly anthropological observation—empiri-
cal realities are far more complicated and varied than a one size fits all 
theoretical argument might have us believe, no matter how convincing 
it might seem. Through these observations it became clear that often, 
when left to their own devices, far from exploiting resources to exhaus-
tion people would come up with practical rules and systems of organi-
sations which would maintain and care for the commons. Many of the 
examples where the tragedy could be found occurred precisely because 
people were not in a position to establish such systems—there were im-
positions from the state or market which prevented the self-organisation 
of the commons. 
 These observations did a huge amount to demonstrate that other 
arrangements are possible beyond the classical economic dichotomy of 
state and market. The choice is not a matter of state, or market, or tragic 
ruin. Much of this may seem obvious to anthropologists, whose discipline 
has developed around the recognition that human societies vary greatly 
2 Whilst Ostrom’s study was not the only one to do this, (e.g. Feeny et al. 
1990), it was one of the more influential as attested to by Ostrom being awarded the 
Nobel Prize in economics.
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across the world, and across time, and that institutions like the state and 
free market are by no means universal. But it appears not to be so obvious 
to many policy makers and orthodox economists. With Ostrom, however, 
there is a shift towards a more complex understanding of economic phe-
nomenon, leading her to advocate arrangements of ‘polycentric govern-
ance’ (Ostrom 2010), in which state, market and other localised institution 
come together in complex nested arrangements. From an anthropological 
lens, and with just a bit of poetic licence, such a proposal can appear like 
the Maussian total social fact (2002: 100) as a principle of social organi-
sation or governance. It is a perspective that rejects simple either/or di-
chotomies (state or market, or tragic ruin), and instead becomes attuned 
to the simultaneous presence of all elements of society within observed 
phenomenon—components of the state interact with components of the 
market, whilst components of potential tragic ruin remain present, and 
a whole host of other institutions often relegated to the position of exter-
nalities in orthodox economic discourse remain in play. 
 With Ostrom, as with Mauss, it is not a case of either a total egali-
tarian commons, or a total state-market based capitalism—the question 
is always more complex and nuanced. This tendency, as far as Mauss is 
concerned, is expressed clearly in The Manual of Ethnography, where he 
writes, 
“If one really wants, societies can be defined by their 
communism or individualism, or more precisely by the de-
gree of communism and individualism that they show. Both 
are always present; the task is to determine their respective pro-
portions.”
(2009: 99 emphasis added).
As with The Gift (2002), it is neither a case of total altruism or total 
self-interest—both are always present. Likewise, with Ostrom it is neither 
a case of the inevitable tragedy of the commons, nor of holding up the 
commons as a complete alternative model of social organisation. 
 Ostrom’s analysis, as with many other economically oriented 
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analyses of the commons, deals primarily with a category labelled as re-
sources, hence the use of the term ‘common pool resources’ in her works. 
A large amount of insightful ethnographic and anthropological has de-
veloped around this perspective. Much of this literature examines how 
people do, or do not, establish self-organised rules and systems to care 
for the commons, and how these commons intersect, become entangled 
with, or enter into conflicts with other state, market and non-state institu-
tions and agencies. But there is another discourse on the commons which, 
whilst it cannot be entirely separated from the analysis of common pool 
resources, thinks of the commons in terms of relations and processes. Such 
a perspective often starts from a broader understanding of the commons. 
For instance, in Commonwealth Hardt and Negri recognise the importance 
of the commons understood as resources, or in their words, “the com-
mon wealth of the material world”, but also understand the commons to 
include “those results of social production that are necessary for social in-
teraction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, 
information, affects, and so forth.” (2009: viii). This later understanding 
of the commons is emphasised by Hardt and Negri as more significant 
and attempts to “not position humanity separate from nature, as either 
its exploiter or custodian, but focuses on the practices of interaction, care 
and cohabitation in a common world” (ibid). Such a definition, as sum-
marised and paraphrased by Žižek, concerns “the shared substance of 
our social being” (2009). As with Ostrom, there are more anthropological 
resonances here. 
 To describe the commons as those relations that facilitate social in-
teraction, production and shared inhabitation of a common world brings 
us close to an understanding of the commons which resonates with one 
of anthropology’s historically central concepts—culture. We are in many 
respects not so far from Geertz’s famous summary of culture as the webs 
of significance in which people are suspended and which they have them-
selves spun (1973: 5). The shared substance of our being that Žižek calls 
commons, by another name, is these very webs. But culture as a concept 
has been subject to much contestation within anthropology and beyond. 
Within anthropology the culture concept has at times been criticised for 
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upholding an Enlightenment epistemology which imposes separations 
between culture and nature. Such an imposition has led to a rigid tax-
onomy separating humans (with culture) from non-humans (without 
culture) and causing people to become radically separated from their en-
vironments and from other kinds of beings. Much anthropological ink 
has been spilt attempting to bridge this gap, or great divide (Latour 1993), 
between nature and culture in order to open a way towards more eco-
logically oriented understandings (e.g. Bateson 1985, 2000; Morris 1996; 
Ingold 2011; Descola 2014). And here, there is also another anthropologi-
cal resonance with Hardt and Negri’s understanding of the commons—
namely that they do not separate humans from nature. 
 This is one of the criticisms that has been levelled against Ostrom, 
and many other economically oriented understandings of the commons, 
namely that by treating commons as resources they are reduced to eco-
nomic categories subject to scarcity and exploitation—they are reduced to 
a matter of management, and “this transformation of commons into re-
sources dissolves them” (Esteva 2014: i148). The commons become inac-
tive objects of a nature radically separate to and manipulated by culture. 
Through such an understanding the commons, as resources and objects, 
become assigned to the pole of nature and the rules for governing the 
commons are assigned to the pole of culture. In contrast to this econo-
mistic perspective, this thesis engages in an understanding of the com-
mons as relation and process. Such an understanding of the commons 
was regularly expressed by the collectives with which I participated in 
the collaborative construction of The Field. Often, these collectives explic-
itly rejected Ostrom’s analysis as being economistic, reformist and having 
the potential to aid in the maintenance of capitalist hegemony. Whilst I do 
not entirely reject Ostrom’s work, as some members of these collectives 
appeared to at times, I do share some of the suspicion of economistic per-
spectives and tend instead towards ecological ones. I consider Ostrom’s 
work to be of great significance and use, and it has done a huge amount 
to demonstrate that other forms of ownership and property are possible 
beyond the stale opposition of public and private. However, all bodies of 
work and perspectives have limits and horizons beyond which they can-
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not see.
 It is here that the broader understanding of the commons as pro-
cess and relation comes into play. It is a perspective that is often better en-
capsulated by the verb to common, or commoning, rather than the noun 
commons. As Peter Linebaugh writes, 
“To speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource 
is misleading at best and dangerous at worst—the commons 
is an activity and, if anything, it expresses relationships in so-
ciety that are inseparable from relations to nature. It might be 
better to keep the word as a verb, an activity, rather than as a 
noun, a substantive.” 
(2009: 279)
 To common here becomes a practice, an action. Commoning “is a 
way of doing both community and economics as immersed in the here and now 
of living habitat.” (Menzies 2014: 123 emphasis original). To common is 
not to manage an inactive resource, but to act with it, alongside it and 
through it, it is to engage with other beings in a manner that is ecologi-
cal, caring for and attending to the relations between them. I here follow 
from Gregory Bateson’s use of the term ecology—for Bateson, mind was 
not bound to the human brain, or even the human body, but “immanent 
in the total interconnected social system and planetary ecology” (2000: 
467), and it was in these relations of interconnectivity between differential 
beings that ecological problematics were located. In short, it makes little 
sense to consider an agency, experience, organism or being outside of the 
relations in which it is entangled. Tim Ingold has offered a revision of 
Bateson’s Ecology of Mind, opting instead for an Ecology of Life, looking at 
the “creative unfolding of an entire field of relations within which beings 
emerge and take on the particular forms they do, each in relation to the 
others.” (2011: 19). Commoning, as an activity of caring for and commu-
nicating with a living world is a practice of attending to and exploring the 
possibilities of such an ecology of life, of creatively exploring other ways 
of being, thinking and doing. It is such an understanding of commoning 
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that is explored in this thesis. 
 Ingold has himself, in his more recent publications and lectures, 
turned to notions of commoning (2017; 2018a; 2018b). One of the central 
themes of this thesis, that of communication, is explicitly referred to in 
these works. Drawing on Dewey’s discussions of education (2004), In-
gold points to communication understood as a creative process, as forms 
of commoning. The relationship between communication and common-
ing is an intimate one, as both Dewey and Ingold highlight. To commu-
nicate is to create a process of commoning, it is to “make meaning to-
gether” (Ingold 2018a: 4). In this way commonality is not the prerequisite 
of communication, but its outcome. It is the establishment of a relation 
of correspondence (Ingold 2017). The starting point of communication 
is difference, rather than an absolute similarity or univocality, it is the 
uncommons that makes possible the commons (Blaser & de la Cadena 
2017). Communication is not simply the conveyance of information, but 
a practice of actively making and remaking meanings. It is the composi-
tion of systems of meaning capable of nurturing common forms of life. 
Ingold states this clearly, and links back to an ecology of life, when he 
writes “communication is the commoning of life” (Ingold 2018a: 5), it is 
the process of exploring and creating new forms of life. Throughout this 
thesis, communication will be explored in a range of shapes and forms, 
as well as the noise and interruptions that disrupt, distort and transform 
communication, and so too commoning. 
 Such disruptions, distortions and interferences form one of the 
meanings of the term parasite, as used by Michel Serres (2007). The French 
term parasite used by Serres, incorporates the meanings of social or bio-
logical parasite which are present in the English, but it also includes a 
third meaning, that of static or noise.  For Serres communicative signals 
are always run through with noise and static, “[n]oise is always already 
part of the signal; blindness inescapably accompanies vision” (Wolfe in 
Serres 2007: xiii). Attempts to communicate are accompanied by a third, a 
para-site (para—besides, other, adjacent; site—space, domain, locus). Such 
noise emerges of these sites of adjacency, alternative patterns and modali-
ties of communication which run alongside others and which have dif-
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ferent histories and trajectories. Sometimes these adjacent communica-
tive fields intersect and establish successful channels of communication, 
sometimes they produce misunderstandings, repulsions, diversions and 
interruptions. Sometimes they simply fall to static and noise. Communi-
cation is never a simple matter of conveying information, all kinds of sites 
of adjacency come into play, all kinds of noise disrupt the signals. Col-
lective endeavours produce clamour, “[t]he collective is a black box. The 
set makes the noise… The collective is white noise itself… Noise comes 
out of the black box. Noise and shivarees.” (Serres 2007: 123). Whilst we 
attempt to unpack the black box, to discern sense amidst noise, there al-
ways remains something unseen, unheard, something that falls to static, 
an observation that applies to ethnography as much as it does to com-
moning. 
 Another central theme that recurs throughout the following chap-
ters is that of care, and it is another notion that Ingold has taken up in 
his more recent publications. Care, for Ingold, is related to attentionality, 
and in this way also to commoning and communication. It is a matter of 
attending to others, of being present to them and allowing them to be 
present to us in order that we can respond and attend to their needs and 
desires (Ingold 2017; 2018a). The theme of care recurs throughout much 
of the literature on the commons. As Maria Mies clearly states, “The main 
principles of the commons were (and are): Commons could not exist 
without a community who took care of them” (2014: i107). Attending to 
and exploring ecologies of life requires practices of caring for the partici-
pants of those ecologies, be they human or non-human. In this regard I 
have also drawn from Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s understanding of liv-
ing webs of care incorporating human and non-human actants, which 
call on us to “take care of things in order to remain responsible for their 
becoming” (2010: 43). Care throughout the following chapters is explored 
as a contingent practice (Mol et al. 2010) of attending to differences in 
such a way as to facilitate their flourishing, and as such is understood as a 
central component of commoning as the attempt to explore the possibili-
ties for ecologies of life.
 Just as communication always comes with interruptions and noise, 
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however, so too does care comes with its counter parts, what Heidegger 
referred to as “[t]he deficient modes of omitting, neglecting, renouncing, 
resting” (2010: 57). Just as practices of care run throughout the follow-
ing chapters, so too do manifestations of these failures of care, moments 
where attending to others became too great a burden, or where an excess 
of attention in one direction led to a deficiency in another. Such deficien-
cies of care could be found in the collapse of the building itself, in the rela-
tions between people, or in emergent affective states. So just as this thesis 
explores the central importance of care, so too does it highlight the ever 
present possibility of modes of neglect that are an inescapable possibility 
for commoning. Such modes of neglect, however, are not inevitabilities as 
with the fatalistic tragedy of the commons, but are rather the contingent 
results of specific arrangements, orientations and positions. 
 Care is also a domain of practice that has become systemically ne-
glected by capitalism.  David Graeber has proposed a phenomenon that 
is particularly acute in what he refers to as the ‘caring classes,’ namely the 
fact that the more a task produces collective social value, the less it is com-
pensated for through wages (2018). There is an inverse relation between 
the creation of social value and the compensation it receives in quantified 
economic value. Graeber points to how those engaged in caring profes-
sions, such as nurses, social workers, and teachers, are often those who 
receive the least amount of compensation in the form of wages. There 
is a link here to Graeber’s earlier work on value (2001), where a distinc-
tion is marked between singular economic value and a plurality of values 
belonging to moral or ethical considerations. The former domain is the 
narrow quantification of practices in terms of the economic value they 
produce; the latter, that of values, is a domain where it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply a unitary quantification of the benefits produced. 
Many of the practices that fall into the domain of what Silvia Federici has 
referred to as “the means of reproduction”, referring to “all the activities 
necessary for the reproduction of human life” (2012b: 55), have come to 
fall in this latter domain of values which cannot be fully quantified from 
the narrow perspective of economic value. 
 Federici shows how this separation, between the productive 
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sphere for which a wage is paid and the reproductive sphere which re-
ceives less or no renumeration, is a gendered division. In Caliban and the 
Witch, she argues that during the transition to capitalism and a wage-
based proletariat,
“production-for-market was defined as a value-creating 
activity, whereas the reproduction of the worker began to 
be considered as valueless from an economic viewpoint and 
even ceased to be considered as work…. The economic im-
portance of the reproduction labour-power carried out in the 
home, and its function in the accumulation of capital became 
invisible, being mystified as a natural vocation and labelled 
“women’s labor.”” 
(2014: 75)
 A slight of hand is enacted, whereby those practices which are 
most vital for the continuation of human life, and so also for labour-pow-
er, are precisely those that are most devalued from the stand point of eco-
nomic value and become concealed in the naturalised female sphere of 
domestic work. The practices of maintaining, nurturing and recreating 
human life became assigned to a domain deemed valueless from the lens 
of unitary economic value, in spite of the fact that these very practices are 
vital to the production of economic value itself.
 This tendency continues in the monetary devaluation of caring la-
bour in contemporary capitalism. Graeber has outlined ‘caring labour’ as 
entailing “a self-effacing openness to the realities of others and their needs 
and desires […] caring is not actually a value but the primary means for 
the creation of value […] caring labour’s best conceived as labour that 
is directed ultimately at maintaining or enhancing another’s freedom” 
(2018). It is these forms of practice, systems of values beyond the singu-
lar economic value, that commoning seeks to explore in attempts to find 
mechanisms to allow forms of care to be valued. Commoning attempts to 
find ecologies of life in which care is not devalued or concealed. As such, 
the practices of commoning discussed in the following pages hold within 
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them an integral feminist and anti-capitalist orientation. They seek to ex-
pand what is valued beyond the narrow limits of economic value.
 This orientation also brings them into an uneasy, but nevertheless 
antagonistic, relationship to the narratives on the Big Society discussed 
above. Emma Dowling has argued that the Big Society 
“is about increasing that huge amount of work that we 
do in its unwaged form… The rhetoric of care, compassion 
and community is an attempt to make work not appear as 
work so that it does not have to be negotiated as such and 
remunerated.” 
(2012 : 88).
 From this perspective, the Big Society is a continuation of the mar-
ginalisation of the caring classes, an attempt to expand the concealed and 
mystified domain of reproductive work that is excluded from, or mini-
mised in relation to, the cipher of economic value whilst simultaneously 
being the foundational possibility of that system of value. Commoning, in 
this dimension, is the attempt to return reproductive work to centre stage, 
to become attuned to and recognise its centrality in the continuation and 
flourishing of life.
 If there is ‘a thesis’ to the following pages then, it is this: common-
ing is based upon the uncommons, that is the encounter of difference, and 
emerges as a grounded exploration of ecologies of living and forms of life 
in which communication and care are central practices and orientations. 
But this very ground of the uncommons, and the centrality of communi-
cation and care, whilst being the positive conditions for commoning are 
both its possibility and potential limit. The attempt to common may col-
lapse back into uncommons, care can be run through with neglect, and 
communication can fall to noise.
 It is these themes that I attempt to draw out in the following chap-
ters, in all their inherent ambiguity, complexity and potential for misun-
derstanding and miscommunication, as well as the ever-present reality 
that my attention for one thing may lead to neglect for another. Chap-
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ter one, The Field and The Field, explores the entangled formation of The 
Field, and my anthropological fieldsite. The chapter shows how the two 
were nested processes, that is how the emergence of my research pro-
ject, methodology and fieldsite, was inseparable from the emergence of 
The Field as a proper noun, place and project. Drawing on contempo-
rary proposals for social research methodologies, the chapter outlines the 
approach that I took during my research. Attention is also drawn to the 
points of overlap between commoning practices and anthropology. Both 
practices seek to explore the possibilities of human collectivity, and both 
do so through encounters with forms of difference. These points of over-
lap and intersection are drawn together through the notion of commoning 
anthropologically, a situated and awkward form of inquiry that asks about 
the possibilities of collective life. Running alongside this chapter are two 
textual ‘parasites’ which prefigure one of the central arguments of this 
thesis—that all communication across difference is run through with in-
terference, static and noise from other channels. These parasites attempt 
to embody this proposal in the form of the text itself by running alongside 
the more academic and scholarly form of textual communication that this 
chapter enacts, and by introducing more experiential and affective mate-
rial describing my experiences of some of the moments discussed in this 
chapter. In this way they attempt to set up spaces of communicative adja-
cency which both overlap and depart from the main body of the text, and 
which show how modes of communication are rarely univocal or simple.
 The second chapter, On What Commons?, develops a partial lit-
erature review primarily based on the reading groups of the New Cross 
Commoners, a collective which preceded The Field and who were an 
important part of The Field throughout its development.  The chapter 
outlines a particular notion of the commons and commoning, one that 
emerges as a form of struggle against the state and capital. This notion 
of the commons is one that is anti-capitalist, and anti-statist, looking to 
the commons as holding the potential to bring about social transforma-
tion and a post-capitalist form of life. The literature review is based on 
a selection of reading groups, discussions and workshops organised by 
the New Cross Commoners that occurred in locations and places directly 
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related to the texts themselves, enacting a form of situated and grounded 
study that sought to develop forms of practice from the theories of the 
commons.
 Chapter three, Communication, examines the role of non-humans 
in the commons and The Field. Drawing on developments within posthu-
manism and other forms of social research which turn to material culture, 
objects, things, and beings other than humans, the chapter attempts to 
consider the commons as cosmopolitical ecological formation. The space 
of encounter here, is not only an encounter between human beings, but 
between a broad range of differences—buildings, environments, tools, 
materials, affects. This broader range of difference I refer to as difference-
writ-large. It is through attending to these encounters with difference-
writ-large that beings which have formerly been excluded from political 
activity can begin to be included in it. The chapter concerns an attempt to 
allow politics and political actions to become attuned to a broader range 
of agencies entities and beings through the composition of common 
worlds. Two primary conceptual devices are deployed in this chapter. 
First, through the call of ruins the chapter attempts to look at the force that 
the building itself, and its state of disrepair, enacted in the composition of 
the commons. Second, through a discussion of communication, the chapter 
attempts to expand communicative practices beyond the limited realm 
symbolic language to open possibilities of communication with other be-
ings.
 Following this chapter, we encounter the first of two major ‘para-
sites.’ As with the shorter adjacent parasites in Chapter One, they estab-
lish sites of adjacent communication that both overlap with and partly 
diverge from the main structure of the text and in so doing interfere with 
and transform other meanings elsewhere. This first parasite is a partial 
transcription of a long sound recording in which five people engage in a 
difficult and very dangerous building job without the proper skills, tools 
or knowledge. Alongside the clamour of the five human voices, I have 
incorporated the voice of the building and the materials itself, drawing 
them into the interruptive clamour that this section seeks to enact. 
 Chapter Four, Four Fields of Politics, sketches four forms of politics 
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that I identified as emerging from The Field. The first of the four fields 
outlined is that of transversal radical democracy, an opening towards a 
community comprised of anyone. This is the field that has been identified 
by some political thinkers as the primordial field of politics—a open and 
anarchic space in which difference is encountered and identities are dis-
rupted. The second field is that of constitutive outsides. This is the field of 
oppositions between us and them, and friends and enemies, the field of 
antagonism and agonism. It is the field which enacts the inverse gesture 
of transversal radical democracy in which the opening towards anyone is 
closed and the political community locates its inside and points of exclu-
sion. Third, the political force of relations to futures is sketched through a 
discussion of the relationship between the apophatic gesture of analysis, 
and the non-apophatic gesture of the imperative. This field emerges as a 
gap between an identified current state of affairs and a desired and desir-
able future, one which compels action and intervention. The final politi-
cal field to be sketched is that of cosmopolitics. This final field is a stance 
of non-disqualification towards others and attempts to retain political 
modesty in relation to other ways of thinking, doing, communicating and 
being. This stance is one that attempts to guard against the premature 
closure of the political community, that attempts to keep it open to others.
 Following these four political fields comes the second parasite 
which takes the form of a collation of visual materials that provide an 
adjacent narrative for the formation of The Field. The materials gathered 
here are ones that did not have a clear location within the main flow 
of the thesis, but nevertheless are useful in expanding its ethnographic 
depth. This section is free of text so as to not attempt to explain the visual 
through discourse, but rather to allow it to exist as its own modality of 
expression. The lack of text also seeks to show, in the form itself, that not 
all communicative interferences are audible, and can be ocular or relating 
to other sensory and affective registers. 
 The fifth chapter, Commoning Beyond the Commons, approaches the 
limits of commoning practices as they were found at The Field. The en-
counter with difference, that this thesis proposes should be considered as 
central to the commons, always brings with it the possibility of friction, 
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conflict and failure to construct common worlds. Some of these moments 
are discussed in this chapter. The title attempts to highlight the fact that 
commoning is a practice which takes place beyond the commons-- it is the 
moment at which commons attempt to recompose themselves in order 
to incorporate an element that was previously excluded, be it a person, 
an object, an idea or anything else. This practice highlights the fact that 
common does not simply mean a unity of the same, but a community in 
which differences come together whilst retaining their specificities. This 
is the (non)domain of the uncommons. Several conflicts that occurred at 
The Field are discussed to show how this is not always a smooth process, 
and how common worlds cannot always be successfully recomposed, 
and that at times uncommonalities proliferate. However, these uncom-
monalities are also the very possibility of the common as they mark the 
differences upon which the heterogeneous commons are founded. 
 The final chapter Affective Activity and Careful Collectivity, turns its 
attention to a theme that runs throughout the entire thesis—the impor-
tance of care in commoning. The chapter particularly focuses on care in 
relation to value, action and affect, looking at how they intersect and are 
entangled with one another. Drawing on personal experience, as well as 
the experience of other participants at The Field, the chapter develops a 
reconsideration of the notion of burnout through the lens of value, affect, 
care and neglect, to consider burnout as emergent of particular constella-
tions of value, care and neglect that produce oppressive affective states. 
The proliferation of communicative failure, or noise and static, is dis-
cussed with a view to revealing a clamorous cascade of misunderstand-
ing, ressentiment and neglect which produces the experience of burnout. 
The chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance of becoming attuned to 
a wide variety of modes of care in order for the composition of common 
worlds to be emotionally sustainable for participants. 
 The conclusion attempts to draw the preceding chapters together 
to examine some of the key emergent themes and additional problem-
atic fields.   The opening section offers a cautious reconsideration of the 
notion of commoning anthropologically given in chapter one, proposing 
that whilst it can be important for anthropologists to participate in the 
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composition of common worlds, this is not without its dangers, short-
coming and possible failures. Following this, commoning is examined as 
a practice of making-sense in which both communication and care func-
tion as existentially constitutive gestures. The question of difference is 
then returned to, examining how commoning produces further differ-
entiation rather than its diminishment before turning to the problematic 
of ‘differences which make a difference’. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a brief discussion of the political moment in which my fieldwork 
concluded.
 I have opted to list photographs and images in the appendix, 
rather than at the front with the table of contents, in order that this mate-
rial may be permitted to speak for itself, rather than being subordinated 
to textual description. I have also not used any captions or numbering 
throughout the thesis for the same reason. In the second appendix a list 
of images can be found with the relevant page numbers. In this I have 
followed the example of Bourgois and Schonberg in Righteous Dopefiend 
(2009) with the exception that the images are not repeated for a second 
time in the appendix. 
  This text does not always achieve, or indeed strive for clarity. The 
political formations that it participates in themselves deny such a possi-
bility. The modes of commoning that emerged in the three years of field 
work that form the basis of the text was one that could not always permit 
clarity. The emphasis on the encounter of difference, negotiation, experi-
mentation, recomposition, flexibility, transversality and participation, 
produced modalities of politics that defy classification and clarity, that 
relish in the ambiguity emergent of the encounter of difference and the 
uncertainty that this entails. As Anna Tsing (2015) has discussed, encoun-
ters across difference entail indeterminacy and transformation, they are 
creative moments which bring with them contingency, uncertainty and 
ambiguity;as too does the persistence of forms of interference, noise and 
static. To attempt to cover over this uncertainty and ambiguity, and trans-
parently communicate what was itself far from transparent, would itself 
conceal a large amount about commoning, it would fail to attend to the 
potential consequences of the question asked by Judith Butler, namely 
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“[w]hat doe “transparency” keep obscure?” (1999: xix). There is much 
that can be lost in striving for clarity for not everything is itself clear in the 
first place.
 Throughout this text, and following the uncertainty that emerges 
of a politics of encounter and difference, “ambiguity is itself the genera-
tor of meaning” (Lepselter 2016: 34 emphasis original). I have then, not 
attempted to produce a coherent narrative of my fieldwork, or of The 
Field. I was asked by certain members of the collectives engaged with 
The Field to avoid this. I have not sought to represent the project or the 
others with whom I spent much of those three years, but rather to attempt 
to continue to engage with the tensions between us, between different 
ideas, subject positions, theories, political horizons, projects, and encoun-
ters. My experience was that neither the narratives of the project, or the 
idea, or the biographies of specific people, ever emerged as coherent or 
selfsame. There are then, many unresolved tensions, refrains, passages 
and ideas in this text, proposals that remain incomplete or unrealised, 
theorisations or considerations that seem to jar with one another, or even 
with themselves, that never emerge into a larger framework—academic 
or otherwise. There are interruptions, interference, disturbances, disjunc-
tions, jolts, displacements. And this ambiguity and indeterminacy emerg-
es as a positive condition of the text, rather than something to be ironed 
out.  
As such, I aim towards a continuation of the tensions and resonanc-
es of encounter, always from my own partial perspective. When other 
voices speak, it is in conversation with me, it is through my own struggle 
to listen to and hear the other, to communicate with them through all the 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations and displaced meanings this in-
evitably implies—to discern their voice clearly amidst noise. I attempt to 
continue the ongoing tensions between complimentary, conflictual, con-
versational and communicative interactions of ideas, theories, practices, 
ideologies, people, places and things. 
It is, however, useful to attempt to briefly clarify a three of key con-
ceptual terms that I use in the following pages that are perhaps the most 
likely to succumb to static with potentially negative results. Each of these 
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terms will be returned to over the following chapters and elaborated fur-
ther, but for now it is important to offer a few preliminary remarks on 
their use. The first of these terms is ‘difference.’ Drawing primarily on the 
works of Gilles Deleuze (e.g. 1988a; 2011), I understand difference not as 
a matter of opposition or contradiction, but as an emergent process of dif-
ferentiation through repetition. Difference emerges through processes of 
becoming, it is less a matter of negating similarities than it is of affirming 
differences in their continual transformation and emergence. Differences 
are not set or static, but emerge through moments of encounter that pro-
duce differentiations, thus difference is closely associated to becoming 
and multiplicity, and at times appear to converge within Deleuze’s work. 
Difference, throughout this thesis, does not refer to an opposition or 
contradiction between terms or identities, but to processes of encounter 
through which differentiations emerge and are created, differentiations 
which are not unitary, fixed or static, but multiple and in flux. 
This emergence of differentiation through encounter brings us to 
the second of terms that I would like to briefly clarify, that is ‘the other’ 
and ‘others.’ It is a notion that has been the subject of much controversy 
within anthropology, and whilst it may be tempting to abandon it en-
tirely, and not without good reason, when approaching matters of com-
munication, (un)commonality and care the other cannot be easily wished 
away. As Fanon states, “to speak is to exist absolutely for the other” (2008: 
8), that is to communicate, to express, is to address oneself to another. The 
manner in which these others are constituted and experienced is of vital 
importance in understanding the expressive, communicative and caring 
modalities of which they are part. As such, to avoid potential misunder-
standing, it is important to mark how ‘others’ is used in this text. As with 
difference, the other does not here refer to an identity of contradiction or 
opposition, but rather to the experiential moment of recognising differ-
ence, that is the moment where difference is expressed and experienced 
as expression. The other, then, is an event rather than a subject. In consid-
ering the other in this way I have also drawn on Deleuze, who conceives 
of “the Other as the expression of a possible world” (2011: 261 emphasis origi-
nal), as well as others such as Lacan (2006) and Levinas (2011) who open 
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pathways to understanding the other as experiential encounter. The other 
here is an event which opens possibility through its expressive encounter, 
it emerges as an invitation to other possibilities. How this invitation is 
received, whether it is entirely rejected, successfully accepted, clumsily 
negotiated, or maliciously rejected is a contingent matter that cannot be 
decided in advance, but the other as event and invitation here emerges as 
a threshold to another way of being, thinking, communicating or doing. 
The question then, is how these others are constituted and constructed, 
how they are related to, and what kind of invitation is heard from them.
Finally, I would like to clarify my use of a term that has risen to 
prominence in a number of social sciences of late, and that is the notion 
of ‘common worlds.’ A common world I understand to be a shared space 
of interdependency that facilitates the co-flourishing (Haraway 2008) of 
its participants. Common worlds, however, do not efface the emergent 
differences of participants, but establish mechanisms of care and commu-
nication that are capable of bringing them together without erasing them. 
They are constellations of sense, action, value and practice that open pos-
sibilities for communication and becoming-with (ibid). There is not how-
ever, in my usage, a (unitary) common world, or worse—the common 
world. Just as common worlds are internally heterogeneous and multi-
ple, so too are they heterogeneous and multiple in relation to other com-
mon worlds. I have found some of the insights of Peter Sloterdjik’s work 
on Spheres (2011; 2014; 2016) useful in providing mechanisms to concep-
tualise such dizzying proliferation of common worlds. To borrow from 
Sloterdjik’s language, a common world is akin to a bubble amidst foam. It 
is a shared space of experience and sense, but one that is part of foam, an 
intersecting, expanding and shrinking aggregate of common worlds, all 
of which can impinge on each other, bounce off each other, puncture and 
pop one another. They are never settled or fixed but remain in composi-
tion. They are processes of worlding rather than existent or predestined 
forms. Commoning, then, is the practice of embarking on the foam of car-
ing for and expanding and intersecting these bubble-worlds-in-process. 
During fieldwork, it was often unclear to me where my thought 
began and ended. As my ideas, theories and practices were continually 
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articulated within the field of commoning, I could not easily separate 
my own theorisations from those of the collectives. This is perhaps un-
remarkable, for as Anna Tsing writes, “we are mixed up with others be-
fore we even begin any new collaboration” (2015: 29). Of course, there 
were times when differences were clearly marked, but others where the 
boundary was unclear. Where, in this text, differences are announced and 
expressed through different voices and subject positions, it is less with 
a view to assigning a certain opinion or theory to a certain person, but 
more with a view to reveal tensions, interactions, conflicts, encounters 
and resonances. I generally find that my own voice, both as the writer of 
this text and as a shifting series of subject positions within it, is not stable, 
and as such I do not ask that the voices of others manifest stability or co-
herence either. 
I learnt of the commons, of commoning, and of this particular kind 
of political practice and thought, through the three years of participation 
at The Field. I had a vague awareness of the commons, mainly through 
the copy of Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth (2009) that had sat on my 
bookshelf, mostly unread, for years, but I had never engaged with the 
theories and practices of the commons in any kind of sustained way. This 
period of participation in The Field then, was one of conversational edu-
cation where I was drawn into a field of thought and practice with others. 
I could not be an external observer to the practices, processes and ideas 
that are the subject of this text. My own voice in writing merges with 
those of others, it is an open instrument, one which is always already 
run through with the voices of others, that is formed by the voices of oth-
ers and which speaks to others. Theories, ideas, texts and stories come to 
us from the other and leave us to the other. There is never the moment 
where we can fix them down and declare them as our own. 
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ChAPTER 1
ThE FIELD
AND ThE FIELD
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My arrival at my fieldsite was gradual, messy and porous. There 
is a sense in which my fieldsite arrived, or better continued to travel, 
rather than me arriving at it. The fieldsite had its own agency in the 
emergence of my research. It did not simply await my arrival.
When I first entered the building on Queens Road that would 
later become The Field it was not as an ethnographer crossing 
the threshold beyond which their research would begin. 
The basis of my initial engagement with The Field un-
folded gradually over a course of time that also 
unfolded the shifting horizons of my research 
in a way that meant the fieldsite did not 
pre-exist the research project, nor 
the project the site. At the point 
at which I set foot across the 
threshold of the build-
ing, it was not as an 
anthropologist, 
I 
s t e p 
across the 
threshold of the 
plot of land. Under-
foot I travel from the slabs 
of the pavement, to the cement 
aggregate that lies before the build-
ing. It is a small and squat building, set 
back from the pavement by a couple of meters. 
It is small, squat and grey.  It was once white, but 
years of weathering have rendered it grey. The surfaces of 
paint have become dirtied and the surfaces beneath the paint 
have been revealed. The windows are broken. Many are boarded 
up. Some are simply broken.
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ethnogra-
pher, or re-
searcher that 
I did so. At this 
time, at the begin-
ning of 2014, I was 
attempting to develop 
a different research pro-
ject, one that would ex-
plore the contemporary po-
litical economy and ecology of 
‘creativity’ within London. My 
test fieldsites for this project had 
been various—artists working in stu-
dios in converted factories in Bermond-
sey, stop motion animators and musi-
cians living and working in warehouses in 
Tottenham, advertising executives in SoHo, 
governmental discourse on the ‘creative’ in-
dustries, public art installations. The process of 
establishing the research project was unfolding as a 
gradual exploration of the possibility of locating field 
sites, an attempt to move from a theoretical and discur-
sive consideration about the role of the notion of creativ-
ity in contemporary political economy, to an ontological 
domain in which I could observe empirically the effects these 
discourses produced. My first engagement with what would 
become The Field, then, can be understood as a continuation of 
 I step across the threshold. But the threshold is not clear. It is not clear 
until it is crossed. It is not clear where the pavement ends and where the 
plot on which the building sits begins. It is only when invited to cross 
this threshold that I notice that the building is there. It is only one 
story and being attached to the two story building that is the doc-
tor’s surgery on one side and neighboured by a two story house 
on the other the buildingit seems to crouch between them in an 
attempt to make itself less visible; aand there is no wall and 
there is no gate and there is no clear boundary between the 
pavement and the forecourt and the door does not look 
like it can be used and it is not until I am invited to 
cross the threshold that I notice the building is there 
at all and I feel uneasy. 
 I must have travelled past this building 
many times before, but I have not noticed it. 
Living in the city for many years can have 
the effect of narrowing vision, of exclud-
ing. I rush. I travel. I pass things by. 
I have become so used to the signs 
of urban decay and degradation. 
Abandoned buildings. Empty 
lots. Overgrown gardens. 
Empty archways. Dilapi-
dated alleys. Border-
lands. Wastelands. 
U n i d e n t i f i a b l e 
plots encased in 
rusting fences. 
I t 
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these processes—the search for and creation of fieldsites. I, with oth-
ers, helped to create The Field, but the challenge it presented was 
quite different to that of observation, participatory or otherwise.
On first entering the building, as has been mentioned, I 
did not do so as a researcher but more as potential contribu-
tor to an emergent process. I had known several members 
of the collective that formed at The Field for years before-
hand, having been undergraduates alongside several 
of them and attended protests, occupations and dem-
onstrations together, we shared certain political 
ideals, aspirations and horizons. We had shared 
late night conversations about the possibility 
of setting up what at that time was simply 
referred to as ‘a space.’ So it was in this 
context that my first engagements with 
The Field occurred. Enrolled as a part-
time research student and working 
close to full-time, the hours I spent 
at The Field initially took place 
in what little spare time I had 
and occurred on the basis of 
specific unintentionally 
prefigurative devices. I 
refer to these devices 
as prefigurative 
because they un-
folded prior to 
my recogni-
tion of The 
Field as 
m y 
field-
is 
a t 
m o -
m e n t s 
of disrup-
tion that 
this dilapida-
tion makes itself 
present, forces it-
self upon you, makes 
you confront it. Your 
routine is disrupted. The 
rush of your journey grinds 
to a halt. You look around 
amidst a gridlock. The ano-
nymity of the city unmasks itself. 
Something goes wrong. Some danger 
makes itself felt. The uncanny decay of 
the city emerges. You are invited into the 
dilapidation. You invite yourself into the di-
lapidation.
  I’m invited to step across the threshold. 
To walk through the door that looks unusable and 
I step inside.
 It is dark.
 It is dark and dank and the smell of rotting wood mixed 
with wet dust fills my nostrils and I cannot see far in front 
of me and to my left the wall is coated in a moist slime-like 
substance and to my right an archway opens up to a small dark 
room lit only by what little natural light can get through the few 
windows that are not boarded up and above me the roof is open and 
water is falling through and through the archway at my feet there is a 
hole in the floor where the floorboards have turned to sawdust and have 
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been eaten away and the room is filled with junk  and the smell shifts from 
rotting wood to something far more foul. Something that I cannot identify. 
Something imposes itself upon me. 
The friends that invited me in step in behind me.
They tell me to watch out for my coat.
To watch out for my shoes.
They are excited.
This is their place they tell me.
But I am uneasy.
I am sceptical.
The building is dirty.
It is polluted.
It is dangerous.
It makes me uneasy.
And I don’t know who will clean it.
I would not come back to the building for 
months
site 
a n d 
r e -
s e a r c h 
focus, and 
as such they 
played a pre-
figurative role 
in relation to the 
entire research pro-
ject. They manifested 
prototypical characteris-
tics (Corsín Jiménez & Es-
talella 2016; Corsín Jiménez 
2014b), that set-in motion pro-
cess that modified the devices 
themselves as ongoing open-ended 
experiments. They functioned as de-
vices in which processes re-inscribed 
themselves, and which were in turn re-
inscribed by those processes in an ongoing 
recursive feedback loop. 
The earliest of these devices was the build-
ing itself. Each week I would go down to the build-
ing on one or both of the two days a week I had free 
and offer what unskilled work I could. Scraping paint 
off walls, chipping away at old plaster, sanding down 
doors, floorboards and shelves, clearing debris from the 
garden and rubble from the previous work, building plant-
ers and fixing window frames, walking the streets of New 
Cross looking for pallets or other discarded materials that could 
be of use—these were the practices which I engaged with initially 
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at The Field. Through this work I became gradually more engaged 
with the day to day life of the project, the ideas that were informing 
it and the processes that were occurring alongside the building reno-
vation. I was included in e-mail discussions about the economy and 
direction of the project and invited to meetings, which initially I did 
not attend due to time pressures. Starting from the materiality of the 
building, I was drawn further into the formation of the project, and as 
I became more involved with the project, a series of other prototypical 
prefigurative devices emerged. 
I began talking to people more about the specific needs of The 
Field, and where it was headed. The building work, it began to be-
come apparent, was not only prefigurative to what would become my 
research, but also to The Field as a whole. The work was unskilled, 
unpaid, and exploratory. The point was not only to renovate the build-
ing, but also to explore the possibilities of self-organisation, of learn-
ing new skills together, of developing new relationships to one anoth-
er and the city through this specific site. The process of exploring and 
caring for the building, was also a process of caring for one another, 
of producing common spaces, common vernacular knowledges, com-
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mon affects, common social aggregates—in short, common worlds. As 
we explored the building and the process of building work we ex-
plored what the building could be and become. Conversations were 
had with passers-bys, and ideas about the possibilities of the building 
were drawn in from regular and one-time visitors alike. Meetings and 
discussion were held probing the possibilities for the general economy 
of The Field. 
Starting from the building other devices emerged. The need for 
someone to work on various digital platforms became apparent and 
having an amateur interest in web design and coding, and having my 
own hosting account, I volunteered myself. The website became an-
other of the prototypical prefigurative devices. Groups of us would 
meet to discuss what we wanted the website to be, how we wanted it 
to function, what we wanted to communicate. We would try and write 
copy together, objecting to the use of certain words as being too aca-
demic, too hegemonic, too twee. Like the building, the website provid-
ed a platform from which to discuss the conceptual shape of The Field 
whilst maintaining a relation to a practical task—that of communicat-
ing and representing whilst exploring modes of collective expression. 
After being informally involved for a few months I saw an e-
mail circulating the Goldsmiths Anthropology Department calling for 
contributors for a zine based on the topic of ‘the makeshift city’ based 
on a two-day event to be organised in Hackney Wick comprised of 
a public debate and walking tour. The event formed part of an on-
going collaboration between public works, “a critical design practice 
set up in 2004 that occupies the terrain in-between architecture, art, 
performance and activism” (public works 2018), and Isaac Marrero-
Guillamón, who would later become one of my doctoral supervisors.1 
Initially I engaged in this project from the perspective of the research 
project on ‘creativity,’ makeshift architecture being a mode of crea-
tive practice that challenges certain modernist conceptions of what 
it means to create. As I became more involved in the project, talking 
1  In this instance these prefigurative devices also influenced and fed into the 
institutional infrastructure of my research in contributing to the choice of doctoral 
supervisors.
49
more with Isaac and the others involved, the affinities between make-
shift architectural practices and The Field became clearer and it was 
proposed that we invite members of the collective to present at the 
public debate. At this point, what and who formed the collective of 
The Field was particularly unclear, and so it was the New Cross Com-
moners2  who were invited to the public debate as the primary identi-
fiable collective coalescing around the building.
2e The New Cross Commoners will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2: 
On What Commons?
We are stood in a playground in Hackney Wick. 
We stand in a circle introducing ourselves. 
I have a camera around my neck.
I don’t really know how to use it.
I am anxious.
I have invited the Commoners to attend and have a pe-
culiar feeling of individual responsibility.
As we stand in this circle I see Commoners ar-
riving and joining the circle. We smile and 
nod at one another. Others text me to 
say they are on their way. 
Later we are sat upstairs at 90 
Main Yard. The lights are 
dim. Illumination comes 
from laptop screens 
and the projected 
power point 
p r e s e n t a -
tions. The 
hum of 
t h e 
It 
was at 
the public 
debate, held 
at 90 Main Yard 
beside the River 
Lee Navigation canal, 
when the New Cross 
Commoners stepped up to 
present, that it was said for the 
first time—‘Toby is pretty much 
a commoner’ and I was asked 
to join them. If we are to look for a 
telic point of entry to the field, one that 
marks a 
beginning, this moment could perhaps im-
perfectly stand in its place. However, there was 
a sense in which I entered the field without being 
aware that I had done so in a manner that makes any 
after the fact attempt to locate a telic start to fieldwork 
disingenuous.
It was through these devices that my initial interactions 
with The Field unfolded. Each of them set a tone and prefig-
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ured the way in which research would unfold. The building work, 
the website, the Wick Session established modes of collaboration 
through the materiality of the space, the structures and platforms 
of organisation, and the epistemic exchange of discourses. 
Each of these areas opened the fieldwork process as collabo-
rative, collective and experimental, functioning as “[m]
ethodological devices that allow us to intervene in so-
cial research through an experimental gesture in col-
laborations with our counterparts in the empirical 
work.” (Estalella & Sanchez-Criado 2015: 2). These 
devices were the foundation of my participa-
tion in The Field, and they paved the way for 
my future contributions which took forms 
such as other digital platforms, account-
ing and bookkeeping, building and 
maintenance work, organisational re-
views and various other day to day 
contributions to the project. These 
devices highlight the entangle-
ment of the formation of The 
Field and the formation of 
my research project and 
its fieldsite. The demar-
cation and emergence 
of The Field and 
the field were in-
separable from 
one another. 
pro-
j e c -
tor fan 
rattles in 
the back-
ground. Oc-
casional shouts 
are heard from a 
drama rehearsal tak-
ing place in an adja-
cent room.
The Commoners are called up 
to speak.
Someone jokes (a Commoner or 
not?—the distinction does not really 
matter or hold true) that half the audi-
ence is to step forward. Those who do step 
forward spread themselves out. They want 
to join with the audience, to be continuous 
with them in a way that undoes the very possi-
bility of a fourth wall. They look around to see who 
else can join them, who else counts as a Commoner. 
I am called up. Someone jokes that it will never end. 
Someone agrees that it should never end, that it should 
extend all the way from here to New Cross. I sit at the edge 
of the non-boundary between the presenters and the audience. 
We begin to talk. 
I still feel anxious.
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ThE AGENCY OF ThEORY
There is a sense then, in which the epistemic work of defining my 
research project was also part of, and entangled with, the epistemic 
work of The Field. The formation of the conceptual directions of The 
Field, was also the formation of what became my research project. The 
two were nested processes, sharing common entanglements, inquiries 
and horizons. Through the process of becoming more involved with 
the project, engaging with the collective discussions, a series of ques-
tions unfolded. These were not questions that were exclusively mine, 
or that I asked alone, but questions that emerged collectively and that 
we sought to address collectively.  The Field and the Commoners, as 
such formed examples of what Holmes and Marcus have referred to 
as “[e]pistemic communities” (2008a: 82). These are communities “in 
which “research,” broadly conceived is integral” (ibid) to their collec-
tivity, communities which are already engaged in para-ethnographic 
practices (Holmes & Marcus 2005; 2008b). Research, then, was not 
something that was added by my project, or by the presence of the eth-
nographer’s gaze, but was something that was already present prior to 
a clear anthropological or ethnographic commitment on my part. On-
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going inquiry and reflection formed a large part of the practices of The 
Field and the New Cross Commoners.3 Research was not something 
that I added to The Field, but something I became entangled with. 
The immanent forms of enquiry already unfolding in the pro-
cesses of self-organisation The Field was attempting posed both com-
mon questions and questions of the commons. They concerned the 
possibility of creating commons, and catalysts of commoning prac-
tices within the urban context of New Cross. This was a line of enquiry 
that many members of the collective had been engaged with for sev-
eral years previously as the New Cross Commoners3, both prior to The 
Field and to my interaction with these processes. In the Commoners’ 
2013 publication, commoning was defined as
I) The activities through which a common is consti-
tuted and maintained, through which a resource, material 
and/or immaterial, comes to be used and organized col-
lectively. These activities imply conflicts, negotiations and 
care. The conflicts are both antagonistic towards the market 
and privatization and towards the control of the State. On 
a different level conflicts and care take place amongst the 
different people using the resource.
II) Sharing a certain knowledge, thing or skill with 
people openly and with pleasure: Suzy thinks that com-
moning is not a concept but an embodied activity that 
needs time, space and care.
III) Any act through which you remove yourself 
(mentally, financially, socially) from the grips of State con-
trol and Market control.
The Field was in part a continuation of these lines of enquiry, 
an attempt to explore the possibility of commoning a building and 
creating a neighbourhood resource. These processes of enquiry, re-
search and experimentation were unfolding long before I formalised 
3  See Chapter 2: On What Commons?
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a research project.
Terms in the definitions offered above such as ‘conflict’, ‘negotia-
tion’ and ‘care’ signal to the need for ongoing emergent processes of 
collective learning and interaction. The conditions of organisation for 
a given resource are not given beforehand but are dependent on these 
ongoing processes of negotiation. Commoning is a process of ongoing 
care between people and resources, one in which attention is directed 
towards the collective, directed towards processes of taking care. As 
such, the processes of commoning are ones of ongoing research and 
collective education, of exploring and establishing the conditions in 
which the resource can be managed and used collectively. As such, 
commoning implies modes of pedagogy in that it concerns learning 
different ways of relating to one another and the world, ways of living 
and organising social aggregates differently. Practices of commoning 
express desires to establish different methods of social organisation 
that are not already given, and as such must be learnt collectively—
this exploratory process is expressed in the description of The Field 
as “an experiment in creating a new institution of the commons, one 
for local, self-organised research, education and action” found on the 
Twitter page, or in the poster which adorned one of the boarded up 
windows briefly during the period of building work that described 
The Field as “an experiment in growing, building, sharing, learning, 
creating, collaborating, improvising.” Both these descriptions empha-
sise the pedagogic components of The Field as a site for exploratory 
learning practices and experimentation. 
 Such a process requires modes of research different to those 
practiced in the institutional setting of the university, but which nev-
ertheless share points of overlap and intersection. Commoning, as 
such, is also the sharing, redistribution and collectivisation of knowl-
edges and practices. What is more, the definition above clearly places 
the processes of commoning within the realm of struggle against capi-
tal and the state. In addition to the pedagogic project of learning and 
establishing how to common a particular resource, commoning also 
concerns the project of attempting to move beyond hegemonic social 
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structures, of exploring and establishing new modalities of collectiv-
ity that can be enacted and reproduced. The Commoners, as was ex-
pressed by Rebecca, one of the founding members, was established to 
try and close the gap between the commons as theory and commoning 
as practice. As they put it, The Commoners was established to
“try to create a group to discuss these concepts but 
to not just discuss the concepts and read texts about them 
but to also see how they connect to our lives … There was 
a desire to say it all sounds fantastic when you read about 
it, how you share, negotiate, produce, reproduce, how you 
create community that is heterogenous and so on, but then 
also think, well what happens once you put this in practice”
Commoning, then, could be said to reveal itself as a mode of prax-
is understood both as purposeful activity targeted at bringing about 
change in the world, as the more Marxian genealogy would define it, 
and as actions incorporating ethico-political concepts and practices, 
as the more classical Aristolean definition could be argued to sug-
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gest. As praxis, commoning presents an ongoing process of “reflection 
and action upon the world in order to transform it” (Freire 2005: 51). 
It acts upon the world in an attempt to alter it. It is a conscious and 
concerted effort to intervene in and direct the “production of material 
life” (Agamben 1999: 59). In this way commoning seeks to examine 
possible modalities of sociality through the practical transformation 
of material conditions. It seeks to locate tools for the transformation of 
ecologies of life. As one member of The Field and Commoners collec-
tives put it to me when I began to speak about the ‘beauty’ of a con-
cept, “I kind of want weapons, and don’t much mind if they’re ugly.” 
The aim of commoning was not distanced theoretical reflection, but 
action in a world with a view to transforming that world. 
However, this practical focus does not mean that commoning, as 
praxis, as a wilful attempt to locate tools and methods of transforma-
tional and emancipatory potential, is devoid of relationships to theory. 
As Heidegger puts it in discussing the relation of theory and praxis, 
““[p]ractical” dealings have their own way of linger-
ing. And just as praxis has its own specific sight (“theory”), 
theoretical research is not without its own praxis…. It is by 
no means clear where the ontological boundary between 
“theoretical” and “atheoretical” behaviour really lies!” 
(Heidegger 2010: 341 emphasis original). 
Indeed, the praxis of the Commoners and The Field can in part 
be understood as an effort to bring theory into the domain of action, 
that is to enact commoning as a means of overcoming the false op-
position of theory and practice that Heidegger challenges above, to 
see how theory becomes practice, to grant theory agency, or rather to 
support, enrich and enable the agency of theory. This is a way of con-
ceiving of theory that is profoundly empirical, in that it brings with it 
concrete and practice-based manifestations and transformations; it is 
a theory that is put to work in the domain of practice in such a way as 
to collapse their initial separation. Thus, theory here has an empirical 
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character, it is manifest in worlds and enacts changes in those worlds. 
There are resonances here with what Goethe alluded to as “a deli-
cate empiricism which makes itself utterly identical with the object, 
thereby becoming true theory” (Quoted in Robbins 2006: 1); an em-
piricism in which concepts also find their place in the picture of reality 
and as such must find their place in ethnographic practice as objects 
of empirical observation, not only as the tools and frameworks of the 
anthropologist. 
Theory here is not understood as a distanced reflection, a mode 
of consciousness outside of everyday life, or as the ideational pinna-
cle of thought, an expression of the “supreme mind at the top of the 
ladder, … the explanation of everything downwards” (Bateson 1971: 
35). It is no longer given the role of explicator, of the plane of me-
ta-analysis, but that of a tool, a device, of an instrument that brings 
about changes to what it is possible to achieve within a given state 
of affairs. The use of theory here is the use of tools, it is a mode of 
theory for which agency is not only recognised, but actively sort and 
enacted. As such, theory does not operate only in the domain of being 
present-at-hand (Heidegger 2010), of being an object of observation, 
consideration, abstraction and deliberation, but also moves over into 
the mode of being ready-to-hand (ibid), it is put to work and experi-
enced through embodied action in the world, through being put to 
use. It is here that theory finds its tool-being (Harman 2002), that is it 
finds meaning in action, in a practice that is not devoid of theory, but 
borne of the interfacing of theory with the worlds to be created and 
transformed. Theory as a mode of tool-being changes what it is pos-
sible to achieve within a given state of affairs through enabling and 
expanding the agency of others whilst simultaneously expressing its 
own agency. 
This is one of the meanings of the ‘theory’ of the commons for 
The Field and The Commoners—that of enabling us to think other-
wise, to see otherwise and to practice otherwise, to enact and explore 
new futures through an ongoing process of research and collective 
pedagogy, to expand our field of vision. And for my own writing now, 
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as we will discuss further below, this is also one of the roles of theo-
ry—that of a tool to think otherwise and to expand the possibilities of 
commoning through oscillations between being present-at-hand and 
ready-to-hand. As such, the use of theory here, and for The Field and 
The Commoners, situates itself as cross-cutting a long-standing de-
bate that has placed interpretation and transformation in opposition 
to one another. One pole of this opposition can be expressed through 
Marx when he famously states, “philosophers have hitherto only in-
terpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” ([1845] 
2018). The opposite pole of this opposition can be found in Latour’s 
contrasting paraphrasing and adaptation of this statement, “[s]ocial 
scientists have transformed the world in various ways; the point, how-
ever, is to interpret it” (2007: 42). Rather than staying within the con-
fines of this opposition, the use of theory here, and by The Common-
ers and Field, cuts across transformation and interpretation, between 
distanced reflection and engaged action. Instead theory is approached 
as a mode of tool-being, a form of delicate empiricism, a mode that is 
not unthinking, but unfolds in this interplay and oscillation between 
thought and action and the implication of each in the other. So, the use 
of theory is at once a recursive adoption of the practice of the collec-
tives in which my research took place, and, as recursion, it is has fed 
back into that praxis.
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MAKING NATIVES AND REMAKING ThE SOCIAL
The formation of The Field was caught up with various trajec-
tories, many of which connected it to Goldsmiths College. Several of 
the early members of The Field collective had attended Goldsmiths 
previously, some still did, and some worked there. Likewise, the New 
Cross Commoners also emerged from milieus connected with Gold-
smiths. Not only was the Commoners emergent from a desire to en-
gage with theory differently, that is as praxis, but it also came from a 
desire to do so starting from everyday life in New Cross. As Rebecca, 
explains in an interview in 2013 for Uncut Talks,
we are all living in New Cross, we have a connection 
because we come to Goldsmiths to study, but there was not 
much we would do in between studying at Goldsmiths and 
our homes, so we would basically cycle to college maybe go 
to the pub, cycle back home, and then go to the city centre 
for cultural activities and then to say, well couldn’t we live 
the neighbourhood differently and try to see what is there 
already going on … because I think there was this feeling of 
New Cross being a bit run down, not so exciting, somehow, 
everything is concentrated at Goldsmiths, there is not so 
much cultural activity going on around it, that was sort of 
the sensation we had, and then starting with the New Cross 
Commoners to actually go to visit places, like the library, 
housing co-ops, house boat communities, community gar-
dens, we realised that actually a lot is going on and that it’s 
a vibrant place to be
The Commoners, came from a desire to move outwards from 
Goldsmiths, to explore the area in which Goldsmiths is situated dif-
ferently, and in so doing find means of commoning some of the enclo-
sures the university enacts. These enclosures were multiple, referring 
at once to the material space in New Cross that was closed off to those 
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above, the engagement of students or staff at Goldsmiths with the 
surrounding area was often very limited, and as with so much of ur-
ban life in London, was limited to certain enclaves and well-trodden 
routes. The situation was similar for me. I had studied at Goldsmiths 
for many years, but my interactions with New Cross and the sur-
rounding areas were largely limited to the kind of activities pointed 
to above—attending events or lectures at Goldsmiths or going to the 
pub with friends and colleagues. For me, as with the other common-
ers, this outward movement of exploration constituted a new form of 
engagement with New Cross. 
The process of renovating the building on Queens Road that 
would become The Field led us to new places and to meet new peo-
ple—for the first time we would begin to explore the vast industrial 
estates between New Cross and Surrey Quays looking for a good deal 
on certain building materials, or we would walk the streets looking for 
discarded items. We would meet traders of reclaimed materials under 
the railway arches between Queens Road Peckham and Peckham Rye, 
their makeshift structures piled high with different lengths of tim-
ber. We would strike up conversations with local industrial bakers, 
without the required authorisa-
tion, and the enclosure of knowl-
edge that Goldsmiths enacted as 
a neoliberal academy. And it was 
this gesture, this outward move-
ment, that was in part understood 
under the banner of commoning, 
the gesture of moving outward 
from enclosures and in so doing, 
producing, locating and sustaining 
commons.
These outward movements 
reiterate what was perceived as a 
disconnection of Goldsmiths from 
the local area.  As Rebecca said 
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lic areas, and would collect them regularly, local history enthusiasts 
who could tell us where the underground rivers ran, and hoarders, or 
so the Council called them, who would walk the streets with a sharp 
eye, looking for discarded items they could add to their collections. 
We would meet people passing by after coming from the Dr’s surgery 
next door. And one night we would walk the streets with a heterodyne 
detector to explore the relationship between gentrification and the bat 
population in the area. 
Entangled with and emergent from these processes my field-
work became one of collective exploration and experimentation. I 
began within a milieu fairly familiar to me, in which I was already 
engaged—namely, that of Goldsmiths. Rather than going native, we 
made natives, and made ourselves our own natives. Our sense of be-
longing, the formation of the group or ethnos, was moulded through 
the construction of commons. Through the practices I have pointed to 
above, we engaged in processes of remaking the social. Here, I draw 
on and adapt Bruno Latour’s title Reassembling the Social (2007). In so 
doing I wish to draw attention to the agency of nonhumans in the 
assemblages with which we engaged—the building, tools, the city, 
fine art packagers, shop owners 
and others, and come to arrange-
ments where they would donate 
to us their surplus goods. And as 
we worked each day in the build-
ing, new people would look in to 
speak to us, interested in what was 
happening to a building they had 
passed for many years but had al-
ways been dilapidated and board-
ed up. We would meet people who 
had experienced New Cross in dif-
ferent ways—foragers who knew 
where all the fruit and nut trees in 
the area were, in private and pub-
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discarded items, bats, documents, theoretical concepts, among others 
actants all become important components in the collectives and com-
mons. And as will be discussed later, these nonhuman agencies are 
integral to commons and must be properly considered and accounted 
for. Such nonhumans played significant and transformative parts in 
the processes in which we engaged.4 However, in shifting from reas-
sembling to remaking, I wish to move away from Latour and ANT’s 
emphasis on description, shifting the focus instead to experimenta-
tion and intervention, that is a process of construction and engage-
ment with the unknown. Where ANT can at times appear to attempt 
to aim towards a fly-on-the-wall form of research, one where the re-
searcher seeks to become invisible and only describe what is already 
there, the form of research practice I am attempting to describe was 
far from neutral, rather it was implicated in the active co-production 
of situations and sites. There was a political commitment from the be-
ginning, one that means epistemologies of observation are perhaps 
less appropriate here than epistemologies of experimentation. That is 
rather than reassembling what is already present through the act of 
descriptive writing and observation, we collectively sought to make 
and effect situations, collectives and contexts through experimental 
interventions.
EXPERIMENTAL EThNOGRAPhIC INTERVENTION
This shift to remaking, that is to the construction of fieldsites 
as the site of ethnographic encounters, realigns the field as a domain 
of experimentation. This is not a term that I am introducing myself. 
Experimentation was a practice and notion that was drawn upon by 
various members of the collectives. The Field was described in many 
ways, but often in terms of experimentation. The project itself was 
described as ’an experiment in constructing a new institution of the 
commons.’ In several of the various documents that described which 
groups, individuals and projects could use the space, it was said that 
4  See Chapter 3: Communication
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it was available to those ‘experimenting with alternative political and 
economic organisation.’ There was also discussion of experimenting 
with ourselves, with our individuality, the way we ordered our lives, 
our personal relationships, our needs and desires. Self-organisation 
itself was seen in terms of experimentation, as an attempt to explore 
possibilities of collectivity. 
Several events organised at The Field structured themselves 
around practices of experimentation. One such event, the Fear and 
Anxiety Group, which soon became the Undoing Fear and Anxiety 
Group, emerged in such a manner. The initial meeting took place in 
the garden of The Field one evening in the summer of 2014. It was 
one of the longer days of the year, granting us those additional hours 
of half-light where the disappearance of the daytime is drawn out 
and extended and an atmosphere of hazy calm gradually settles until 
late. A time when the city appears to calm, as though drawing a long 
breath before night. Around twenty people met in the garden. There 
was no electrical supply in the building, which remained a building 
site scattered with the tools and materials that had been used during 
that day’s work of sanding back rafters, attaching floorboards and re-
pairing windows. The interior of the building was covered with a thick 
layer of sawdust which would stick in the corners of your eyes at the 
end of each day. So instead, we met in the garden which was, at that 
time, little more than a concrete yard. It was still a major improvement 
on its former state—at the very least it was clear. We pulled together a 
circle out of the mismatching chairs we had, and the benches we had 
built out of discarded timber and scaffold boards. Several people sat 
on logs. 
We had come together to read We’re All Very Anxious:  Six Theses 
on Anxiety and Why It is Effectively Preventing Militancy, and One Pos-
sible Strategy for Overcoming It (Plan C 2014). The text proposed spe-
cific relationships between precarity, capital and anxiety, concluding 
with the proposal that new forms of consciousness raising groups are 
needed to focus on precarity and the construction of anxiety inducing 
situations. The suggestion was not read as a prescription, but as an 
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invitation to engage in an open-ended process of exploration. We dis-
cussed the specificities of the text, the problems we found with it, and 
what we found exciting, and agreed to meet again to explore where 
we might go next. The process that unfolded was one of gradually set-
ting the boundaries to a collective, one in which participants discussed 
future directions as their possibilities emerged, leading to workshops 
on a range of topics that were uncovered as relating to anxiety. It was 
a process which engaged with an exploration of unknown possibili-
ties without seeking to entirely predetermine the context or results. 
Gradually boundaries were set, but interestingly as more boundaries 
became set the number attending dwindled—it is hard to say why, but 
after a couple of months, the process drew to a close. The experiment 
had not failed, but rather its openings and closures became folded into 
other open-ended, experimental practices.
Such a notion of the experiment engages in encounters with the 
unknown; that is, with the active construction of conditions the re-
sult of which are unknown. In Leviathan and the Air Pump Schaffer and 
Shapin (1985) explore the nature of experimentation through the case 
of Robert Boyle’s research in pneumatics and his air-pump experi-
ments. They demonstrate a displacement of certainty in emergence 
of the epistemology of the experiment as introduced in the history 
of English empiricism by Boyle and his followers, which proposed 
“all that could be expected of physical knowledge was “probability,” 
thus breaking down the radical distinction between “knowledge” and 
“opinion.”” (ibid: 24). The links between knowledge and the absolute, 
philosophy and the god-king, are displaced here, opening a ground of 
controversy and conflict between knowledges. But with The Field we 
are talking about a gathering of people, a building, a political project, 
rather than an air pump. To take the claim that The Field developed 
an experimental practice seriously, it may be of use to be reminded 
of Schaffer and Shapin’s proposal that “[s]olutions to the problem of 
knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order” (ibid: 332). 
The question of experimental knowledge is, then, inseparable from the 
organisation of the social, its remaking; the question of epistemology 
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inseparable to the question of politics. They are questions of forms of 
life, of possibilities for anthropos—Aristotle’s (1970) political animal. 
 The controversy between Hobbes and Boyle reveals not only 
the struggle to establish the hegemony of a certain mode of knowl-
edge production, but also the struggle for other political possibilities. 
When Hobbes rejects the experimental practices of Boyle, he also re-
jects the contingency that this brings with it, the opening of a domain 
of political and epistemological indeterminacy, the questioning of dis-
sidents and heretics. This contingency threatens the divine authority 
of the Leviathan (1985), the arbiter of social order, and so too knowl-
edge according to the natural order. But it is this very displacement, 
this severance of the divine hierarchy which is unified under the fig-
ure of the Leviathan, that opens the possibility of politics. It is this ne-
gotiated contingency, that takes place between a scientific community 
as it does through political debate and struggle, that is pointed to by 
Rancière when he writes, 
“[t]hat is effectively when politics commences: when 
the principle of government is separated from the law of 
kinship, all the while claiming to be representative of na-
ture; when it invokes a nature that cannot be confounded 
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with the simple relation to the father of the tribe or to the 
divine father.” 
(2006: 40). 
A certain mode of politics begins with the experiment, with the 
opening of a space of contestation and indeterminacy that resists reso-
lution by the divine father or Leviathan, with the acknowledgement of 
the very void that Hobbes could not admit.5 Boyle not only constructs 
the fact of the vacuum, but also gives form to the void integral to poli-
tics,6 a void emergent of experimental modalities which existed before 
his air pump, but nevertheless find a place in the ordering of discourse 
through it. Rather than a unification of the body politic, the experiment 
introduces the space of dissensus, a lack, an ongoing displacement of 
assurances and fixed identities, as the space in which divergent and 
contingent positions negotiate, bear witness to one another, construct 
their ontological conditions of existence. 
Such experimentation is a form of constructive intervention, one 
where there is no certainty regarding the effect of the conditions con-
structed. There may be varying elements of predictability, but not cer-
tainty. This lack of certainty is a void that is at once epistemological 
and political. And it is this very lack of certainty, the void created by 
the displacement of arbitrary authority, that contributed to the forma-
tion of the experimental community as an ethical community. It was 
in this historical community that publicists of the early Royal Society 
located a use of free discourse, of negotiation and debate, that did not 
lead to the fearful Hobbsiean war of all against all, but to a practice 
of consensus construction, a constructed consensus that rested upon 
5 This is not a historically chronological claim that such a mode of politics 
did not exist prior to Boyle. This would undoubtedly be an absurd claim. Rather, 
the controversy between Boyle and Hobbes is but one manifestation of a conflict 
between attempts to eternalise knowledge and authority, and what Rancière refers 
to as the commencing of politics, it is but one example of a point at which the 
absolute authority that denies the possibility of Rancièrian politics was undone and 
challenged. But a moment that is particularly relevant here as it was the experi-
ment that brought this challenge.
 6  This void that is integral to politics is one of the recurrent points made 
by Slavoj Žižek—see for example The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political 
Ontology (2008b).
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dissensus, a commencing of politics. The experimental community 
emerged as a polis that was not dependent on the rule of the master, 
but employed mechanisms of self-organisation, in that it internally es-
tablished rules and conventions to regulate the behaviours of its mem-
bers and its community boundary. 
This community was not a boundless one, open to all, but one 
constructed around a series of boundary conventions, one that al-
lowed for the formation of a common space around which this com-
munity could coalesce. There is a sense in which the scientific commu-
nity was not public, as observed by Hobbes (Schaffer & Shapin 1985), 
but rather established a common space—it was in theory open, but to 
those who took on, learnt and developed the values and value prac-
tices that formed the boundaries and regulated the behaviours of the 
community.
What this scientific community engaged with were practices of 
knowledge production, the construction of facts. Stengers describes 
the fact emergent of experimentation as “an artifact, a fact of art, a hu-
man intervention.” (2010: 50). For The Field, the domain of experimen-
tation was that of political organisation, the space in which difference 
is encountered7. Its technical apparatus was the building itself, and 
the possibilities of encounter that it facilitated. There was a coming 
together of interventionist political praxis, with modalities of experi-
mentation. In this way, the process of experimentation merged with a 
political praxis that sought to interrupt the regularity of everyday life 
and the expected, drawing on a tradition with echoes of the situation-
ist dérive, “a mode of experimental behaviour linked to the conditions 
of urban society” (Knabb 2006: 52). What the experimental practices of 
The Field produced were also modes of knowledge here embodied not 
only in the discursive practices of the collective, but also in the form of 
the building, the codes and structures that mediated interaction and 
contribution to the commons, and the identity of the collectives that 
coalesced around the building.
But as we have already noted, these experimental interventions 
 7  See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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took place in an environment quite different to those of Boyle’s air 
pump and the tradition of experimental science that followed. This 
domain of experimentation bears some similarities to that opened by 
ethnographic practice. As Roger Sansi writes, “the experimental field 
where anthropologists work is not a controlled site, isolated from the 
outside, like scientific labs used to be; but it is … the world of everyday 
life.” (2015: 138). The field of experimentation in which ethnographers 
and anthropologists engage is open-ended, subject to contingency. 
As has been regularly observed, ethnographers begin fieldwork not 
knowing what they will find. The experimental field of ethnography 
cannot be subject to the same level of control, the same disciplining 
of technical apparatuses, that is sought for in laboratory conditions. 
Nevertheless, there remain common threads in the opening to con-
tingency through which experimental science displaced certainty by 
probability (Schaffer & Shapin 1985), and in the creative construction 
of knowledges as facts of art, be they manifest in practices, materiali-
ties, concepts or collective formations. 
The notion of experimentation that has emerged is one marked 
by contingency and creation. But it is a contingency that is greater 
than the displacement of certainty by probability, and a creation that 
is looser than the ordering of a technical apparatus. There is a shift in 
the foregrounded aspect of the experiment to “the experimental as a 
social process.” (Corsín Jiménez 2014b: 382). We have perhaps arrived 
at an understanding of experimentation that, whilst sharing similari-
ties with that of Boyle, comes closer to an artistic mode. So, we can 
now turn to a different domain of experimentation, whilst reminding 
ourselves of Stengers’ (2010: 50) observation that the fact emergent of 
the experiment is a fact of art. 
Joseph Beuys, the German social sculptor, spoke of his practice 
as follows,
I know a lot before a start an action. I know a lot about 
the necessity of the general idea of sculpture, but I don’t 
know anything about the process in which the action will 
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run. When the actions runs, my preparation works, because 
I am prepared to do a thing without knowing where it goes. 
You see, it would be a very uninteresting thing – it would 
have nothing to do with art – if it were not a new experi-
ment for which I have no clear concept. If I had a clear con-
cept of solving the problem, I would then speak about the 
concept and it wouldn’t be necessary to make an action. 
Every action, every artwork for me, every physical scene, 
drawings on the blackboard, performance, brings a new el-
ement in the whole, an unknown area, an unknown world.
(Beuys quoted in Carin 1993: 73)
 For Beuys, it would not be art if it were not a new experiment. It 
would not be art if it did not partake in an exploration of the unknown, 
if it did not create something through engagement with the unknown. 
There are parallels here to both ethnography and The Field. The Field 
began knowing a lot—it followed from the long process of reflection 
initiated by the New Cross Commoners,8 but it did not know what 
would happen on attempting to put these ideas into practice through 
a building. The Commoners themselves wrote, before I had met many 
of them, 
“To occupy a building has advantages and disadvan-
tages that are difficult to weigh before taking action: on 
one side the intensity of the political engagement would 
increase and could attract more and different kinds of peo-
ple, on the other, occupying would require more energy, 
involving a more continuous commitment and most prob-
ably a very nomadic and precarious existence.” 
(2013: 6) 
 Likewise, as ethnographers we know a lot, or at least some 
things, about anthropology, but we do not know what we will find, 
 8  See Chapter 2: On What Commons?
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what we will write about. A component of this uncertainty is perhaps 
a result of the fact that what The Field, Beuys social sculptures, and 
ethnography seek out are encounters, and encounters always bring 
with them an unknown remainder, a void, a commencing of politics. 
Anna Tsing writes that 
“[u]npredictable encounters transform us; we are not 
in control, even of ourselves. Unable to rely on a stable 
structure of community, we are thrown into shifting assem-
blages, which remake us as well as our others.” 
(2015: 20). 
The ethnographic encounter, the encounter of the other in the 
common, the encounters of Beuys with visitors to the Bureau for Direct 
Democracy (Beuys & Schwarze 2006), are transformative of self and 
other, they engage in creative transformations emergent of experi-
mental interventions. 
My own practice as an anthropologist and ethnographer became 
folded into the experimental processes of The Field. My fieldsite it-
self was perhaps even one of the facts of art that emerged from it. To 
return to the example of the Fear and Anxiety group, I collaborated 
with one other group member to facilitate a session based on anxiety 
and the urban environment. We selected a series of texts exploring 
the urban environment, and particularly excerpts from Pathologies 
of Modern Space: Empty Space, Urban Anxiety, and the Recovery of the 
Public Self (Milun 2007). I had been reading this text already as part 
of my ongoing graduate studies, which at that time were yet to settle 
at The Field as a fieldsite. But the text was not the primary method of 
the session. We explicitly discussed ‘experimenting’ with walking as a 
method, with exploring “the city as a self-eliciting pedagogical form” 
(Corsín Jiménez & Estalella 2016: 16). We met in the middle of Ford-
ham park. The seasonal cycle had advanced quite significantly by this 
point and so it was dark when we met. Two of us stood in the middle 
of the park’s playing field at the agreed time and as we waited, gradu-
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ally around 10-15 other figures slowly joined us from the edges of the 
park. As each person joined we could see others progressing from the 
lit paths and margins of the park, to the dark centre where we stood. 
Once assembled we completed a brief grounding exercise in an 
effort to better attune our senses to the environmental shifts through 
which we would be passing. Asking everyone to attempt to remain as 
silent as possible whilst walking, and instead focus on the environ-
mental transformations, we set off. We walked from the park to the 
road running parallel to New Cross Road, passing through the edges 
of several housing estates on the way. The road that we walked along 
played host to the rears of the shops on New Cross Road. The sound 
of air conditioning units accompanied us as we walked, constituting 
a soundscape of varying yet constant mechanical singing set against 
the shifting roar of the traffic on the other side of the shops. Piles of 
boxes, stock cages and large bins lined the sides of the road. Eventu-
ally we joined the A2 before descending the hill into the car park of the 
commercial unit hosting Sainsbury’s, one of the empty spaces Milun 
considered as productive of agoraphobia (2007). Leaving the car park, 
we continued along quieter residential roads before arriving at the 
busy intersection where New Cross Road meets Old Kent Road and 
Queens Road, the pavements lined with multiple bus stops on either 
side. From here we returned to The Field to discuss the experience. I 
sat in the middle of the circle, on the floor, with a large piece of paper 
and a series of pens, attempting to produce some kind of mind map on 
the basis of the discussion underway.
Through this process a modality of collective experimentation 
can be seen to be interacting with my own emerging research practice. 
To paraphrase James Oliver and Marine Badham in their contribution 
to the notion of ethnographic conceptualism (2013: 157) , there was no 
commons to be studied; but the practice was the common(ing).9 My 
own research interests, practices and knowledges, were inescapably 
entangled with those of The Field—the emergence of The Field and of 
the field(site) were inseparable. I simultaneously engaged in the con-
9 The quote I am paraphrasing here is “there is no object by the practice; the 
practice is the object(ive) (Oliver & Badham 2013: 157)
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struction of a fieldsite, and the literal bricks and mortar construction 
of The Field. This component of my research methodology finds paral-
lels with Ssorin-Chaikov’s fourth thesis for ethnographic conceptual-
ism, namely that the research practice “constructs the reality that it 
studies, […] this means it actually fabricates the unknown” (2013: 16). 
This proposal for ethnographic conceptualism develops something 
that anthropologists have known now for a long time—that we active-
ly create and transform the groups that we study (Clifford & Marcus 
2008; Wagner 1975). But it seeks to move beyond an acknowledgement 
that anthropologists depict groups, and in their depictions, transform 
them, and instead make this creative intervention, this experimental 
practice, a positive methodology available to ethnographers. In so 
doing, it extends an acknowledgement of the transformative and in-
ventive character of the ethnographic encounter, to the point where it 
becomes “a self-conscious device” (Murawski 2013: 66) that partakes 
in the construction of the situations, groups and collectives that also 
become the focus of study. 
The infrastructure of my fieldwork methodology was nested in 
the emergent infrastructure of The Field—both sought towards the 
construction of encounters that could be productive of knowledges 
and facts of art. There was a dimension of The Field that served as 
a prototype of my fieldwork, and components of my research prac-
tice that functioned as prototypes for The Field. There were attempts 
at multifaceted constitutions of “a culture of mutual learning” (Cor-
sín Jiménez & Estalella 2016: 5), which would take social processes 
themselves as their domain of discovery. Through this dual process in 
which The Field (partly) infra-structured my research and my own re-
search (partly) infra-structured The Field, there operated openings by 
which both The Field and fieldsite were transformed and enabled by 
one another. Infrastructure here takes on the characteristics of a verb, 
to infrastructure, thus highlighting the creative and processual nature 
of the interactions which became enabling of the production of facts 
of art. The Field emerged through this  reversible infrastructuring less 
“as the object of […] ethnography but as its enabling infrastructure” 
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(ibid: 15); it emerged not as an object of enquiry, but both ethnogra-
phy and The Field functioned as enabling infrastructures productive 
of facts of art, some of which emerge as anthropological knowledge, 
and others as different forms of knowledge expressed in modalities 
other than discourse and text such as practices, objects, political or-
ganisations, zones of encounter. 
These ethnographic modes such as ethnographic conceptualism 
(Ssorin-Chaikov 2013), ethnography as prototyping (Corsín Jiménez 
& Estalella 2016), and experimental collaboration (Estalella & Sánchez 
Criado 2018)—alongside other collaborative anthropologies and eth-
nographic practices—open the way to forms of constructivist anthro-
pological practice that are not only constructivist in the epistemologi-
cal sense, but also in ontological ones. They open forms of research 
practice where “[t]he experimental becomes a distinctive articulation 
of the empirical work of anthropologists shaping their relationships in 
the field collaboratively.” (ibid: 12). Such methods aim towards partic-
ipation in the construction of the social realities in which they partici-
pate, be they experiments, prototypes, practices, collectives, situations, 
projects, or any number of other devices. It is not only disciplinary 
knowledge that is constructed alongside action in such processes, but 
also contexts for action and further constructive situations, and the 
knowledges that are constructed continue to participate in these ac-
tions and situations as well as encounters yet to come. It is not outside 
the realities it studies but participates in their composition. As Ssorin-
Chaikov puts it, “In contrast to ethnography as participant observa-
tion of what exists, ethnographic conceptualism explicitly constructs 
the reality that it studies.” (2013: 8). We no longer strain to read over 
the shoulder of the person to whom culture belongs (Geertz 1973: 452), 
but interpret, discuss and re-compose our common worlds in conver-
sation with them, we write, re-write, typeset and bind the text which 
we read together and then cut it up and dissemble it to initiate the ex-
perimental process again. Perhaps then, such constructivist anthropol-
ogy, constructivist in this ontological sense, is also a mode of praxis. 
But here it is a mode of praxis liberated from the human-centric grand 
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narratives of Marxism and friend/enemy models of politics,10 a praxis 
that is the active participation of anthropology and ethnography in the 
composition of common worlds. It is an insurgent constructivism, but 
one that attempts to retains the modesty of the cosmopolitical figure of 
the idiot (Stengers 2005). It stays with the question, with the common 
exploration of the incomplete and possible, the uncertain, contingent 
and unknown.
COMMONING ANThROPOLOGICALLY: 
EThNOGRAPhY, ThE OThER AND ThE COMMON
To conclude this chapter, I would like to state more clearly some 
of the points of convergence between anthropology and commoning 
that emerged through my engagement with The Field. In doing so, I 
am aiming towards outlining this methodological approach as a prac-
tice of commoning anthropologically. This conjunction of terms seeks to 
draw out the entanglement of the two nested forms of practice that 
cut across both ethnographic engagements, and the processes of com-
moning, as they characterised my research practice.
 To begin this elaboration of the practice of commoning anthro-
pologically, I would like to propose a recuperation of the much prob-
lematised notion that anthropology is the study of the other, or as 
Marc Augé puts it “anthropological research deals in the present with 
the question of the other” (Augé 2008:15). The constitution of the other 
by anthropological discourse has rightly been the subject of much cri-
tique (e.g. Minh-Ha 1989; Said 1994; Fabian 2002). But here, I would 
like to work with an altered conception of the other. I would like to 
consider that to say that the anthropologist examines the other is sim-
ply to say the experience of the anthropologist with others is the area 
of anthropological inquiry, it is the space of ethnographic encounter, 
the space through which we enter into communication with others to 
produce knowledge. This is an important amendment, for the other 
10   See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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in such a characterisation is not a distant other, marked by an insur-
mountable alterity, or inhabiting a different temporal landscape, or 
the bearer of an entirely unfamiliar culture, or the shadow of the same, 
but more modestly, the other to which we address ourselves when we 
speak and by whom we are in turn addressed, the other which acts 
upon us and upon which we act, the other which we encounter. The 
other then is the experience of emergent difference through encounter. 
It is an event. This is a conception of the other that appears as closer to 
the psycho-analytic other, whom through the desire of the self is me-
diated (Lacan 2006), or the existential other with which we come face 
to face (Levinas 2011) and in so doing find ourselves through commu-
nication. It is the other that is not the self but is nevertheless inextrica-
bly implicated in the formation of self.
To say that anthropos, the opening domain of anthropological 
enquiry, is a political animal (Aristotle 1970), is to say that it is always 
found entangled with others. It is to say that human-being is entan-
gled and knotty. That being human is to be subject to infinitizing cas-
cades of contingent relations with others. But even if anthropos is the 
opening domain of anthropological enquiry, this very opening, and 
the entanglement that it brings with it, means that anthropology does 
not stop at anthropos, but brings into it all kinds of other beings—
objects, materials, ideas, animals, plants, chemicals, bacteria etc. For 
whilst we may not strictly always speak with them, we nevertheless 
encounter these others. These other beings are also included in the 
space of otherness, a space that due to the fleetingness of its horizon, 
resists closure. This expansive otherness, or ‘difference-writ-large’, 
will be returned to later,11 but for now it will suffice to state that an-
thropos is a being that is entangled with others.
This entanglement with difference is not only the domain of an-
thropological enquiry, but also that of commoning. In the broadest 
sense, the commons concern experimental explorations of “the shared 
substance of our social being” (Žižek 2009), or put differently, it is 
the knotty space of entanglement with others, the space in which our 
11   See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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desires, thoughts, and actions are enfolded with others. In Latour’s 
words, “there is another name for overlap, another name for fold, an-
other name for enfolding, and that is Commons.” (2006: 13-4 emphasis 
original). The exploration of the commons is the exploration of how it 
is possible to organise anthropos as a political animal, it is an explo-
ration of what possible common worlds we might forge together, of 
how we might live together with others, what facts of art we might 
produce.
Such a conception of commoning resonates with a certain way 
of engaging with anthropology. This conception of anthropology is 
not an entirely new one, but one that has been expressed in numer-
ous ways throughout the course of the discipline. We might turn to 
the question posed by M. F. Ashley Montagu to Melville J. Herskovits 
where he asks, “[s]hould anthropologists contribute their special skills 
and knowledge to the betterment of the world in which they live, by 
actively participating in the process of building a new world?” (1946: 
666). The implicit response to this question appears as ‘yes’, but here 
we may want to add a minor but nevertheless important amendment, 
that we replace the injunctive ‘should’, with a softer ‘can’, so as not to 
disqualify other ways of conceiving of practicing anthropology. But 
the point remains, that anthropology as an exploration of anthropos 
can participate in the collaborative constitution of common worlds, of 
contributing to exploring ways of relating to the other. A more con-
temporary formulation of a comparable sentiment can be found ex-
pressed by Tim Ingold, who writes, “[a]nthropology is studying with 
and learning from; it is carried forward in a process of life, and effects trans-
formations within that process.” (2013: 3 emphasis original). Anthropol-
ogy here is a collective learning process where we learn and act with 
others to bring about transformations, it is a form of praxis, an engaged 
theory which participates in the construction of common worlds.
One further example of a such a sentiment can be found in the 
opening lines of David Graeber’s Possibilities, where he outlines his 
initial attraction to anthropology.
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 “I was drawn to the discipline because it opens win-
dows on other possible forms of human social existence; 
because it served as a constant reminder that most of what 
we assume to be immutable has been, in other times and 
places, arranged quite differently, and therefore, that hu-
man possibilities are in almost every way greater than we 
ordinarily imagine.” 
(2007: 1)
Here is found an expression of anthropology as an exploration 
of other times and places in which we find common worlds that are 
organised otherwise. Graeber points to the fact that anthropology can 
draw our attention to the full spectrum of possibilities for anthropos, 
that it shows us that what is presented to us as natural and eternal, is 
in fact historically constituted and contingent; that groups have organ-
ised themselves differently in the past and elsewhere. This realisation 
is an expression of what Rancière referred to as the commencing of 
politics, the realisation that political systems and structures are not 
eternal and unchanging sets of natural laws, but contingently fabri-
cated arrangements through which the collective life of anthropos be-
comes organised. 
The moment of the ethnographic encounter is the moment of at-
tempting to participate in these arrangements in such a way as to bet-
ter understand them. It is a communicative encounter in which we 
come face to face with others in an effort to engage in the common 
worlds in which we and they are enmeshed, and in doing so we come 
to participate in their fabrication and recomposition. It is the moment 
of finding a way to accept the invitation of “the Other as the expression 
of a possible world” (Deleuze 2011: 324 emphasis original), and so too an 
invitation to partake in the construction of possible common worlds. 
Above, when Graeber points to the dimension of anthropology that 
reminds us that anthropos is organised differently in different times 
and places, the future is not explicitly stated as one such other time 
and places. Nevertheless, as he continues, the aim of the essays collect-
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ed in the text which these words open is to “keep possibilities open” 
(2007: 1). Keeping possibility open is a matter of attending to the fu-
ture. Whether the anthropologist is seeking to understand a culture 
that pre-exists they’re engagement with it, or whether they are partak-
ing in the construction of the reality that they study, there remains a 
futural element—there is a fact of art that they are aiming towards, 
and this fact of art is manifest in the ethnography. The ethnography is 
a fact of art emergent of encounters with others. 
In returning to the proposal that both commoning and anthro-
pology concern the question of the other, that is that they refer to the 
shared substance of our collective being and its possibilities, the no-
tion of commoning anthropologically may begin to become clearer. 
Both anthropology and commoning concern relations to others and 
the manner in which these relationships to others are and can be or-
ganised. There is a sense then in which anthropology already deals 
with the question of the commons, the shared space of otherness in 
which the self is immersed. And conversely, there is a sense in which 
commoning already concerns anthropos, that is the manner in which 
the polis is organised, the manner in which life becomes structured, 
the possibilities for human collectivity. It is here, in this overlap, that 
the dimension and practice of commoning anthropologically emerges, 
as a mode of research which enquires into the possibilities for the con-
struction of common worlds, one that participates in the construction 
of these common worlds. A mode of inquiry in which method, theory 
and object of study converge—I practiced commoning to learn about 
commoning and to participate in the construction of common worlds. 
There is a recursive feedback loop where practice informs theory, and 
each informs and guides composition, a loop in which each of these 
communicative relations are reversible and intersectional.
But it is not a matter of a total collapse of the two domains and 
practices of commoning and anthropology, a collapse where the two 
domains converge to such an extent as to become indistinguishable. 
Rather, I consider this relationship between commoning and anthro-
pology to be better conceived of in terms of a situated, awkward relation-
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ship. The awkwardness of this relationship I take from Marylin Strath-
ern (1987), the situatedness from Donna Haraway (1998). Below each 
component is examined in turn.
Strathern writes of an awkward relationship between feminism 
and anthropology, a relationship where at times the two discourses 
learn from one another and collaborate, and at others they enter into 
productive tensions and conflicts. At times they are in agreement, at 
others they offer challenges to one another. At times the two converge, 
at others they come apart, sometimes speaking together and some-
times becoming highly critical, even mocking of one another, but they 
remain in an awkward tension that is productive and beneficial to the 
development of both. This awkwardness was found also in my role 
as ethnographer at The Field. There were times when other members 
of the collective would be highly suspicious of me, and of academia 
more generally, particularly in relation to matters concerning the en-
closure of the university through privatisation, but also through the 
use of theoretical terms, languages and modes of thought that ap-
peared somehow separated and abstracted from the messy domain of 
lived experience. 
These tensions unfolded in the first meeting at which I proposed 
to conduct my doctoral research at The Field. The meeting was itself at 
times awkward and uncomfortable, and at others took a more collabo-
rative tone. One person at the meeting spoke up, saying—‘from what I 
read I see this figure of the intellectual as this kind of privileged figure 
that somehow has the skills to kind of provide this theoretical analysis 
but if I think about the reality of the field I would say, we are all able 
to do that’. Another responded—‘I don’t think we have to worry too 
much about Toby taking an intellectual’s position above because I feel 
like we just wouldn’t let him.’ And someone further interjected with—
‘say Toby was able to get the money to do this research it also means 
he wouldn’t have to work and he’d be here a lot and that’s really im-
portant as well.’ An awkward shifting of positions emerges here. Peo-
ple are worried about the imposition of theory by a privileged figure, 
but equally others do not think that I would be able to enter the space 
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‘above’ as they quite simply would not let me. Subsequently a more 
pragmatic matter arises—if I was funded to conduct research at The 
Field, I would be there more, and thus be able to contribute more to 
the life of the project, to the composition of the commons and the care 
that it requires. No simple resolution, rather an awkward set of rela-
tionships—some co-operative, others antagonistic. 
Now for the situatedness. As mentioned, I take this compo-
nent from Donna Haraway who writes about how there is a need for 
knowledge to become aware of its conditions of production. The sepa-
ration of knowledge from its conditions of production, as is often the 
case in natural sciences, does not grant it additional objectivity, but 
rather conceals a central component of its construction and in so do-
ing conceals certain ideological assumptions, positionings and pow-
er relationships that may be at work within the production of that 
knowledge. To overcome this, Haraway proposes that knowledge 
producers clearly situate themselves, and do not attempt to separate 
the knowledge they produce from the process of production, thus in-
cluding their positionality, situatedness and all the perspectival limi-
tations this implies within the knowledge itself. So here knowledge 
does not function as an objective entity awaiting discovery, but as a 
constructed process that retains the possibility of being reconstructed 
or deconstructed, a fact of art. For The Field, and the practice of com-
moning anthropologically I am here elucidating, this manifests in an 
ongoing engagement with a specific set of political and ethical ideas 
that do not conceal themselves and remain a central component of the 
knowledge produced. 
Finally, this awkward, situated knowledge is not limited to the 
written text, that is to this thesis or to any of the other texts that may 
emerge from the process of knowledge production, but exists in The 
Field itself—in the relations with others that were formed through it, 
in the building that was renovated through the process, in the organi-
sational forms and practices that exist as a result of the project. Each of 
these, I propose, also constitute objects of knowledge and facts of art. 
They are simply expressed in a different mode to the text. The build-
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ing itself holds knowledge in its material form, in the transformations 
of its body; the social relationships are forms of knowledge concerning 
the practices of relating to others; the organisational forms are facts of 
art in that they are constructed structures of facilitation. In short, I am 
outlining a conception of knowledge that is broader than the textual 
and discursive, a conception of knowledge in which concepts and facts 
are not only manifest through discourse but also through bodies, re-
lationships, structures and materialities. In this conception of knowl-
edge there is no privileging of the textual or discursive, no appeal to a 
superior domain of thought, ideas and intellect. In short, the text is but 
one result of the creative processes in which I became entangled, and 
by no means the most important. In this way, my participation and 
contribution to the composition of the common worlds that unfolded, 
and continue to unfold in my absence, is not only a matter of the dis-
semination of discursive knowledge, but an embodied result of my en-
gagements. The effects of anthropological engagement are not here a 
matter to be considered only through the text and its dissemination to 
publics, a matter to be considered following writing up, but are more 
significantly the facts of art that emerged from the work of fieldwork, 
facts of art that were produced with others and continue to exist and 
be transformed through the work of others. 
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ChAPTER 2
ON WhAT 
COMMONS?
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“That, said Coppi, was when they gained their advan-
tage over us, which keeps confronting us with the fact that 
everything we produce is utilized way over our heads and 
that it trickles down to us, if at all attainable, from up there, 
just as work is said to be given to us. If we want to take 
on art, literature, we have to treat them against the grain, 
that is, we have to eliminate all the concomitant privileges 
and project our own demands into them. In order to come 
to ourselves, said Heilmann, we have to recreate not only 
culture but also all science and scholarship by relating them 
to our concerns. We have stated common knowledge about 
the shape of our planet and its position in the universe, 
but for us there is something odd about this simple lore… 
Whenever the image of the world as established by ancient 
scientists is taken over in its full scope, it always expresses 
the tie to the existing rules of social conditions. Only by 
realizing that we are on a rotating sphere and by forgetting 
all the connected things that are taken for granted can we 
grasp the horrors that mold our thinking.” 
(Weiss 2005: 33-4)*1 
“We wanted to find out for ourselves what spoke to 
us and what was worn out, what was in the service of the 
demagogues and what might help us in our efforts to track 
these things down.”
(Weiss 2005: 64)*
1 Throughout this chapter, texts which I know were read directly by The 
Field or the New Cross Commoners are marked with an asterisk*; texts which I 
have come to by following, or are included in references of those texts, or were 
engaged with indirectly (i.e. did not form part of a specific reading group) are 
marked with a caret^; texts which I have introduced myself, and which as far as 
I know, were not explicitly engaged with by the collectives are marked with a 
dagger†. It is the first set of texts, those marked with an asterisk* which form the 
foundation of this chapter. The only references which remain unmarked are those 
which are direct references to the words or texts of the collectives, or members of 
the collectives, themselves.
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These lines from Peter Weiss’s The Aesthetics of Resistance (2005),* 
a novel which was read collectively by members of The Field and 
the New Cross Commoners, resonate clearly with the forms of study 
(Harney & Moten 2013)* that these collectives enacted. Through these 
forms of study, there was an attempt to develop a practice of self-or-
ganised learning through which theories, thoughts, texts and practices 
could be related to the specificities of daily life in New Cross, and to 
processes of commoning, and through which a specific series of no-
tions concerning the commons and politics began to emerge. Such 
study, as a “a mode of thinking with others separate from the think-
ing that the institution requires of you” (ibid: 11)* unfolded through 
the practices of The Field and the Commoners, a study that sought to 
collectively ‘find out for ourselves what spoke to us’, to continually 
constitute this ‘us’ through these processes, to recreate thought and 
collectivity by ‘relating them to our own concerns’, and to facilitate a 
collectivity that remained shifting, open and contingent, a collectivity 
that attempted to remain in recomposition. As the website of the New 
Cross Commoners says to this day,
New Cross Commoners is permanently under con-
struction! It will change all the time: “we” don’t want to 
fix it before this “we” begins to recompose itself, before the 
“commoners” will gather and exchange ideas, experiences, 
desires, and before they’ll learn how to do that… Still, there 
is somewhere and something to start with here: New Cross 
(the geographical boundaries of this area should remain 
open rather than regulated by postcodes) and commoning 
(a process of coming together and doing things together 
that differs from the private and the public/State controlled 
ways of doing things).
(New Cross Commoners 2017)
 
Before The Field, there was the New Cross Commoners (NXC). 
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The Commoners opened a process of inquiry into the possibility of 
applying ideas and concepts around the commons to daily life in 
New Cross, this process began well before I became involved with 
The Field. As such, what I draw upon in this chapter is pieced togeth-
er from discussions and conversations with those who had been in-
volved in the process for longer, the New Cross Commoners’ blog and 
publication (2013), and through reading the texts with which the com-
moners initially engaged. The aim of this chapter is to offer a partial 
literature review of the commons but done from the basis of the read-
ings, discussions, ideas and practices of the NXC. As such, the chapter 
attempts to trace the formation of particular notions of the commons 
developed by the NXC. It is a form of situated knowledge (Haraway 
1998)† which speaks from a specific position and partial perspective. 
There are both losses and gains from adopting this method. A textual 
limit is imposed, one that is given to me by the collectives with which 
I participated. In following this textual limit, there is the potential to 
reproduce the omissions and silences of the discussion and processes 
that led to the notions of commoning explored below. But something 
is also gained—what is found is a specific and situated conception of 
commoning, one that is emergent of a specific process of study.
To some extent, this approach constitutes an ethnography of 
discursive formations that emerged from a process of self-organised 
learning, discursive formations which were, and continue to be, inex-
tricably associated to praxis.  This occurs through the lens of my own 
position and perspective and does not claim to speak on behalf of the 
Commoners, which due to the open nature of the collectivity practiced 
would already be an impossible task, but rather offers my necessar-
ily partial understanding of how the commons and commoning was 
understood through the Commoners, and in turn The Field. It is a text 
which seeks to demonstrate what I learnt from engagement with the 
NXC, how the members of that collective and their activity enriched 
and directed my own understanding of the commons. In short it is 
about what becoming part of those collectives taught me.
As seen in the proceeding chapter, the discursive practices of the 
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Commoners were inextricably focused around praxis. The discursive 
processes were placed in direct relation to practice, to everyday life, 
with all its messiness. This praxis of commoning outran the concepts 
of the commons, that is the embodied practices of commoning extend-
ed and continually overtook the theoretical notions of the commons. 
Marylin Strathern draws our attention to a similar characteristic 
of anthropological writing, in that “the capacity for conceptualisation, 
one might say, outruns the concepts it produces” (1991: xv)†. Here too, 
the processes and practices, that is capacities as dimensions of possi-
bility and potential, outrun the concepts that were produced and dis-
cussed, and so too does it out run the process of writing that unfolds 
now, a process that cannot help but, to some extent, make static and 
fixed that which was processual and shifting. There is a remainder 
that cannot be reduced. As Strathern continues, 
While we might think that ideas and concepts grow 
from one another, each idea can also seem a complete uni-
verse with its own dimensions, as corrugated and involute 
as the last.
This may be rephrased as a matter of overlapping di-
mensions.”
(1991: xvi)†
To follow up this rephrasing of the singularity of each concep-
tualisation and capacity as a matter of overlapping dimensions may 
lead us to the possibility of presenting this chapter as a matter of over-
lap, a discursive practice overlapping with further discursive practic-
es which are themselves overlapping with other embodied modes of 
praxis. This text overlaps with other texts, and with the practices and 
processes from which it emerges and with which it is entangled. It 
becomes a matter of bringing together, through overlap, heterogene-
ous and differentiated notions, ideas and practices in ways that resist 
simplification, and the connections between which are always partial. 
It becomes a matter of constituting a commons comprised of multiple 
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voices and modes of practice, for as we saw in the preceding chapter 
through Latour, “there is another name for overlap, another name for 
fold, another name for enfolding, and that is Commons.” (2016 empha-
sis original)†. Here then, this chapter functions as an attempt at enact-
ing an unstable discursive practice, one which touches upon the over-
lap of different notions of the commons and commoning, and which 
enfolds itself into that process of conceptualisation and praxis, that 
does not place itself outside of, or above, the processes in which it is 
entangled, that does not become transcendent to the practices with 
which it emerges, but remains immanent to them (Stengers 2010)†. It 
is a mode of commoning as a practice of correspondence, of “an im-
aginative stretch by which I attempt to cast my experience forward in 
ways that can join with yours” (Ingold 2017: 15)†. The notions of the 
commons and commoning it presents is itself a form of commons, it is 
comprised of overlap and differentiation and does not seek resolution 
into one coherent conceptual totality.  
To return to The Commoners, the process began, in part, from 
series of frustrations. As Paolo Plotegher states in a public lecture as 
part of a series on self-organisation organised by Goldsmiths Visual 
Cultures department,
“[w]e started the NXC out of a frustration, a frustra-
tion we had as students with the insularity of Goldsmiths 
and our disconnection with the life of New Cross… We 
wanted to break the enclosure separating the life of the 
campus from that of the neighbourhood, and we suspected 
that there was a lot we could learn from the neighbourhood 
as well, especially from how people in New Cross organise 
themselves bottom up.”
 (2016: 1)
The NXC began as an attempt to move outwards from the uni-
versity and explore the neighbourhood surrounding it, to extend 
some of the processes occurring at Goldsmiths into the surrounding 
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area, to start to undo some of its enclosures. To ask: what can happen 
when theory extends beyond the academy and into our daily lives? 
This frustration was inextricably linked to another frustration regard-
ing enclosure. As Paolo continues, 
“There was another type of enclosure that Goldsmiths 
produces and that frustrated us, an enclosure that has to 
do with theory and its separation from practice, under-
stood as a practice of everyday life. We were aware of the 
amazing transformational potential of some of the theory 
we learned at Goldsmiths, but we also saw the danger of 
getting trapped into some kind of academic self-referential 
production of knowledge: what is the impact some of these 
amazing books we read can have, not on the writing of our 
essays and dissertations, but on how we organise our life, 
even in its most banal aspects? What can happen if we try 
to apply theory directly onto our lives? To rethink our lives 
with theory?”
(ibid: 2)*
 There is a complex recognition occurring here in relation to the 
university. On the one hand, the university as an increasingly priva-
tised space, is in the language of commoning an increasingly enclosed 
space and is caught in self-referential processes of knowledge produc-
tion. On the other, there is a recognition of the transformational power 
of theory and some of the knowledge that emerges from universities. 
It is not a simple matter of enclosure in the university opposed to com-
moning outside of it, but of relations between outsides of different 
kinds, between processes of becoming-outside, that is a creation of 
condition in which enclosure can open up into commons. This becom-
ing-outside will be returned to below, but for now it will be more use-
ful to see how this emerged as a practice.
The first text read collectively by the Commoners was an inter-
view with Massimo de Angelis and Stavros Stavrides conducted by An 
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Architektur (2010)*. The text was read out loud, in small groups and 
gradually. Each sentence was framed not only in terms of its theoreti-
cal content, but also, and more significantly, in its relation to everyday 
life in New Cross. In this way, a relatively short and conversationally 
formed text took five sessions of two hours to finish. Each statement, 
each idea, was examined collectively and brought into the context of 
the daily lives of the readers. 
 The interview situates, from the very beginning, the commons 
as the site of a struggle for a society beyond the limits of capital accu-
mulation. De Angelis begins by describing the commons as “a means 
of establishing a new political discourse that builds on and helps to ar-
ticulate the many existing, often minor struggles, and recognizes their 
power to overcome capitalist society.” (An Architektur 2010: 1)*. At 
the same time, it is acknowledged that the contemporary form of capi-
talism that is seen to be emerging locates the commons as the basis of 
growth. Such an acknowledgment situates the commons as sites that 
are potentially subject to enclosure, that is integration to the market. 
This harks back to Marx’s discussion of primitive accumulation and 
the enclosure of English common land in Part 8 of Capital (1986: 873-
940)^. In this way the commons are situated as sites of struggle.
 De Angelis goes against what he sees as the dominant Marxist 
tradition, which situates enclosure and primitive accumulation as a 
predicate to capitalism within a linear mode of development framed 
in terms of historical necessity, as a series of events that allow capital-
ism to emerge through the commodification and marketisation of that 
which was previously beyond capital’s reach (2007: 134)*. Rather than 
situating enclosure as an event that occurs on a scale of linear progres-
sion, an event that is necessary to ‘kick start’ capital accumulation, De 
Angelis proposes that enclosures be considered as
 “a value practice that clashes with others. It is ei-
ther capital that makes the world through commodification 
and enclosures, or it is the rest of us — whoever is that ‘us’ 
— that makes the world through counter-enclosures and 
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commons.” 
(ibid: 135)*
 In this way, De Angelis situates the commons as sites of ongo-
ing struggle against the expansion of capital. They are not simply a 
prehistory to capitalism, but an ongoing site of encounter and strug-
gle between the value programme of capital and other value practices. 
Commons are then not to be understood as common pool resources 
(Ostrom 1990)^, for De Angelis “this resource-based definition of the 
commons is … too limited, it does not go far enough. We need to open 
it up and bring in social relations in the definition of the commons.” 
(An Architektur 2010: 2)*. Interrelation becomes central to the com-
mons, constituting them less as a form of economic classification, and 
more as a modality of relation. 
This initial reading took place in the New Cross Library, now 
New Cross Learning, on New Cross Road. The location of this read-
ing was not incidental but was linked intrinsically to the process of 
inquiry underway. It was a site that brought the theoretical notions 
of commons and enclosure into the domain of life, into practices that 
people were engaged in in New Cross. It constituted a movement 
outside of Goldsmiths and into the surrounding area. The reading 
grounded itself in a site of struggle, a site of commoning that sought to 
enact value practices other than those of capital. The library had been 
scheduled for closure as part of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government’s austerity programme. As such, it constituted 
a movement of enclosure whereby a publicly owned and publicly ac-
cessible space was due to become privatised—in this instance it was 
due to become a pound shop.  As Lilly explains,
“I think that it was in the process of being sold to this 
pound shop company and they had this huge protest, like 
a sit in protest, and then the council finally agreed to let it 
be run as a trial run for two weeks, or maybe a month, by 
the people who were organising the protest and organising 
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it to be run by volunteers. But then it was successful, and 
now being just run by volunteers its actually more success-
ful than it was being run by the council. So it’s more suc-
cessful, and then it has more visitors attending groups and 
session and just more people coming in to the library and 
using it than it did before because people organised more 
space, more groups.”
Such a process constitutes a localised manifestation of what De 
Angelis referred to in terms of a clash of value practices. It was a site 
of struggle where a self-organised common emerged rather than a 
transfer from the public sphere of state control, to the private sphere 
of the market. Conducting the reading in this space sought to enact 
a process of exploring the local area, as well as bringing the theory 
of the commons out of the university and into the everyday life of 
the surrounding area. A practice of commoning was introduced to a 
site already engaged in the commoning of knowledge. Engaging in a 
process of self-organised learning in a site that itself was involved in a 
struggle to provide common access to learning enacted an attempt to 
bring together theory and practice, to not only discuss the possibility 
of commoning, but to enact it through the discussion itself. 
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The situatedness of this process brings us to another salient fea-
ture of the commons as conceptualised by NXC and the authors with 
which they engaged—namely that all commons are localised and spe-
cific. This illustrates the principle that there can be no commons with-
out community (Federici & Caffentzis 2014: i102; Mies 2014)*. Such a 
conceptualisation of the commons denies the possibility of the ‘global 
commons’ (Buck 1998; Goldman 1998; Vogler 2000)†. As Federici and 
Caffentzis write, “we cannot speak of ‘global commons’, as these pre-
sume the existence of a global collectivity which today does not exists 
and perhaps will never exist as we do not think it is it is possible or 
desirable.” (2014: i102)*. Each common requires a specific community 
which coalesces around common ground, such as that of New Cross 
Library which brought together a community in order to prevent a 
market enclosure of a publicly available service or the site of the Com-
moners next excursion, Sanford Housing Co-op and Deptford Creek 
houseboat community. 
For these visits the Commoners engaged with Stuart Hodkin-
son’s text The Return of the Housing Question (2012)*. The text draws 
on the work of Massimo De Angelis, as well as Peter Linebaugh and 
others, to consider the question of housing in relation to commoning 
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and the commons. In this way, the immediate question of “needs and 
desires” (De Angelis 2007; 2017)* and the reproduction of everyday 
life (ibid; Federici 2012a; 2012b; 2014)* was reintroduced through the 
discussion of one of the foundational cultural needs of functionalist 
thought, shelter and dwelling (Malinowski 1947: 124)†. The text does 
this through firmly “placing the housing question within this wider 
framework of capitalist enclosure and anticapitalist commoning”, of-
fering “three ethical coordinates” under the headings of “prefigura-
tive commoning: living-in-common”; “strategic commoning: housing-
as-commons”; and “Hegemonic commoning: circulating the housing 
commons” (Hodkinson 2012: 438-9)*. Once again, these coordinates 
situated the commons and commoning as a process of struggle against 
capital. In this way it spoke once more to the theme of commoning 
as a process of a becoming-outside of capital (De Angelis 2007: 30-
31)*, that is a process of struggle that constitutes an outside of the 
value systems, practices and programmes of capital in the process of 
struggle itself. Such a conceptualisation challenges the more totalising 
framework of Hardt and Negri in Empire (2003)^, Multitude (2005)^ 
and Commonwealth (2009)^ where postmodern capital is presented as 
having no exterior thus situating the possibility of struggle as part of a 
biopolitical mass “that has no “outside”” (ibid: vii)^. 
The first of the three ethical coordinates concerns a prefigurative 
modality of politics and directly refers to Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of 
Being-in-Common (1991: 1-12)^. This is a modality of politics through 
which “life despite capitalism” (Hodkinson 2012: 438 emphasis origi-
nal)* is enacted, through which commoners “act as if they are already 
free” (Graeber 2009: 433)†. It establishes an ontology that asserts an 
inalienable “categorical imperative not to let go of sense in common” 
(Nancy 1991: 12 emphasis original)^, for which the question is that of 
“the community of being, and not the being of community” (ibid: 1). 
Such a proposal develops a ontologically primordial notion of com-
monality, one which designates the commons as “the shared sub-
stance of our social being” (Žižek 2009: 212)†, something in which we 
are always already included through the very fact of being. Through 
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such a modality the commons is enacted despite its attempted enclo-
sure, which attempts to respond to needs and desires, such as those 
for housing, here and now through the networks and resources im-
mediately available, within in the world as it exists prior to any rev-
olutionary moment. In the context of daily life in New Cross, such 
practices were seen to be enacted at Stanford Housing Co-op and the 
Deptford Houseboat communities, which to some extent, created au-
tonomous communal living situations within the individualising and 
disciplinary structures of capital.
The second coordinate introduces the strategic dimension, and 
thus shifts from a prefigurative and immanent modality of relating 
to the future, where the future could be enacted in the present, to one 
which takes a more teleological route. Such a strategic dimension is 
recognised as vital as “living-in-common is not enough because en-
closure is always imminent, always threatening.” (Hodkinson 2012: 
438)*. This principle introduces a perspective “accentuating the stra-
tegic and tactical interventions required to resist enclosure.” (Ibid: 
438)*. It highlights that a prefigurative politics of the commons is not 
enough, that becoming attuned to the fact that we are always already 
in “the community of existence” (Nancy 1991: 1)^ is insufficient when 
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faced with the expansive force of capital and enclosure. This situates 
the very existence of communally owned housing, such as Sanford 
Housing Co-op, as a form of resistance against the enclosure of hous-
ing which is accelerated in the UK through the mass privatisation of 
publicly owned housing that has occurred since the Thatcher govern-
ment of the 1980s and the breakdown of the post-war consensus.  But 
a further local example of such resistance to enclosure could be found 
in the practices of the Radical Housing Network, “a network of groups 
fighting for housing justice” (Radical Housing Network 2017), who 
later came to use The Field as an organising base, thus forming a com-
ponent of The Field’s collectivity.
Through the notion of commoning we are thus “to see how the 
value practices of living-in-common (prefigurative) and housing-as-
commons (strategic) are not inherently opposed or mutually exclu-
sive” (Hodkinson 2012: 439)*, but are rather brought together in the 
practices that create, maintain and protect commons. This brings us to 
the third ethical coordinate, which brings together the former two, in 
the practice of “Hegemonic commoning: circulating the housing commons” 
(ibid: 439 emphasis original)*. This principle recognises the need to ex-
pand commoning practices through engagement with sites of hegem-
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ony, it recognises the open zone of indeterminacy and struggle where 
determining economic forces come into play with contingent political 
practices and formations, where identities, values and positions are 
contested, opening the way for new forms of articulatory practice (La-
clau & Mouffe 2014)†. Considering the practice at hand, that of hous-
ing provision, such a moment would constitute a praxis of disrupting 
the privatisation of housing and introducing alternative ways of pro-
viding housing. Hodkinson cites the example of Westminster based 
Walterton and Elgin Action Group who, on learning that the council 
intended to privatise the social housing in which they lived, “decided 
to use the government’s privatisation legislation against itself in order 
to transfer ownership of the estates to the community” (Hodkinson 
2012: 440)* creating a resident led housing association. As such, a pro-
cess of enclosure that constituted a moment within the circuit of capi-
tal (Marx 1981)^ was disrupted and an alternative logic of circulation 
was introduced, that of the circulation of the commons. 
Sanford Housing Co-op and Deptford house boat community 
are here both considered as manifestations of such alternative circu-
lations. They are breaks in the commodification and privatisation of 
the housing market and attempt to establish and expand alternative 
ways of relating to housing. Housing, a vital component of reproduc-
tion, understood here in Federici’s sense as “all the activities necessary 
for the reproduction of human life (2012b: 55; see also 2012a; 2014), is 
brought into a cycle of value practices other than those that are pri-
marily organised around the circulation and accumulation of capi-
tal. Through this cycle attempts are made to begin to provide for the 
needs and desires for shelter and community in a manner that, at least 
in part, departs from the circuits of capital.
Commoning then is not simply a matter of a shift in relations 
to production, but rather a wider shift in practices of reproduction 
understood in this broad sense. Continuing in this vein one of the 
next meetings of the Commoners took place at Burgess Park Food Pro-
ject. Once again a text was read as part of the visit, this time an inter-
view with Federici concerning food politics and sovereignty (2009)*. 
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The text extends the historical analysis presented in Caliban and the 
Witch (Federici 2014)* which showed how through the enclosure of 
the commons in England a process of primitive accumulation was en-
acted that allowed for the emergence of the capitalist market. As part 
of this process the domain of reproduction was separated from that 
of production with the effect that  “only production-for-market was 
defined as a value-creating activity, whereas the reproduction of the 
worker began to be considered valueless from an economic view point 
and even ceased to be considered as work.” (ibid: 75*). Reproduction 
became concealed and subordinate to production which was the sole 
value producing domain from the perspective of capital. 
This division between the realms of productive labour and so-
cial reproduction had a particularly adverse effect on the position of 
women who became “increasingly confined to reproductive labour at 
the very time when this work was being completely devalued.” (ibid: 
74)*. Such a division has also been considered by Abdullah Öcalan 
as part of an ongoing process of the subjugation of women that he 
refers to as ‘housewifisation’ (2013; 2015). The emergent division of 
labour between valued commodity production and the devalued and 
hidden reproduction of labour-power was a gendered one. This divi-
sion of labour, over the following centuries became more entrenched 
with the emergence of the full-time housewife and the nuclear family, 
functioning as a site for an accumulation of unpaid services that are 
nonetheless necessary for the reproduction of labour-power. Spheres 
of activity that became deemed as non-productive became increasing-
ly assigned to the domestic sphere.
 Food production was once such activity. With The Expropriation 
of the Agricultural Population from the Land (Marx 1986: 875-895)^ peo-
ple lost access to the means of producing their own sustenance. Those 
who previously had been able to make use of the common land to 
grow their own food and thus support themselves and their families 
“had no access to land and had to buy the food that they had once pro-
duced” (Federici 2014: 76)*. Thus, a process of proletarianisation was 
enacted whereby the only means available to people to obtain the food 
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that they had once produced themselves was through selling their la-
bour power on the market, an option which was primarily available 
to men whereas women’s work became increasingly concealed within 
the domain of reproduction that was deemed as outside the processes 
of valorisation from the perspective of the emergent market. 
 As such, Federici identifies “a direct relation between the de-
struction of the social and economic power of women in the “transi-
tion to capitalism” and the politics of food in capitalist society.” (2009: 
26)*. The construction of a situation of food scarcity through enclosure 
continues in new forms today, such as through the genetic modifica-
tion of seeds and contractual agreements to prevent propagation and 
the increasing efforts of the world bank and development agencies 
to convert land used for subsistence farming into collateral for credit 
(ibid: 27)*. Initiatives such as Burgess Park Food Project can, to some 
extent, be seen as attempts to intervene in this logic of marketisation 
and enclosure by restoring certain components of food production to 
a more immediate scale.  As Federici says of the urban gardens move-
ment in the USA, 
“gardens are the seeds of another economy, independ-
98
ent of the market. Not only do they fulfil an economic func-
tion by providing cheaper, fresher food that many could 
not otherwise afford, but they create a new sociality; they 
are places of gathering, cooperation, reciprocal education 
between people of different ages and cultures.”
 (Federici 2009: 35)*. 
Whilst still occurring within the highly commodified context of a 
post-industrial city like London, such practices attempt to disrupt the 
values and logics associated with the circuits of capital, instead intro-
ducing moments of struggle for other values and other circulations. 
 So far, I have discussed three meetings of the Commoners, each 
of which can be understood as concerning a component of the ‘means of 
reproduction’ as defined above by Federici. New Cross Learning was, 
and continues to be, commoning around knowledge; Sanford Housing 
Co-op and Deptford Houseboat community, around housing; and Bur-
gess Park Food Project, around food. Each of these locations, and the set 
of practices engaged with constitute components of the circulation of 
the commons which was discussed above and formed the basis of the 
Commoners next meeting. This meeting took the form of a presentation 
by Andre Pusey, followed by a workshop led by the NXC. This focus on 
the circulation of the commons once again situates localised examples 
of commoning practices as modes of ‘micro-politics’ (Deleuze & Guat-
tari 2004; Adolphs & Karakayali 2007)^†, that is a framing of emanci-
patory political process that focuses less on large scale aggregates and 
formations such as essential class identity, the party and historical ne-
cessity, and more on small-scale daily practices that interrupt the logics 
of capital. Under such a framing, moments of political struggle are not 
restricted to the officially sanctioned politics of the state, or of the pro-
test or demonstration, but are found in the fined-grained daily practices 
that operate according to circuit other than those of capital accumula-
tion. The possibilities of resistance and struggles are expanded, opening 
up the potential for a wider conception of politics as running through 
the value-practices of everyday life. 
99
In such a way, as with De Angelis, the formation of new value-
practices through new articulations in circular time are brought to the 
fore. As Pusey, Russel and Chatterton write,  
“The production and ‘circulation of the common(s)’ 
is key to understanding the potential of new assemblages 
(Dyer-Witheford, 1999, 2006), those that promote and en-
hance the ideas, practices and potential common(s). The 
common(s) are spaces of collaboration, cooperation and 
community. They are process based, made and remade, 
through the collective act of commoning (Linebaugh, 
2008).” 
(2011:  581)^
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The focus here becomes oriented around certain value markers—
collaboration, cooperation and community—that are associated to the 
circulation of the commons as an interruption to the circuits of capital.
The workshops that followed the talk on the circulation of the 
commons oriented around:
 “How to construct new modes of co-production 
and access to means of existence? A hands-on workshop to 
gather, explore and expand ideas of how the creation of so-
cial commons can reduce our dependency of the markets.
 Together we will generate and develop ideas of 
how our everyday activities and resources could contrib-
ute to value-practices that differ from those of capital. To 
explore our ideas, we will improvise small-scale models to 
see what forms our creation of commons could take.”
(New Cross Commoners 2017)
Again, a focus on everyday practices that interrupt the logics of the 
market is evident. But alongside this there is also an additional element 
that here comes through clearly, that of a creative, playful and open-
ended speculative practice em-
bodied in the small-scale models 
that were produced. These models 
play with various potential net-
works, or circuits, of the commons 
that could be imagined, or in the 
Deleuzian language of Pusey, 
Russel and Chatterton, they reveal 
“the common(s) as a key strategic 
form of assemblage” (2011: 578)^. 
These models cut across various 
forms, constituting the commons 
in the idiom of an assemblage as 
comprised of heterogeneous com-
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ponents with relations of exteriority (Deluze & Guattari 2004; De Landa 
2011)^. As the models show components as various as time, language, 
food, bodies, housing, knowledge, skills, water and attitudes as thought 
of as capable of coming together in ways which constitute networks 
and circuits operating according to value practices other than those of 
capital circulation. Here, the commons extend beyond human social 
aggregates to bring into the fold other forms of being—materialities, 
knowledges, affects—that constitute a part of the commons as much as 
the human participants. This theme of expanding the forms of relation 
beyond human interrelations and beyond the economistic idiom of the 
resource is something to which I will seek to return across the thesis.2 
 A subsequent meeting of the NXC brought people together to 
watch a series of shorts from the Black Panther Party Newsreel. There 
are two components of this gesture that I believe to be important for 
the unstable notion of the commons that I am here attempting to draw 
out, namely, the role of what is discussed above in terms of reproduc-
tion, or the means of reproduction, and the focus upon marginalised 
groups. The first, that of the place of reproduction, comes through 
2 See Chapter 3: Communication
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clearly in the practices of the Black Panthers’ survival programmes. 
The example that recurrently came up in subsequent conversations 
with people who had been involved the early processes of the Com-
moners was the Free Breakfast for Children Program. This program 
took the simple reproductive need for food as the basis for a practice 
of self-organisation. As Huey Newton said, “our children shall be fed, 
and the Black Panther Party will not let the malady of hunger keep 
our children down any longer.” (1969)^. The Free Breakfast Program 
was understood as a means of meeting the most basic needs of a dis-
possessed community as the base line of any kind of emancipatory 
organisation. As explained by Alkebulan in his history of the Black 
Panther Party, 
““Survival pending revolution” was a practical politi-
cal move. Seale and other Panther leaders were convinced 
that a lifeline to the people must be built to enhance the 
party’s chances for survival. Institutional survival was a 
necessary first step.””
 (Alkebulan 2007: 41)†. 
Such survival oriented itself around the most basic reproductive 
practices, in this instance access to nutrition.
 The second associated component of this practice was the inte-
gral focus on a marginalised social group, in this instance black people 
in America. The Panther’s theorisation of this included within it an 
anti-capitalist dimension. As Stokely Carmichael states,
“We understand that a capitalist system automatical-
ly contains within itself racism, whether by design or not. 
Capitalism and racism seem to go hand in hand. … The 
society we seek to build among black people is not an op-
pressive capitalist society. Capitalism, by its very nature, 
cannot create structures free from exploitation…We are in 
the cities. We can become, and are becoming, a disruptive 
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force in the flows of services, goods and capital”
 (Carmichael 1971: 160-161)†
This perspective leads Carmichael to speak of “the system of in-
ternational white supremacy coupled with international capitalism” 
(ibid: 150)†. A salient point 
is that capitalism emerged 
through the marginalisation 
and oppression of certain sub-
jects, the concealment of this 
exclusion and the value pro-
duced by such communities 
under forms of domination 
and white supremacy, and that 
it continues to operate in this 
way (Mills 1999; 2011)†. Far 
from being a secondary cultur-
al identity in a domain sepa-
rate to that of political econo-
my, race emerges as a crucial 
mechanism in the structuring of capitalism, that is “race has been fun-
damental to the configuration of the modern world and is integral to 
the very configuration of socio-economic inequalities in the present.” 
(Bhambra 2017: s227)†. Race is not a secondary identity in relation to 
the primary division of economic classes in the structure of capitalism 
but is a crucial mechanism in the constitution and continuation of the 
economic system itself. 
This perspective resonates with that of Federici in Caliban and the 
Witch (2014)* where it is not only the bodies of women who become 
points of capital’s leverage through ascribing them to a position of 
reproduction outside the valorisation process of capital, or more cor-
rectly concealed within the valorisation processes of capital, but also 
the bodies of the colonised. As such, the perspective that emerges is 
one of capitalist development that is inherently racist and sexist and 
that makes use of race and gender as crucial mechanisms of power. 
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This orientation brings out the dimension of the commons that 
has been described as the undercommons (Harney & Moten 2013)*. The 
undercommons extends the principle outlined earlier that the circula-
tion of capital is also the circulation of struggle, that the sites of collec-
tive alienation are also the potentialities for other forms of collectivity, 
that the ground of alienation is also the ground of emancipation. To 
inhabit the undercommons, to be part of its commonality, is “to inhab-
it the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who 
has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism” (Halberstam in Har-
ney & Moten 2013: 8)*. This constitutes the undercommons as a site of 
blackness. As Halberstam continues, “[i]ndeed, blackness, for Moten 
and Harney by way of Fanon, is the willingness to be in the space that 
has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order.” (ibid). Part 
of what this strikes at is the need for commons to be sites for non-
homogenous (De Angelis 2007)* communities to come together in self-
organised emancipatory practices. The diversity of the community 
that could come together through commoning was a component that 
the NXC both set its sights upon, and struggled with achieving (New 
Cross Commoners 2017), but nonetheless remained a central compo-
nent of the shifting horizons of the commons which emerged.3 This 
engagement with the perspectives and practices of the Black Panther 
Party, then, was an attempt to attend to the structural role of racism, 
white supremacy and white privilege in capitalism and to recognise 
that to develop a meaningful departure from the circuits of capital 
through commoning would also entail overcoming the racist and sex-
ist structures that are vital to those circulations. It was, to borrow an 
apt phrase from Gregory Bateson, an attempt to examine “a difference 
that makes a difference” (2000: 459 emphasis original)†4,  that is to iden-
tify race as crucial component in the historical and structural forma-
tion of capitalism. 
The next meeting of the NXC that I would like to point to here 
3 This problematic will be returned to in the final two chapters, Commoning 
Beyond the Commons, and Affective Activity and Careful Collectivity.
4 For a discussion of the intersections between Bateson’s information theory 
and Charles W. Mills critical race theory see Syed Mustafa Ali’s article Race: The 
Difference That Makes a Difference (2013)†.
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was organised around brewing beer. The text that was engaged with 
for this meeting was another of Federici’s, this time Feminism and the 
Politics of the Commons (2011)*. Here Federici returns to the feminist 
perspective touched on above, “where ‘feminism’ refers to a stand-
point shaped by the struggle against sexual discrimination and over 
reproductive work” (ibid)*. In this article Federici also briefly restates 
her critique of Hardt and Negri’s theory of the common (2003; 2005; 
2009)^, which in the accelerationist tradition which pushes Marx’s 
proposal that “[t]he true barrier of capitalist production is capital itself” 
(1981: 358 emphasis original)^ to the end, extending the proposal of 
Deleuze and Guattari that the revolutionary moment may not be with-
drawal from capital, but quite the opposite. In Anti-Oedipus they write,
“Which is the revolutionary path? Is there one?—To 
withdraw from the world market, as Samir Amin advises 
Third World countries to do, in a curious revival of the fas-
cist “economic solution”? Or might it be to go in the oppo-
site direction? To go still further, that is, in the movement of 
the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? … Not to 
withdraw from the process, but to go further, to “accelerate 
the process,” as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is 
that we haven’t seen anything yet.”
(2011: 239-40)^
Hardt and Negri extend this proposition through the line of 
argumentation that a new mode of social organisation structured 
around the common is already emerging in immaterial and affective 
labour and forms of production and association social cooperation 
which exceed capital’s tendency towards commodification and enclo-
sure. Federici’s critique of this position is twofold, in the first instance 
that it relies on a picture of the commons that “absolutizes the work of 
a minority possessing skills not available to most of the world popula-
tion … [and] … ignores that this work produces commodities for the 
market” (Federici 2011)* as well as being reliant on market produced 
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commodities such as technology—computers, microchips, etc. But 
more significantly for our purposes here, the theory of the commons 
developed by Hardt and Negri, according to Federici, “skirts the ques-
tion of the reproduction of everyday life.” (ibid)*. Federici’s proposal 
is that rather than looking to the work of cognitive labourers in the 
developed world as the source of a new social organisation, it is rather 
“the ‘commoning’ of the material means of reproduction is the pri-
mary mechanism by which a collective interest and mutual bonds are 
created.” (2011)*. Through this meeting, the NXC took the production 
of beer as one such site of struggle over the means of reproduction.
 If we are reminded of the broad definition given to reproduction 
earlier, as including culture, it may become clear how the brewing of 
beer constitutes a reproductive practice. It is commonplace for many 
anthropologists to point to culture as such a site of reproduction of 
human life. As Geertz puts it, 
“[b]ecoming human is becoming individual, and we 
become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, 
historically created systems of meaning in terms of which 
we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives.” 
(1973: 52)†. 
The process of becoming human, according to Geertz, is one in 
which we begin to step into culture, that is we begin to situate our-
selves within the chains of significance and webs of meaning of our 
particular position. It is part of the reproduction of human life. For 
anyone who has spent time in London, or in Britain more generally, 
the place of beer in this process will be relatively self-evident. The 
public house forms a crucial site of social encounter and interaction, 
one which forms a central component of many people’s daily lives. In 
this context, the collective DIY brewing of beer can be understood as 
a small-scale example of such struggle over a particular reproductive 
process. 
Further, the history of brewing and ale is entangled with the en-
107
closure of English common land and the separation of the produc-
tive and reproductive spheres discussed by Federici. As discussed in a 
small pamphlet entitled Radical Brewing: Work, Energy, Commoning and 
Beer (Stuffit 2009)*, a text which was proposed as a possible additional 
reading for the NXC workshop on brewing, prior to the 10th Century 
“[b]rewing and selling took place in domestic households normally 
by women called ‘alewives’” (ibid: 3)*. Alongside enclosure brewing 
processes shifted from the domestic sphere to the emergent market, 
and beer using hops, as opposed to more locally available herbs and 
plants such as nettles, became more prominent. As Stuffit continues, 
“Between 1500-1640 hopped beer superseded ale and 
brewing, which had traditionally been done in villages by 
alewives, became a (male) urban occupation. As a conse-
quence of the amounts of capital needed to retool hop pro-
duction, breweries tended to become larger and more con-
centrated business enterprises.” 
(ibid: 7)*. 
This process demonstrates a specific instance of the enclosure of 
a process and practice, and alongside it a loss of local knowledge and 
self-organised provision. 
In this way it manifests a component of the process of proletari-
anisation that occurred through enclosure. Such proletarianisation is 
not only to be understood as a separation of the worker from the means 
of production, as the more classical Marxian definition would present 
it, but can also be considered as “a process of losing knowledge” (Stie-
gler 2010b: 38)*, that is a loss of, in Stiegler’s terms, both savoir-faire 
(knowledge-of-making) and savoir-vivre (knowledge-of-living) (ibid: 
33)*. In the example here of ale production, the knowledge of brewing 
increasingly transferred from the domestic sphere and the alewives, 
to commercial breweries, and alongside this loss of knowledge of the 
process of brewing occurs a parallel loss of the knowledge of the life-
styles that it facilitated, in this instance pushing women from the more 
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central position of the alewives, to that of “barmaids and landlord’s 
appendages.” (Easrnshaw in Stuffit 2009: 7)*. Such processes can be 
seen contributing to the creation of the proletarian condition which, as 
put by Bue Rübner Hansen a contributor to the Nanopolitics Handbook 
(Nanopolitics Group 2013)*, a collective in which some members of 
the NXC were involved previously,  “is the condition of being un-
able to sustain one’s body without selling or submitting it” (ibid 208)*. 
And, as Federici shows, for women this process further marginalised 
their position to the reproductive sphere which became concealed and 
hidden behind the productive domain of labour. 
So, this process of learning brewing collectively can be under-
stood as an attempt to respond to the call for “a far-reaching pro-
cess of de-proletarianisation, that is, the recovery of knowledge of all 
kinds.” (Stiegler 2010a: 11)*. The practice of situating self-organised 
processes of commoning as modes of de-proletarianisation tied into 
a subsequent meeting of the NXC, which took place at New Cross 
Cutting. This once again sought to situate commoning within the spe-
cific contexts of daily life in New Cross and the surrounding areas. 
As part of the visit a workshop was held on skill and resource shar-
ing, and de-proletarianisation (New Cross Commoners 2017). Such 
a focus again illustrates the relationship of de-proletarianisation to 
commoning outlined above, that is the sharing and collective study 
of skills and practices. This focus developed through the Commoners 
was continued later at The Field where various attempts were made to 
establish a series of workshops based on skill sharing under the ban-
ner of course titles such as De-Prole Yourself! or After-work. Skill and 
resource sharing, and the self-organised collectivisation of knowledge 
as a process of reclaiming practices lost through enclosure and prole-
tarianisation, constituted significant components of the commoning 
practices developed.  
 The next meeting was organised around a visit to Deptford 
beach. A key reference point for this meeting was the work of Peter 
Linebaugh who, in The London Hanged (Linebaugh 2006)* and The 
Many Headed Hydra (Linebaugh & Rediker 2012)*, examines the histo-
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ry of commoning practices and the circulation of struggles, as well as 
processes of enclosure, around the Deptford area. Deptford, being one 
of the six Royal Navy dockyards from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries is easily identified as a site of capital’s emergent power and 
British naval dominance. As such a site of power it is also, perhaps less 
obviously, also a site of resistance. Extending the line of thought dis-
cussed variously above, namely that the circulation of capital is also 
the circulation of struggle, or the circulation of the commons, Line-
baugh develops a picture of the Deptford dockyard where sites of re-
sistance do not fall into the background. One such example of a circu-
lation of commons accompanying emergent circulations of capital was 
that of collecting ‘chips,’ a custom that allowed workers to appropri-
ate and collect “wood scraps and waste created during the work of 
hewing, chopping and sawing ship timbers” (Linebaugh 2006: 378)*. 
Here, there is an immediate parallel to the gleaning practices of col-
lecting the excess harvest in the open field systems (Cooke 1856), for it 
permitted dockyard workers “to take from thence the small Chips and 
Gleanings of the Yard.” (Oppenhiem in Linebaugh 2006: 378-9)*. Such 
practices granted workers a certain amount of increased class power, 
for whereas wages were set and often withheld or paid up to several 
years in arrears, the conditions regarding the gleaning of chips were 
ambiguous and negotiable, which often benefited the workers. 
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Despite efforts to limit the amount of chips that could be appro-
priated by workers, the workers at Deptford brought their families to 
help remove the chips from the site up to three times a day, and would 
also use the custom to limit the length of the working day by finish-
ing early to permit time for such gleanings. Placed in the context of 
the terms employed thus far in this chapter, this granted the workers 
some control over their means of reproduction beyond complete reli-
ance on the wage. Chips operated for dockyard workers as “an essen-
tial part of their ecology - in housing, in energy, in cooking, in furnish-
ings”, such an essential ecological component that “Deptford workers 
in the seventeenth century said that they could not live without the 
practice” (ibid: 379)*. There is a parallel which can be drawn here to 
some of the commoning practices of The Field and the New Cross 
Commoners who, at their ‘people’s kitchens,’ made use of surplus 
food that was donated from local businesses, or ‘skipped’ food that 
was to be discarded from New Covent Garden market to provide free 
or cheap meals. Both practices attempt to employ gleaning as a means 
of empowerment and reduction of reliance on the wage for survival. 
Beyond the dockyard, Linebaugh and Rediker discuss elsewhere 
how the ship itself became a mobile site for the dual circulation of 
struggles and capital. In The Many-Headed Hydra (2000)* they show 
how the ship “became both an engine of capitalism in the wake of the 
bourgeois revolution in England and a setting of resistance.” (Ibid: 
144-5)*. This dual development they term, borrowing from Richard 
Braithwaite, hydrarchy, once again emphasising the dual gesture of 
the circulation of capital and struggle. The meeting of the Commoners 
discussed these texts and ideas situated in the locations they occurred. 
Lunch was had on Deptford Beach, temporarily creating a common in 
a marginal and predominantly unused urban space. The new forms of 
enclosure manifesting themselves in Deptford also constituted the ba-
sis of the discussion, particularly the proposed development on Con-
voy’s Wharf, the site of the former Royal Dockyards. Once again, there 
is a grounding of commoning and enclosure within a specific site.
These nine meetings and discussions are only a snap shot of 
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the long and extensive process of study developed by the New Cross 
Commoners.  This open process of situated inquiry came together in 
the production of a publication by the New Cross Commoners, shortly 
before the process of renovating the building on Queens Road that 
would become The Field began. This publication offers a useful con-
densation of some of the particular notions of the commons and com-
moning that emerged through this practice of study. The publication’s 
glossary offers the following definitions:
Circulation of the commons:
I) Keeping in motion what we share openly.
II) The need for different experiences of commoning 
to relate and sustain each other, also beyond local contexts.
III) Commons are all about the connections. When 
they begin to close off they easily become isolated, sterile 
and exhaust the people involved.
Commoning:
 I) The activities through which a common is consti-
tuted and maintained, through which a resource, material 
and/or immaterial, comes to be used and organized col-
lectively. These activities imply conflicts, negotiations and 
care. The conflicts are both antagonistic towards the market 
and privatization and towards the control of the State. On 
a different level conflicts and care take place amongst the 
different people using the resource.
II) Sharing a certain knowledge, thing or skill with 
people openly and with pleasure: Suzy thinks that com-
moning is not a concept but an embodied activity that 
needs time, space and care.
III) Any act through which you remove yourself 
(mentally, financially, socially) from the grips of State con-
trol and Market control.
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De-proletarianisation:
I) Process that allows us to free ourselves from the 
slavery of the wage labour by learning how to do things to-
gether for ourselves, how to live together collectively, how 
to self-organise our lives.
II) It is about gaining the knowledges and skills for 
going about our lives without constantly needing to rely 
on the market. In this sense, it is about taking back knowl-
edges that we have exteriorised, but also about finding out 
what new knowledges and skills we need for our contem-
porary lives.
(New Cross Commoners 2013)
These three definitions each present components of the practice 
of commoning as a process which is both local and situated, and one 
which reaches beyond the local to interrupt the circulation of capital; 
a process that is located in relations, and requires care, negotiation 
and conflict; a process of collectively learning and studying; a process 
which explores new collective possibilities and forms of life. 
As The Field began to take shape, the boundaries between it and 
the New Cross Commoners blurred and shifted, sometimes becoming 
clearly demarcated, other times becoming ambiguous, porous and un-
clear, but the relation was always intimate, and the explorations of the 
New Cross Commoners reverberated throughout The Field. In many 
respects it was these processes of study that formed some of the seeds 
of inspiration for The Field. Many members of the New Cross Com-
moners became regular members of the organising collective of The 
Field, whilst others continued to engage in both more sporadically. 
As the image here shows, the Commoners and The Field were closely 
bound, and yet peculiarly separate, they are seen here “as two hands 
clasping” (Ingold 2017: 10)†, in a relation of correspondence emergent 
of “interstitial differentiation” through which “difference continually 
113
arises from within the midst of joining with, in the ongoing sympathy 
of going along together” (ibid: 13 emphasis original)†. The two col-
lectives and processes, blurred and yet distinct, going along together 
and intersecting, sometimes caring for one another, sometimes enter-
ing negotiations, sometimes in conflict with one another, continually 
communicated with one another. 
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ChAPTER 3
COMMUNICATION
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WhAT IS IT?
In September 2014 a document was circulated around the twenty 
or so people who were centrally enough involved to be included in the 
e-mail discussions. The number of people included in these e-mails 
fluctuated, and itself often became an issue of controversy as a mecha-
nism of inclusion and exclusion, and for a long time there remained no 
formalised rules for people being included in e-mail communication 
or not—at this time, there were around 25 on one list for The Field, 
and around 35 on another for the garden project, there was also an 
extended list of around 150 for wider communications. This document 
was sent around the 25 people who formed an informal ‘core group.’ 
It sought to outline how The Field might begin to situate itself bet-
ter to open broader processes of commoning, that is the encountering 
of differences in the intentional attempt to construct common worlds 
through an ‘Initial Research Phase’. The document stated early on that,
“this is about thinking in terms of the place, both the 
building and new cross, and its history, to explore the needs 
and desires of people that live here (and our own), with an 
aim to come away with a clearer sense of what we’re work-
ing in and with, and how best we can utilise the resource of 
the field, and the collective resources we have between us, 
to respond to it.”
 What this final ‘it’ is, to which response is sought, and in which 
and with ‘we’re working’, is unclear here. It could be read as referring 
to the place, the building, New Cross, history, a given constellation 
of needs and desires, or ‘The Field’ itself. The ‘it’ points towards a 
‘thing,’ it points to towards some form of existential signification, that 
is the existence of some-thing, or a series of some-things. I have come 
to think that the best way to understand this ‘it’, this existential signi-
fier whose object is unclear, is as a ‘thing’ understood in the sense of a 
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gathering (Heidegger 1975; 1979).1  The ‘it’, that is referred to is not the 
place, the building, new cross, history, or a given need or desire, but 
rather the gathering of all of these trajectories that The Field sought 
to bring together.  I have come to understand this gathering to be the 
active and recomposing assemblage that, in lieu of the possibility, or 
perhaps desirability, of a more specific or objective signification, was 
The Field. The play on the notion of a field of force, or field of play 
(Bourdieu 2000) is important here, for it is less in the idiom of an objec-
tive entity, as an object, that The Field emerged as a thing, but rather 
in the gathering and interplay of forces and trajectories that unfolded 
as a field of activity, a field of ongoing recomposition and encounter. 
 In using the term ‘thing’ here I am seeking to achieve several 
aims. First, the notion of a thing as a gathering and entanglement of 
various trajectories and entities that become together is useful for it 
manifests a key component of commoning—the bringing together, or 
gathering, of heterogenous entities through ongoing encounter and 
mutually constitutive becomings. Secondly, the term ‘thing’ retains 
some of the integral ambiguity that such encounters produce. When 
difference comes together in encounter, the results cannot be entirely 
predetermined, but remain as a question which must be continually 
readdressed; there remains an unpredictable remainder, one which 
cannot be reduced to causal or objective relations or descriptions. Fi-
nally, the term ‘thing’ has a significant political meaning, especially 
when understood as a gathering, or assembly. Examined etymologi-
cally the Old German word, thing or dinc, has the “meaning of a gath-
ering specifically for dealing with a case or matter” (Heidegger 1975: 
175), it designates an assembly that comes together to address issues 
and concerns.  It is a space of encounter in which events and concerns 
are attended to. It is the site of governance of the old Germanic tribes 
(Jóhannesson 1974: 35). There is a particular historical site, and name, 
1 The clearest expression of ‘the thing’ understood as a gathering is given in 
the following lines of Heidegger’s:
“Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is: 
thing.” (Heidegger 1975: 174)
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field. Thingvellir can literally be translated as ‘assembly fields’ or the 
‘field of assembly.’  It is the field of politics. The field in which things 
are assembled, in which differences encounter one another. We find 
here, with Thingvellir, a resonance with Latour’s notion of the Parlia-
ment of Things (Latour 1993)—one which speaks to us etymologically 
if we can attune ourselves to listen. A resonance that Latour himself 
attends to in the proposed shift from Realpolitik to Dingpolitik, a shift 
which declares that “the “Body Politik” is not only made of people!” 
(Latour 2005: 6).  If we attempt to remove the firmly established cipher 
that, from the start, divides our worlds into objects and subjects (Öca-
lan 2015), we can perhaps begin to see that politics has always been 
concerned with things, with gatherings, with fields of assembly. 
 And there is also here, a clear resonance with The Field, which 
chose its name partly in reference to the open field system of the Eng-
lish Manorial system, but also in reference to the more romantic and 
metaphorically open-ended nature of fields. The Field sought to enact 
a gathering, a ‘thing’ in the sense outlined above, a bringing together 
of difference into a common field through which entangled becomings 
could flourish and unfold. What was drawn into this common field, to 
return to the document outlining the ‘Initial Research Phase’, included 
that resonates even more clearly 
the relation such ‘things’ to poli-
tics, and particularly with The 
Field, that is pointed to by La-
tour (2005), and that is the site of 
the original Iceland parliament, 
Thingvellir. 
 The Icelandic parliament, 
or Althing (Alþingi), is said to be 
the oldest in the world, being 
founded in 930 AD. The name of 
the original site Thingvellir (Þing-
vellir), where meetings were held 
until 1800, is comprised of two 
parts: thing- meaning gathering 
or assembly; and -vellir meaning 
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the building, places, histories, concepts, ideologies, resources, needs 
and desires. 
 The relationships between people are not secondary or ignored 
by this ‘it’, by a long way. But, significantly they are engaged with pro-
cesses entangled with the building and place. That is, they are ground-
ed and situated—it ‘is about thinking in terms of place’. The commons 
then are not an abstract preformed social relation, but a process of 
encounter and communication through and with the building and the 
surrounding area in order to better understand what ‘we’ have, what 
‘we’ need and how to respond. The positionality of the various bod-
ies then, the ‘we,’ the building, the place, is not bound or fixed, but 
engaged in an ongoing process of composition, a mode of communi-
cation with the other which attempts to listen to things in order that it 
can then respond. 
ThE COMING TOGEThER OF (UN)COMMONS
 In a gesture of insurgent posthumanism (Papadopoulos 2010), 
in what follows I will seek to suggest that the building was an active 
participant in the modes of politics that unfolded. In following sec-
tions I am proposing that we attune ourselves to the ways in which 
a building or material can refuse or engage with the gatherings and 
assemblies in which it is entangled, that we not only see it as a thing 
(gathering) rather than an object, but that we also listen for its call to 
engage in taking care of things, that we attune ourselves to the calls for 
care that things manifest. We can then see in neglected materials not 
only matters of fact, nor only matters of concern, but we may be able 
to attend to them as matters of care (de la Bellacasa 2011; 2012; 2017). 
If matters of concern require us to reveal and make visible modes of 
fabrication and mechanisms of stabilisation (Latour 2004), matters of 
care require us to become attuned to the practices of care involved in 
processes of knowledge production that contribute to the construction 
of common worlds (de la Bellacasa 2017). The perspective of matters 
of care asks us not only to reveal the broad constellations of agencies 
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in the emergence of a thing, but also to care for them, and particu-
larly to care for those that are neglected by an assemblage. It brings 
into sight the ethical question of our obligations to the others with 
whom we seek to construct common worlds and mobilizes care “to 
serve a gathering purpose” (ibid: 45). In this section I would like to 
point towards the manner in which The Field sought to open forms of 
political practice through modes of engagement that attempted such 
attunement, that attempted to draw into the fold all the needs, desires 
and potentialities that constituted ‘it’.  In this ‘it’ there are both modes 
of resonance and repulsion, affirmation and refusal, which formed a 
basis from which affirmative modes of politics could emerge—refusal 
was part of the uncommons (Blaser & de la Cadena 2017) that under-
pinned the possibility of commons.
 Various trajectories came together in order to open the possibil-
ity of a shared temporality of attending to neglected things. As was ex-
plored in the last chapter, the New Cross Commoners in part emerged 
from a dissatisfaction with a form of enclosed and self-referential aca-
demic knowledge production and the separation of theory from prac-
tice. This feeling was shared by Matt who recounted to me some of the 
possible origins for the idea of The Field.
There’s lots of different moments I could sort of pick 
out like, one of them would be, the thing around the fees 
and kind of things that were coming up around that,  you 
know the occupation of the library  and the protests  and 
the experiments in alternative education.  That was defi-
nitely the first time I kind of started thinking about alterna-
tive education…
And then also just being at Goldsmiths and just look-
ing at, developing a kind of more nuanced political cri-
tique, feeling really frustrated at the university itself as this 
place which felt like it was complicit somehow and even 
the lecturers felt like they weren’t able to support us and in 
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this kind of, you know, I guess Goldsmiths in itself is kind 
of a particular place, more so than most other universities 
I suppose, because you really are given the kind of space 
to develop an anti-capitalist critique and yet it’s still so 
very obviously part of that so I felt kind of suffocated and 
I felt like I wanted to do something being in that situation 
and then also watching, looking at how either academics 
would, or people would, either go into academia and then 
produce work in that environment that was not really go-
ing anywhere, especially in anthropology like I remember 
asking Irina, who was like my favourite teacher like: where 
does you work go? At what point does the change come? Where 
does the effect happen? 
I just felt really frustrated by that. And its probably a 
kind of naïve way of thinking about it but that’s how it felt  
and how like people in my cohort, fellow students, it was 
either that route or going into some kind of institution that 
was not really trying to address the issue, so that’s where 
the idea came from, of well how about creating a place where 
this kind of continued education can happen and which can try 
to on a very localised level do something with this knowledge that 
was developed.
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In searching for a space to initiate the project that would become 
The Field, Matt, Jane and Dave began to scour New Cross for empty 
buildings, disused spaces, sites that were in one way or another passed 
over or neglected, that were uninhabited or unused. Their search was 
itself spurred on through modes of political refusal; and in this search, 
they attempted to attune themselves to the call of ruins, to the possibili-
ties encased within sites of urban decay, neglect and abandonment. 
These sites were those that, in some way, did not fit within the narrow 
sphere of urban political economy, that were discarded by the inter-
ests of capital, sites that were deemed non-productive in the schema 
of the urban economy. 
 Whilst this search was underway, they began to attend the meet-
ings of the New Cross Commoners. One of the meetings they attended 
was held in Fordham Park. At this meeting the Commoners continued 
the process, which had been initiated at their first coming together, of 
mapping places of enclosure and commoning in New Cross. This not 
only included looking for practices and places where commoning was 
already taking place, but also looking for “abandoned spaces we might 
consider to take care of” (New Cross Commoners 2013). This was a 
process of both locating alternative political practices already existent 
in the local area, and of seeking out spaces of possibility. There was a 
clear resonance between the search that Matt, Jane and Dave had been 
engaged with, and the forms of political exploration of the New Cross 
Commoners. Matt continues, 
By the time we met the commoners The Field was al-
ready a kind of idea that was being developed, we actually 
met them, on the first time we met them we we’re like, me 
Jane and Dave were like—‘we want to set up a place’—and 
the first workshop we joined with them they were mapping 
empty building in New Cross so it was like really weird 
how it was kind of like this convergence of two things that 
felt really kind of right to come together.
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 Their search for a space led them to contact the owners of vari-
ous unused or abandoned buildings around New Cross. Very few re-
sponded. But the owner of The Field was willing to give it to Matt, 
Jane and Dave on a rent-free contract. He had bought it many years 
ago, with the intention of developing on the land, but had soon found 
out that this would be more difficult than expected due to the conser-
vation regulations which govern the area of Telegraph Hill. The build-
ing was on the border of this conservation area, and one of the last to 
be covered by its regulations. As the story was told, he quickly became 
swept up in other things, had his attention taken elsewhere, and the 
building was left uninhabited and unused, for the time being forgot-
ten. It was during this time that it became squatted. 
 The building returned to his attention when he began to receive 
regular complaints. Initially the residential neighbours would contact 
him directly with reports of people taking drugs in the building, mak-
ing a lot of noise at night, defecating in the open drains at the side of 
the house. Soon the doctor’s surgery also began to complain about the 
insanitary conditions and drug use. The landlord did little in response. 
His attention remained elsewhere. Finally, he began to be contacted by 
the police attempting to put pressure on him to take action of some 
form or another as they were regularly being called to the site, to at 
the very least secure it to prevent further squatting. But he continued 
to ignore these complaints and requests. Gradually the complaints 
subsided as the building arrived at the state outlined above where it 
could no longer facilitate human inhabitation.  But the memory and 
stress of this period of regular complaints, and fraught relations with 
the neighbours and police, remained. So, when Matt, Jane and Dave 
arrived at his office in 2014 he was eager to give them the place. He 
would no longer have this gnawing worry.
 Various agencies come together in this process: the conserva-
tion rules that prevented easy development; the worry and relief of 
the landlord; the search for a space from which to organise; the reso-
nance between this search and the New Cross Commoners; the col-
lapse of the building that led to it no longer being squatted; the dual 
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role of Goldsmiths in being a paradoxical source of inspiration and 
despondency, a site of Cruel Optimism (Berlant 2011); the ideology of 
the commons and anti-capitalist critique. It was this convergence, this 
coming together of differential processes, that opened the possibility 
of locating a common time of affirmation between the building and 
the collective of commoners that would become The Field. But this 
common time of affirmation did not unify the various issues at stake 
for each of the participants, that is it did not homogenise them under 
a single banner or set of interests, but rather responded in a way that 
was homonymic (Blaser 2016), that is it addressed different matters of 
concern simultaneously—the property of the landlord was protected 
by inhabitation, the building was given the care for which it called, the 
commoners found a space from which to organise politically. On an 
idealist plane there is a peculiar paradox here in that two of these mat-
ters of concern, that is the protection of property and the organisation 
of anti-capitalist politics, could emerge as contradictory, or conflict-
ual. And yet a common worlding could emerge through these uncom-
mons, through a space of encounter that did not necessarily entirely 
merge worlds into one but facilitated their (partial) communication. 
ThE CALL OF RUINS
 Such communication does not occur only from the perspectival 
side of the human participants in the commons. To take up this pro-
posal of thinking in terms of the building and New Cross, here from 
the perspective of the building as a gathering, that is as a site of assem-
bly, inscription and manifestation of the collectives in which it had 
been entangled, it can be seen how the building itself expressed these 
modes of communicative encounter. We can begin to glimpse answers 
to the question “might there nevertheless be a sense in which things 
could speak for themselves? And what might their voices sound like?” 
(Holbraad 2011: 3); answers which reveal the voices of things in other 
modes of expression.
 On first entering the building, the walls were inscribed with 
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the traces of those who had previously dwelt within it. The writing 
was, quite literally, on the walls. Passing through the building, the 
traces of its former inhabitants, that is the squatters who had caused 
the landlord so much worry, surrounded us. Shopping lists, phone 
numbers, expressions of political discontent and pictures coated the 
crumbling, moulding and peeling walls. The building manifested a 
gathering of the forces, affects, feelings and expressions which had 
left their traces upon its many surfaces. The now absent people who 
had dwelt in this space manifested their presence through such in-
scriptions. The world that here revealed itself was one of discontent 
and neglect, one of a material malaise. The building was run through 
with a spatial melancholia and manifestations of ruination (Navaro-
Yashin 2009), but it was not only a mediation of human melancholia 
through objects, although that was certainly a part of it, but a manifes-
tation immanent to the materiality of the building itself.  These traces 
thus seemed to point to  the failure of people to construct a common 
world, the failure of the former inhabitants of the building to attend 
to their encounters with difference, resulting in the painful emergence 
of excessively uncommmon worlds between the building and the hu-
man dwellers, that is an excessive emphasis on the uncommons—“a 
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condition that disrupts (yet does not replace) the idea of “the world” 
as shared ground” (Blaser & de la Cadena 2017: 186). What came to 
the foreground was precisely the uncommonality of the needs and 
desires of the former inhabitants in contrast to those of the building. 
The encounters of difference here produced divergence and repulsion, 
constitutive resonances that foregrounded the uncommons to such an 
extent that the result emerged as a form of ruination. An entrench-
ment of uncommonality that nevertheless came to serve as the ground 
and possibility of commoning.  
 What was read on the melancholic walls were manifestations 
of modes of neglect on the part of its prior human inhabitants.2  And 
it was not only the inscriptions of the human hand that manifested 
this, but far more significantly the collapse of the building itself. It was 
this collapse that clearly manifested a symptom of modes of neglect, 
a symptom because it is retrospectively interpreted as a manifestation 
of a deferred event or cause. The floor of the building had rotted away 
exposing the ground beneath. The roof had collapsed inwards, and 
water ran from it, gathering in various corners and rivulets formed by 
2 The point here is not to pass moral judgement on the former inhabitants 
of the building. But rather to attempt to look from the perspectival position of the 
building itself.
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the mounds of discarded materials and objects. The uncommon world 
that existed appeared, from the perspective of the building, a ruinous 
one, a decaying and melancholic one, one that had responded to an 
extended period of neglect on the part of the prior human inhabitants 
through the refusal of the possibility of continuing human inhabita-
tion, by emerging as a milieu that was hostile to human inhabitation, 
and instead favouring bacterial and fungal ecologies, an assemblage 
that sought to exclude humans. The notion of assemblage is useful 
here for it allows us to become attuned to distributions of agency, will, 
desire and force that become spread and distributed across fields of 
connections. It opens up the distribution of agency beyond the limits 
of a specific bound agent or subject, allowing us to begin to glimpse 
the ways in which beings of different kinds enable and constrain one 
another, act upon one another, or allow one another to act in certain 
ways. 
 This ruinous assemblage could be seen as the material emer-
gence of post-human ecologies, or to borrow from Tsing’s title, a site 
of capitalist ruins (2015). Drawing on Tsing’s notion of capitalist ruins 
is also important here for it draws attention to the ‘patchy’ nature of 
capitalism, the way in which spaces of abandonment emerge when 
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the perspective of capital no longer can locate assets within, or utility 
from, a site. In one sense, the ruination begins to emerge through the 
disregard of capital for sites deemed to be non-productive. In the ur-
ban setting gaps emerge in the flows of capital as it organises uneven-
ly, skipping over certain areas or spaces, circumventing them. Sites 
of neglect and abandonment emerge. It was such abandonment, an 
abandonment of the interests of development, that opened the build-
ing as a site to be squatted. But this very inhabitation opened a differ-
ent space of neglect and abandonment, one that concerned the relation 
of the building to those who dwelt within it in such a way as to neglect 
the calls for care that issued from the building. It was these modes 
of neglect that led to the ruination of the building, a ruination that 
opened the ground of possibility for it to become the site of common-
ing that became entangled with the searches of Matt, Jane and Dave 
and the New Cross Commoners.
 Such ruination and collapse is emergent through failures of 
communication between humans and their dwelling place, failures 
which lead the building to instead call upon the fungi and bacte-
ria to join in the composition of a post-human ecology that pushes 
away the human. In its affirmative dimension, it turned away from 
the speaking being and favoured other forms of life and associa-
tion. Or perhaps rather, called upon the human who would wish 
to listen to this mode of communication, to listen to the needs and 
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desires that are being expressed, and offer them the imperative that 
should they wish to recompose a common world, should they wish 
to make of the uncommons the ground of commoning, a great deal 
of care will be required on their part. That is, the injunctive demand 
given by the building, by the collection of bodies that composed its 
localised ecology, is such that should the building be asked to care 
for human inhabitants once again, should it be asked to participate 
in the composition of a common world, those prospective human 
inhabitants must first reciprocate by caring for the building. 
 The material refusal of the building, a refusal that constitut-
ed ecological compositions that pushed away human inhabitation, 
manifested a form of communication that responded in silence. As 
Lacan writes of speech, “all speech calls for a response… there is 
no speech without a response even if speech meets only with si-
lence” (2006: 206). Whilst the building cannot be said to speak in 
the narrow sense, it did express unfulfilled needs retrospectively 
interpretable as symptoms. It communicated, in response and call-
ing for further response, the failures of its previous entanglements. 
The collapsed roof, the peeling wall paper, the rotting floor, and the 
entire assemblage of material manifestations that constituted an as-
semblage that sought to exclude the possibility of human inhabita-
tion expressed the lack of care that the building had received in its 
prior gatherings. Its previously unfulfilled needs and desires mani-
fested themselves as ruination, as expressions that are in a sense, 
symptoms of the failures of former encounters. The unfulfillment 
of these needs and desires, such as the need for care and mainte-
nance that any such building possess,  led to the manifestation of 
a call. The call is here understood as a tonality of expression, an 
additional plane which transforms the meaning of expression.3 It 
3 Lacan speaks of the call, through the work of Karl Bühler, in his first semi-
nar:
“In any imperative, there’s another plane, that of the call. It is a question of the tone 
in which the imperative is uttered. The same text can have completely different 
imports depending on the tone. The simple statement stop can have, depending on 
the circumstances, completely different imports as a call.“ (Lacan 1991: 84)
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is a tonality of expression which transforms meaning. To begin to 
extend the possibility of the call beyond human language the example 
used by Lacan may be instructive, where he points to the ability of a 
pet to draw one’s attention to something that it lacks (1991: 84). To 
extend this possibility also to the building ask of us to become attuned 
to the expressions of lack, need and desire that manifested themselves 
through this material refusal, through the silent refusal that commu-
nicated through the rotting floors, the collapsed roof, the cracked and 
shattered windows. It asks us to attune ourselves to the calls for care 
that the other addresses to us. It asks us to open ourselves to differ-
ence-writ-large. After all, the call requires an interpretant to which its 
tonality is addressed, and to be properly attended to, to be responded 
to beyond silence, it must be an interpretant that is willing to at least 
attempt to hear in order to respond. 
 I first entered the building in 
February 2014. I had been on my way 
to Goldsmiths after work one day to 
visit the library. After getting off the 
train at Queens Road Peckham station 
I walked, hurriedly, along the road. 
On approaching Old Kent Road, I saw 
Jane and Matt on the opposite pave-
ment. Crossing to speak to them I was 
immediately struck by the excitement 
that was emanating from them both. 
Jane was quite literally shaking with 
the force of the affect. They stood there, 
covered from head to toe in dirt and dust, and told me “this is our 
place!”, gesturing to the short, squat and severely run-down build-
ing behind them. They guided me towards the door, pushing it open 
partially before it was blocked by some unseen force on the other side. 
“That’s as far as it will open at the moment” I was told. Peering gin-
gerly through the gap, a gap just large enough for a single person to 
fit through, provided they crouched to avoid the beam hanging down 
130
from the ceiling, I was encouraged to step across the threshold. I un-
certainly did so. The stench of rotting wood was forceful. 
 The door would not open fully, and so our bodies had to be 
contorted into strange diagonal crouching positions in order to slide 
in sideways, adapting themselves to the spatial configuration which 
the new lifeworlds of the space had constructed. The floor was no 
longer capable of supporting human weight. The wood which had 
once formed the ground of the building had rotted away leaving a 
fine proto-soil. The fungi had taken hold. In place of floorboards were 
fragmented remnants of rotting timber. We stepped cautiously across 
this archipelago of stable foot holds, feeling our way with the weight 
of our feet. The roof had not fared much better. The shelter that it 
had once offered was now absent. Water dripped from rivulets that 
had formed on the surfaces of the bent, broken, twisted boards that 
now lent inwards towards the centre of the building, as though some 
large object had struck the centre of the roof, causing a crater to form 
and shredding the waterproof felt that now hung tassel-like from the 
warped and splintered panels. The thing that this building had be-
come, the gatherings that it embodied, filled me with uneasiness, they 
communicated to me a profound malaise. 
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RECOMPOSING COMMON WORLDS
 It was this very call that opened the possibility of the building 
being drawn into the processes of commoning that would unfold over 
the following years. The refusal of the building to accommodate ne-
glectful dwelling emerged from the neglect of the needs and desires of 
the building itself. Here desire comes to stand for something beyond 
an exclusively human faculty, but rather for something of a “primor-
dial and universal character” (Tarde 2012: 21), that is as a force that 
leads to affinities and repulsions, a certain force in the emergence of 
what William Mazzarella has called “constitutive resonance” (2017), 
the coming together of certain bodies in processes of mutually consti-
tutive becoming. The proposal here then is that the desire manifest for 
the construction of a common world that unfolded through the pro-
cess of renovating and caring for the building was not only a projection 
of human desire onto an inert object, but a mode of communication 
between humans and nonhumans. 
 I am here attempting to attend to Gabriel Tarde’s consideration 
that, 
“if belief and desire are forces, it is probable that when 
they emerge from the body in our mental manifestations, 
they do not differ noticeably from how they were when 
they entered, in the form of molecular cohesions or affini-
ties. The ultimate foundation of material substance would 
then be open to us;” 
(2012: 21). 
 The point here, as I am reading it, is not to entirely efface the 
human subject or to deny its specificity, but to prevent its premature 
closure. To paraphrase Latour’s (2004) phrasing of the cosmopolitical 
proposal (Stengers 2005; 2010; 2011b), it is to keep the subject open to 
the cosmos and the cosmos open to the subject. It is then, not a refusal 
of the locus of human subjectivity, but a radical recognition of subjec-
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tivity’s connection to the worlds from which it is inseparable. It is less 
an effacement of the subject than a radical recognition of the Freudian-
Lacanian notion that “desire is always already the desire of the Other” 
(Thakur & Dickstein 2018: 2). Once again, here the other does not only 
refer to the human other, but to the experience of alterity of all kinds 
that is integral to the experience of sameness and self. That desire is 
desire of the other is to say that far from being radically separated, 
the human and nonhuman are integrally entangled, that the desire of 
the nonhuman is folded into the desire of the human and that human 
desire is engaged with numerous nonhumans. 
 In this way, the call of ruins that manifests a call for care is re-
sponded to here on the part of humans by the careful construction of 
a common world, by the opening of a process of assembling neglected 
things. The desire for care, on the part of the building, and the desire to 
care, on the part of human commoners, are continuous. Desire, as such, 
is not the reserve of a bounded individual agent, but is formed in the 
interstice between beings. It is relational. The expressions of neglect 
that manifested the call of ruins are then sites for the co-construction 
of desire, sites through which the composition of common worlds can 
begin to be explored. 
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 The process of caring for the building that would become The 
Field made of this relational desire a positive condition of common-
ing.  It unfolded through specific attention to what was possible and 
desirable given local conditions, through an exploration of the build-
ing itself, the local area, and through the skills, needs and desires of 
those who participated in the project. A foundation of the process was 
detailed attention to what was already there, to the specific conditions 
that already existed in that place, to the site’s own desires and specifi-
cities—that is what it already had, the potentials it encased, as well as 
that which it desired.  Materials found at the site amidst the rubbish, 
such as boxes of old tiles and various fancy metal finishings and adorn-
ments, were kept and used in the renovation process to tile the floor 
or add detail. The doors that were found in the building, but which 
were covered in numerous layers of peeling paint and had developed 
various odours of chemical decomposition, were taken off their dam-
aged, rusting hinges to be scraped and sanded down back to the pine 
beneath the numerous surfaces of paint. And each surface of paint 
peeled back could be seen to reveal another layered sediment of the 
fluctuation between common and uncommon worlds, between care 
and neglect. The windows, old Victorian sash windows that we were 
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told later by a passer-by, apparently with some level of knowledge in 
such things, would have cost a small fortune to restore professionally, 
were also taken out of the frames and sanded back before rotten parts 
were removed and replaced with found discards of timber, and the 
broken glass panes replaced by ones found on the street locally. As 
much as could be kept was kept, and in this way the conditions of the 
site itself constituted an active component of the process of renova-
tion.
 The ruins themselves became the positive ground for the con-
struction of common worlds. Not only was the call for care attended 
to, but also the specificities of the conditions in which the recomposi-
tion of common worlds unfolded. This practice of paying close atten-
tion to what was already present at the site sought to enact alternative 
forms of urbanism, forms that paid close attention to local specificities 
and that did not enact the urban as the masterful control and domina-
tion of the environment by human intelligence and efficacy. That is, 
it sought to escape from a production of the city based on what Phil-
lippe Descola has described in Beyond Nature and Culture as “the heroic 
model of creation” (2014: 323). This heroic model of creation is one 
based on “the imposition of form upon inert matter” (ibid) and rests 
on two premises:
“the preponderance of an individualized intentional 
agent as the cause of the coming-to-be of beings and things, 
and the radical difference between the ontological status 
of the creator and that of whatever he produces. Accord-
ing to the paradigm of creation-production, the subject is 
autonomous and his intervention in the world reflects his 
personal characteristics: whether he is a god, a demiurge, 
or a simple mortal, he produces his oeuvre according to a 
preestablished plan and with a definite purpose” 
(ibid)
 In such a model, the source of the force of desire is clearly lo-
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cated in the individual intentional agent. There is no room given for 
an interstitial co-construction of desiring assemblages. Desire, in a he-
roic mode, is that of imposition and domination. The other bends to 
the hero’s desire. 
 In contrast to such a heroic manifestation of the force of desire 
as issuing from the internality of a powerful individual agent, we can 
here draw on the distinction between wayfaring and transport out-
lined by Tim Ingold (2007). Transportation is described as a form of 
travelling that is characterised by departure from and arrival at static 
points. In transportation, both the point of origination and the final 
destination are predetermined, meaning the process of travelling is 
entirely instrumentalised and subservient to the points. Desire is a 
matter of absolute prefiguration. The path travelled is simply a line 
between two or more points that are fixed and set, and that pre-ex-
isted the process of travelling. It is the points that are important, not 
the journey. The ideal form of transportation would be movement as 
quickly as possible between these predetermined points, with no ref-
erence to the space covered in between. Transportation, then, can be 
compared to the heroic creation outlined above through Descola. It is 
destination focused and concerns only arrival at that destination.
 In contrast to this Ingold speaks of wayfaring as a mode of trav-
elling where neither point of departure nor point of arrival are pre-
determined. In fact, strictly speaking there can be no absolute point 
of arrival in wayfaring as it remains an ongoing mode of travelling, 
one based on exploration. In wayfaring the traveller establishes their 
direction as they go along, the path unfolds as the journey is made and 
each change of orientation is contingent on the conditions exposed and 
directions suggested by the conditions encountered along the path. It 
is a form of travelling other than that of arrival at and departure from 
static points. The duration of wayfaring is of absolute importance for 
it is the immanent factor determining the direction to be taken.  The 
directions to be taken are established along the way. The rules of trav-
el do not pre-exist the process of travelling itself.
 Wayfaring then is a process which continually attends to the 
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specificities of the assemblages it constructs and becomes entangled 
with through its specific durations. There is an ongoing attention to the 
interstice. The common world that it seeks to construct is not one that 
is prefigured at the beginning of the journey, but one that unfolds as 
immanent to that journey itself. Attending to the agencies and desires 
that manifest through this process direct the continuation of the pro-
cess itself. The commons that it seeks to construct is not a preformed 
relationship, but one that makes of the difference of encounter, that is 
the uncommons, a positive condition of composition. Each time a new 
entity reveals itself, or is brought into the process, the direction must 
shift, as do the desires that not only become manifest through process 
but are continually reconstructed through it. 
 In the following section, I will seek to tell the story of one such 
encounter and moment. It is an event which took place sometime after 
the initial process of renovation was complete. The building was once 
more capable of participating in common worlds with humans. But 
this does not mean that the practices of care had reached a closure, 
as though their destination had been arrived at, but rather that it had 
opened new possibilities for relations of mutual care. Relations which 
brought with them new configurations of distributed agencies and de-
sires that called to be attended to.
STANDING IN ThE RAIN
I am standing in the rain. The hood of my worn-down raincoat 
is pulled over my head. Only my face and hands are exposed to the 
world. The cold is biting. The rain is constant but light, that kind of 
mist-like rain that has the effect of making everything feel humid with-
out actually feeling like it is falling, just hanging in the air, gliding.  Be-
neath my feet is sodden concrete. The water is mingling on the uneven 
surface of the concrete, running off to gather in dirty little pools dotted 
with cigarette butts, wood shavings, ash and rotting matter.  We don’t 
know how deep the concrete is, but it’s too deep to remove. Several of 
us wanted to rip it all up to get to whatever was underneath, but the 
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cost and scale of such a project would be immense. We’ve drilled into 
it several times, but only a couple of times got through to the ground 
underneath, and at each time it’s been at a different depth that the per-
son holding the drill has suddenly lurched forward as the tip of the bit 
moves from the strong resistance of the concrete to the soft earth be-
low. We’ve deduced that the underside of the concrete is uneven then. 
If it were turned upside down, if its upper surface which faces the sky 
and its lower surface which touches the earth were inverted, we might 
see a series of small hills and mounds, a modernist small-scale model 
of the contours of the North Downs that line the southern limit of Lon-
don some 30 miles away and through which the ancient Anglo-Saxon 
Wæcelinga Stræt that is now the Old Kent Road would have passed 
on its way to Canterbury before heading on to Dover. 
We’re attempting to drill down into the concrete to use it as a 
foundation. There is already a wooden platform extending from the 
rear of the building that was built about six months ago, mostly by 
Jane, and we are now trying to build a lean-to structure to cover it to 
protect it from the weather and allow it to serve as an extension of 
the kitchen. We have a series of Rawl Anchor Bolts that we’ve learnt 
we can use to fix metal shoes to the concrete that will then allow us to 
hold three tall wooden posts in place that can serve as the supports of 
a lean-to structure on the back of the building. The concrete that some 
of us once wished we could remove to make way for planting is being 
put to good use, offering us a solid base on which to erect this struc-
ture. I designed the structure using Sketch Up beforehand. That model 
is proving of limited use now, but it nonetheless serves as a reminder 
of what we are trying to do, a visual aid.
There are three of us stood here in the rain. We were the only 
three available, out of the thirty or so people who constitute the loose 
groups of people engaged enough to be on the e-mail list, or perhaps 
the only three willing, or a combination of both. We are becoming in-
creasingly wet as the time passes, the rain almost becoming less of a 
problem as the humidity of our clothing gradually crawls closer to the 
ambient humidity of the air. We’ve bought the largest drill bit the lo-
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cal B&Q had to offer. It’s far too large for the drill we have and keeps 
coming loose causing the person whose holding it’s arm to shake vio-
lently and haphazardly whenever it does so. Two extension cables are 
running from the inside to power the drill. The point where the second 
plugs into the first is wrapped up in a black bin bag in a makeshift at-
tempt to protect it from the rain. It seems to be doing the job. 
The concrete is run through with little pieces of gravel, and every 
time the tip of the drill-bit meets one of these specks of stone its pro-
gress is halted. It is powerful enough to make it through the concrete, 
but not the gravel. When these tiny pieces of stone are met by the tip 
of the drill-bit all forward movement halts. I can feel that the tip of 
the drill-bit is no longer meeting resistance as it grinds through the 
concrete but is just spinning on top of the smooth surface of the stone, 
not moving forward at all, just sitting on top of it rotating like a child’s 
spinning top or a dreidel. Each time this happens the progress halts, 
concrete dust stops coming up out of the newly made holes and the 
drill bit becomes blunter. We’re fairly certain that this drill is not up to 
the job. It’s just a pretty run of the mill corded masonry drill intended 
for occasional DIY jobs around the house: putting up shelves, hang-
ing pictures, attaching flat pack bookshelves to the walls—that kind 
of thing. The drill keeps heating up to the point that it can no longer 
be touched. The plastic casing has started to melt in areas. But it’s the 
best drill we’ve got. 
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As the rain comes down the holes that were drilling fill up with 
water and the dust of the ground concrete mixes with the rainwater 
to create a grainy dark grey paste which splashes back at us as were 
working. Water is running down off the top of my hood as the rain 
becomes heavier making it hard to see what I’m doing and the drill bit 
keeps coming loose again making it very hard to hold onto the han-
dle of the drill. Occasionally we come up against one of those pieces 
of gravel from a strange angle and rather than spinning against the 
smooth surface of the pebble the bit catches against its edge and freez-
es, the motor of the drill no longer being able to move the bit sends 
the handle flying out and my arm is jolted of in whatever direction the 
drill is moving, striking my elbow against nearby wooden structures 
or shocking my shoulder joint. Either me or the drill are not really up 
to this job. Maybe both of us. Probably both of us. 
The three of us turn and look at each other. None of us are smil-
ing. Shall we pack this in? One of us says. Yeah, this is grim, the re-
sponse comes. From who I don’t remember, but it hardly matters—the 
looks on our faces make clear we are all thinking it. Relieved, we all 
bundle inside rummaging around in the kitchen for whatever food 
might have been left lying around, hoping for some of the almost-stale 
‘artisan’ bread the local industrial bakery gives us every Wednesday 
for the pay-what-you-can kitchen. There’s half a loaf. It’s no longer 
almost-stale. It’s stale. We find a few worse-for-wear vegetables lying 
around the place and chuck them into a pot, longing for any kind of 
warm food to counteract the hours we’ve spent in the rain drilling into 
the concrete. We made little progress in that time. 
These small pieces of gravel sitting inside the concrete surface 
that covered the entire garden functioned as feedback points, moments 
where environmental conditions make themselves heard and express 
their agency.  They revealed moments of encounter whereby entities 
and processes that would often be placed in the category of inactive 
matter forced themselves to be attended to. The will of the drill-bit and 
its user, the will to create a hole in the concrete of 5cm depth, encoun-
ters the resistance of a small piece of gravel embedded in the concrete 
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since it had been laid many years or decades ago—when, we are not 
sure. This resistance, this blockage, is powerful enough to prevent the 
will of the drill and its user being realised. The path of action is forced 
to change—the hole must be drilled elsewhere, meaning the shoe that 
holds the post in place must be moved with it and in order for these 
shoes to be secure a minimum of two holes diagonally opposite one 
another (there is one at each of the four corners of the square shoe’s 
base) so a place must be found on the concrete where it is possible to 
drill at least two diagonally opposite holes in order for the shoe to sit 
securely. And if the shoes move too much the distance between each 
support will be too long meaning the cross beam that they will hold 
will have too much overhang making the entire structure unstable. 
Unable to see where the gravel rests below the surface of the concrete 
we are left to find such a location through trial and error, through an 
ongoing process of exploration of the material, of the environment, of 
our own knowledge and capabilities, and of the tools and resources 
that we have available to us. 
COMMUNICATION
 These pieces of gravel operate as feedback points through which 
the materiality of the concrete, its physical and historical composition, 
become active within the processes underway.  This modality of en-
counter reveals a relationship to things that I would like to explore as a 
mode of communication. There is an intimate link between commoning 
and communication which is outlined by Tim Ingold (2018), through 
the works of John Dewey. “Following the medieval precedent, one 
could turn ‘common’ into a verb; to communicate would then be to 
common,” and through these communicative-commonings “we come 
into a concordance that is new to both of us” (ibid: 4), that is transform-
ing and novel common worlds emerge. Communicative-commoning, 
is then a creative process, a process of constructing new arrangements 
that may facilitate possibilities of care and co-flourishing. It is a prac-
tice of attempting to listen and respond to the articulations of the un-
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commons as sites of emergent difference. Here, as with the other, dif-
ference does not only refer to human or cultural differences, but rather 
refers to differences emergent between beings. It is once again ‘differ-
ence-writ-large,’ whereby human and nonhuman encounter one an-
other. The ‘other’ of such difference is not the cultural other, but a situ-
ated and perspectival other that constitutes the moment of encounter 
as such and the components of “constitutive resonance” (Mazzarella 
2017) which draw entities together in mutual becomings. 
Crucially, following Eduardo Kohn (2013), such communication 
extends the domain of thought and the semiotic beyond that of the 
human, that is it is not only in the more narrowly defined domain 
of ‘speaking beings’ (Lacan 2006) that communication unfolds, but 
also through the interplay of bodies, materialities, affects and forces, 
through domains and entities that we would not usually recognise 
as participating in speech. Through such communication agencies, 
desires and needs encounter one another ontologically, constructing 
common worlds through encounters that confuse the domineering op-
position between the thinking and speaking mind over mere matter. 
What is the subject and what is the object is by no means clear in such 
an encounter. But this does not mean that subject and object entirely 
dissolve, but rather that they are not the essential starting point. The 
division between subject and object shifts and slides, opening spaces 
of interaction, call and response, where the boundaries between be-
ings and difference become unclear in the interstice of encounter. As 
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such, it has an ecological tonality in that the common worlds in ongo-
ing processes of composition unfold on an ontological plane in which 
the perspectives of others are brought into the fold. 
These modes of communication bare some resemblances to the 
practices of controlled equivocation, that is “an attempt to commu-
nicate by differences, instead of silencing the Other by presuming a 
univocality—the essential similarity—between what the Other and 
We are saying” (Viveiros de Castro 2004: 10). The attempt to listen to 
the call of the other is not an attempt to assimilate their needs and de-
sires, their expressions and concepts, their articulations and ideas, to 
a pre-existing system. It is rather a mode of communication which at-
tempts to preserve the uncommonalities that manifest in the encoun-
ter of difference, rather than homogenising them and integrating them 
to the framework of the one who listens. It is a practice that attempts 
to respond to the call of the other, rather than to assimilate it. It is an 
attempt to allow the other to be other and for differences to remain dif-
ferences whilst also opening the possibility of constituting commons 
worlds. It is a mode of communication that attempts to bring into play 
the realities of others through an ongoing process of negotiation. That 
listens for the call for care of the other.  
Such processes of negotiation 
were often highlighted at The Field 
as central components of common-
ing. The commons were regularly 
referred to as sites of negotiation, of 
encountering difference, and  here 
I have extended this claim concern-
ing negotiations and encounters 
to include what we can tentatively 
refer to as non-speaking beings. 
But they are non-speaking beings 
that nevertheless communicate. It 
is when an attentiveness to this in-
terplay between speaking and non-
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speaking communication emerges that we begin to glimpse modalities 
of communication that open up the composition of common worlds to 
a greater multiplicity of agencies and desires. The commons emerge 
as an interplay of beings that become attentive to one another’s needs 
and desires, that care for one another’s realities.
This communication then, is a process of attending to and car-
ing for the gathering of a broad range of agencies. It is a process by 
which the uncommonality of difference is engaged with, a process by 
which the space of the commons is founded on the acceptance and 
interfacing of differences. It is a mode of communication which at-
tempts to listen to that which does not speak, to that which has been 
covered over or neglected. It is for this reason that the entities I am 
here highlighting as engaged in such communicative encounters are 
nonhuman, for it is these beings that can often constitute the other to 
which no responsibility of response is expected or offered. Thus, it 
is perhaps most clearly glimpsed in those interstices between human 
and nonhuman, for it is in these interstices that we often see forms 
of interaction where the other is reduced to a static, inactive object, 
a mere matter. That said, it is does not exclusively concern the inter-
stice between the human and nonhuman. The neglect of others oc-
curs in many political modes, including systems of domination such 
as white supremacy and The Racial Contract (Mills 2011) that excludes 
non-whites from the formation of a polis, or through the patriarchal 
division of labour that assigns women to a concealed position of do-
mestic reproduction (Federici 2014). Some of these other modes of ne-
glect will be explored in the following three chapters. But here, what I 
am seeking to approach is the dimension of communication that is the 
process of listening, hearing, speaking, acting and attending in such 
a way as to permit the needs and desires of others to participate in 
the constitution of the commons, that makes of others components of 
the polis without resorting to simple assimilation to a pre-established 
system of meaning that claims universality. It is a warning against the 
premature closure of the polis in such a way that would define what is 
object and in so doing exclude those objectified beings from participa-
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tion in the composition of common worlds. It is a relationship to dif-
ference which does not only accept or tolerate difference but attempts 
to actively engage and work with it in such a way as to allow others to 
be carefully attended to and be included in the fields of politics. 
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PARASITE
ThE COST OF
CUTTING CORNERS
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The air is thick with plaster and brick dust. Five people stand, a large metal ob-
ject lies across the floor, and several tall poles support a surrounding structure.
^^^^
I think, like, we don’t have to d-o it right now… If it doesn’t work at all 
then…
We’ll just test run it
WAH_OO—wait
Are you taking a lot of weight?
 No the wall’s taking the weight
  We’re waiting to…
No-no, just wait
Hold it against the wall.
   If you hold it here then I can go…   
 I think we’re alright this end.
Just make sure you’re steady…
Do you want to go? 
Are you too close to it?
1…2…3…
[metal grinds against concrete]
GRShhhhhhhh
Got it? GOT IT?
We got it, we got it
How are you down there?
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 We’re alright, we’re alright
     We’re fine
Just don’t let it slip over..
Yeah, don’t let it roll
Are you OK there?
   We’re alright
     Yea it’s fine
      It’s blocked by…  
 
   They both need to go in at the same time don’t they
It can’t go in any further?
   They both…
     It’s blocked…  
 
If you lift it from there does it go in straight?   
Can we try and do the same now with this side?
     Ok I don’t think that 
should be up there because that’s really…
On the edge of what?
    …that’s really still on the 
edge
   Well, as it. it could really just 
fall off the edge
   And get on the…
   Just make sure it doesn’t fall off
     Yeah, yeah
I don’t think it will.
When you do the same on that side…
If you hold it there it’s not going to roll
     
     …Do you reckon…
     ‘Cos it’s not going to 
go straight in
 Just give it a tap there
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[a hammer strikes]
hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh
hh
…It goes to there…
hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh-hh
[rubble falls]
GRFTK__LL__KL_L__GR_L
hh-hh-hh-hh-hh—hh—hh—hh
LL__L_K_GRFKLT
h—h
LL_gr_g
   Got it
hh—hh—hh—h
GRLK_tt_l
Is everyone steady?
   y…yeaaah… 
Just two seconds
Maybe…
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Do you think it’s possible to lift it all in one go now?
   I think it’s worth trying it…
Yeah
   Go on, what’s the alternative?
To get some pieces of wood that are. just a longer bit of wood to sup-
port it that way so we can go up
     I think as they got it 
in, so I think we just… with 3 of us lifting we 
should be ok
   But you’re not going to have as much err ability 
to lift on that ladder
     How do you mean?
   You can’t push from the bottom can you
   in the same way
I think we should get you up off that ladder over to that and swap 
round with this.
     What you don’t think 
this is good?
     I thought this would 
be the best way
 Shall we try?
    Let’s just try
  You’re worried about me being behind?
On that ladder lifting this
   I’m a bit worried that this is basically supporting 
(ha—hehe)
   .. the whole fucking thing
     Yeah. Yeah, yeah.
Don’t worry about that, 
I think
worry about the box underneath it
   Yeah
     Yeah
I think we should tie a rope around it at that end and pull it that way
So it can’t fall that way onto you, [hah]..
If that makes sense
Yeah.. Or now can we.. Can we not put that, over there?
Lift it?
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   Shall we not just try and…
I’m scared that…
  if we get it in won’t that solve a lot of the concerns 
It could work
I just…
     If we get it into the…
 If we get it up
     Exactly
   Once it’s up there these issues.. that means 
there’s a lot less issue right?
          I have the impression that if we 
lift it a little bit, we might be able to    
   Yeah yeah
If we’re closer up we might be able to get it in.   
It’s a 2mm gap, is it a 2mm gap?
           
 If we put that over then we’ll be able to put it in the hole 
   Once this is level
           
 so it’d be good if you… if you
  
As a precaution we should get another piece of wood that’s a bit 
higher
Yeah?
So that if you drop it you need to come back down, you won’t need 
to come back down to
     Yeah yeah yeah ok
I’ll just take this one
     Da.
Yeah.
     Can I just take all of 
this stuff or?
No. Don’t. Can I just.
I think probably 
     We’ll because that’s 
151
going to. If That’s 
Take that out.
DUN
TAK
ThTAK
ThU
ThTAK
Alright?
Alright?
  Yeah, alright.
ShKGRRhhK
    Hah .. This is kind of stress-
ful
  There was me, just practicing piano this morning
How are you planning on doing it?
   What?
This bit?
Up and in…
 ‘Cause we’re not. We’re only just going to be supporting it, 
you need this one, that’s..
No?
   There’s two of us here. Is that?   
Do we need three people on this side?   
 And then one keeping the rope like A keeping the rope so we 
can pull it.   
  This isn’t really doing it.
   It would be nice if we could   
We don’t want to take that of now
   No
In case that all goes wrong then 
   We just need to try and get it
Then we’ll have to take that down again
   Da I don’t think it’s going to 
need much mate
  Yeah I think we should just try and lift it in
Can you?
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We’ve got a bigger piece of wood
    Can you use that one?
  Yeah
	 It’s	fine	on	there..
  I’m just worried
SChRRRRRhhh
KLhK
KLhKKKKTING
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ChAPTER 4
FOUR FIELDS
OF POLITICS
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 If the last chapter concerned the possibility of drawing so-called 
‘objects’ into politics, that is of thinking in terms of things as gather-
ings rather than in terms of inactive objects, then this chapter opens 
the question that the previous chapter already began to address—
namely: what is politics? The chapter is structured around four fields 
of politics that manifested at The Field. These four fields are not to be 
understood as separate and bounded domains, but perhaps are better 
understood as tendencies that overlap and intersect. In intersecting 
and interacting these fields transform one another, give shape to one 
another, and temporarily fix meanings and values. They also do not, 
by any means, exhaust the political field. 
FIELD ONE: TRANSVERSAL RADICAL DEMOCRACY
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The opening field is that of transversal radical democracy. Each 
of these terms—transversal, radical, democracy—come together to 
give the outline of a field of politics that potentially underpins the 
very possibility of politics. This particular political field in many ways 
underpinned The Field and was the gesture of its opening towards 
differences. I will seek to outline why each of these terms are used 
to characterise this political field, and how it manifested through the 
processes of The Field. 
As stated above, the field of transversal radical democracy cor-
responds to a gesture of opening. In the early discussions of how to or-
ganise The Field, there were ongoing debates which revolved around 
the opposition of open-closed. It was an ongoing site of tension amidst 
the discussions. On the one hand, the practice of commoning was un-
derstood as an effort to build a heterogeneous community, an attempt 
to create a community articulated around transforming and trans-
formative value practices. As such, many of the discussions focused 
on the extent to which The Field should be open to a broader public, 
that is to what extent it should, in certain aspects, be a public space 
accessible by anyone, and to what extent meetings, events, or projects 
that required a level of privacy should occur. There was a recognition 
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that different events, practices and groups required different degrees 
of openness and closure. For instance, a number of the events organ-
ised by the Mental Health Resistance Network required a level of pri-
vacy in order to establish a sense of security and a defined supportive 
collective, and likewise certain organisational meetings of The Field 
itself, as well as other groups, would be significantly slowed down by 
the presence of people who had not attended prior meetings or were 
not aware of the history of the issues being discussed. As such, these 
discussions regarding openness and closure engaged with the need 
for the polis and community that was coalescing around The Field to 
be open to newcomers, and to difference, but the need to also maintain 
some kind of consistency that would allow for cumulatively devel-
oped structures and practices to emerge, as well as to develop strong 
interpersonal relationships. In short, forms of both openness and clo-
sure were required to develop communities capable of caring for the 
commons.
Below is an unfinished sketch that emerged from a discussion 
conceptualising what The Field would become, and who should be 
able to access it and how. In the bottom right-hand corner, we see 
a number of statements leaning towards the extreme of openness—
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Anything you want it to be!?; ANYONE; Let’s see what we can build 
together! Join us!. Each of these fragments express a tendency towards 
openness, or better a movement of opening. Here, there are echoes of 
Giorgio Agamben’s Coming Community,  the community that is not 
under the banner of one unitary identity or set (nation, class, religion, 
etc.) but is open to “whatever singularity.” (2007: 1). There is a ges-
ture towards a horizon of absolute openness—The Field could become 
anything you want it to be, it could be built by anyone. 
This was an ongoing theme of certain components of the build-
ing process. During the renovation of the building, and afterwards, 
people would regularly wander in off the street and engage in conver-
sations with us about what the place was, and what it would become. 
The aim was to attempt to find ways to allow these conversations and 
encounters to shape the direction of the project, to build it together. 
A number of these people would also contribute to the physical work 
that was underway, engaging directly with  the process of material 
construction that would renovate the building to the point of allowing 
it to become usable. 
This process sought to introduce a radically democratic compo-
nent in The Field’s practices. Radical here takes on its etymological 
meaning, of ‘at the root of something’. At the root of the democratic 
ideal, and running through these encounters that it was hoped could 
feed into the process of self-organisation, rests a displacement of the 
rights of a privileged individual or group to control or govern. Jacques 
Rancière writes of democracy as being “characterised by the drawing 
of lots, or the complete absence of any entitlement to govern” (2010: 
31); this is also the dimension of what was referred to earlier as “the 
commencing of politics” (Rancière 2006: 46).1  It is this field of radical 
democracy that for Rancière underpins the very possibility of politics. 
It is such a field of politics that The Field sought to construct through 
gestures towards the horizon of openness, of drawing others into the 
processes of organisation that were underway—be they the material 
organisation of the building, or the conceptual and institutional struc-
1 See Chapter 1: The Field and The Field
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tures of the project—and that are found in the inscriptions of Anything 
you want it to be!?; ANYONE; Let’s see what we can build together! 
Join us!. 
However, total openness was less of a pragmatic possibility, than 
it was a utopian horizon. Utopia here is not intended to mean unreal-
istic in any kind of sense that would disqualify its usefulness. Rather, 
it functions as an important component of “a certain utopian social 
imaginary” (Graeber 2007: 327), that orientates actions and practices 
towards possible futures. In this sense it takes on a horizonal quality 
in that it is continually receding, but nevertheless being travelled to-
wards. At The Field, such futures were re-imagined, recomposed, and 
practices realigned, through such opening gestures that provided the 
project’s radically democratic ground. In this sense, then, the utopian 
imaginary of ANYONE, of whatever singularity, also took on a prag-
matic function—it adjusted the course of travelling, it engaged in the 
practice of wayfaring2 and continually intervened in the formation of 
the community.
It is important to note, however, that the prospect of absolute 
2 See Chapter 3: Communication
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inclusivity and transparency was not what was aimed for through this 
process. These terms—inclusivity and transparency—often function 
in the discourses of the state, appearing to assume that they are at-
tainable goals, that democracy functions by acting as if everyone were 
equal. This is one of the salient aspects of Nancy Fraser’s critique of 
the Habermasian conception of the public sphere, “the assumption 
that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status 
differentials and to deliberate ‘as if’ they were social equals” (1990: 
62). The gesture towards opening that The Field sought to enact was 
tempered, or contextualised, by an awareness of such a critique, and 
a concerted effort to practice gestures towards openness that did not 
ignore or conceal the different barriers and challenges that different 
groups or people might face in interacting with the project. 
What this critique of the universal conception of the public sphere 
makes clear is that, as Bateson eloquently puts it, “there are differ-
ences between differences. […] In other words, differences are them-
selves to be differentiated and classified.” (2000: 463). The marking 
of differences by the system of white supremacy that Mills identifies 
in The Racial Contract (2011), are not the same as those marked by the 
patriarchy of the wage (Federici 2014), nor are those that are marked 
by the division into economic classes. And within those systems of 
differences themselves (race, gender, class, sexuality, etc..) the specifi-
cities of each body are themselves marked by further differences that 
singularise it.  The affections, in the Spinozan sense of a body’s power 
of action and capacity to affect and be affected (Deleuze 1988; Spinoza 
1992), brought about by each difference are themselves different and 
are marked by the historical construction and transformation of those 
differences. The barriers to participation that are marked by the sys-
tem of racial differences, for instance, manifest in specific ways. 
Paul Gilory’s classic There Ain’t no Black in the Union Jack carefully 
examines how racism has developed and manifested in the UK show-
ing that “Britain’s ‘race’ politics are quite inconceivable away from 
the context of the inner-city which provides such firm foundations for 
the imagery of black criminality and lawlessness.” (2002: 311). Sev-
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eral of the areas surrounding The Field are the historic site of such 
manifestations of these ‘race politics’ such as the Battle of Lewisham 
of 1977 which saw National Front members clash with anti-racist pro-
testors. Four years later the New Cross Massacre occurred which saw 
the deaths of 13 young black people in 1981 a fire on New Cross road 
which many suspected to be started by National Front members who 
had been active in the area at the time, and which contributed towards 
the Brixton riots of 1981. Further riots occurred in Brixton in 1985, 1995 
and 2011 each of which were instigated by the deaths of young people 
of colour at the hands of the Metropolitan Police. Racism and white su-
premacy are also inscribed in the architecture of New Cross itself. The 
facade of Deptford Town Hall, now owned by Goldsmiths, plays host 
to three figures from British naval history as well as a fourth archetyp-
al figure of a generic British admiral, and is adorned by a weather vane 
in the shape of a galleon, attesting to the imperialistic history of the 
area, its position within the constitution of British naval dominance, 
colonisation and the slave trade (Back 2007; Hendrich 2008). All of 
these events and histories come into play in situating the specificities 
of how race manifests, “[t]hey are unresolved injuries spewing back 
in a layered poetics, revealing the connections and parallels between 
many different histories of power and domination” (Lepselter 2016: 
67). Thus, the task of composing a heterogeneous site of commoning 
requires attending to the specificities of differences, that is the differ-
ences between differences. 
It is here that the question of transversality emerged. Early in 
the process of defining The Field, the collective spent a long series of 
discussions outlining a series of principles that could aid in directing 
the project and communicating its aims.3  One of these principles came 
under the heading of transversality.
Transversality 
We aim for this project to be a place that anyone can 
3 See Appendix 1 The Field Principles
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use, and anyone can participate in running, though we know 
that there are many barriers to people being able to par-
ticipate equally. We aim to be an actively inclusive group, 
challenging discrimination of any kind, with the hope to 
generate a space where differences can be recognised, re-
spected and explored. We also seek to encourage ways of 
working together that avoid rigid hierarchical structures, 
whilst remaining conscious of the power dynamics inher-
ent to collective work.
 Here again, the horizon of anyone emerges, but it is quali-
fied. The Field aims to be a place that anyone can use, that anyone 
can contribute to, but equally acknowledges that people’s ability to 
do so varies and is impeded by different factors emerging from histo-
ries of domination and struggle that constitute differences in specific 
ways. As such, inclusivity is active. It is not a matter of assuming it is 
possible to act ‘as if’ participants are equal, but requires a process of 
recognition, respect, and exploration of difference and the differences 
between differences. Transversality intervenes in openness to anyone 
in order pay attention to the specificities of the one, the singularity. 
For anyone to participate, requires a recognition of the specificities of 
differences in a way that is not predetermined.
 The notion of transversality that emerges here is one influenced 
by Félix Guattari. Several members of the early collective had engaged 
significantly with Guattari’s thought, and it was through such engage-
ments that the term was introduced. Guattari’s concept of transversal-
ity initially comes from his engagements with institutional4 therapeu-
tics (Guattari 2015). Much of Guattari’s work in this area is concerned 
with the regulatory function of psycho-analysis and therapeutics, the 
manner in which it functions to maintain pre-existent social orders 
and hierarchies of authority. This maintenance of authority emerges 
4 It is perhaps useful to note here a discrepancy between the English term 
institution and the French equivalent. The French institution refers in the first 
instance to the practice of instituting, the work of human fabrication. What is com-
monly understood in English as institution would better be covered by the French 
établissement. (See Goffey 2016).
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in Freud’s characterisation of the super-ego (or ego ideal) as that com-
ponent of the psyche which “retains the character of the father” (2001: 
34). In this way the super-ego installs in the psyche the persistence of 
normative social structures in the determination of identity through 
the regulatory function of moral injunction and prohibition. This au-
thority persists beyond the familial realm and extends into other col-
lective relationships in which “the role of the father is carried on by 
teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions re-
main powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, 
to exercise moral censorship.” (ibid: 37). Here we see the movement 
of the figure of the father from the immediate family to the broader 
symbolic order. This expanded role of the signification of the father 
was characterised by Lacan as the name of the father.5 
 Guattari sees in this an “unconscious function of social regula-
tion” (2015: 105) which, in line with Guattari’s broader corpus, is not 
located exclusively at the level of individual subjects, but rather forms 
a mechanism of subjectification—that is of the production of subjec-
tivity—which operates across various domains and levels. The exten-
sion of this authoritative role across collective fields is attested to in 
Anti-Oedipus, where Deleuze & Guattari write of “the phenomenon of 
group “superegoization”” (2011: 382).  Through these vectors of sub-
jectification and superegoization identity becomes caught in normative 
hierarchical structures that are determined by higher authorities. Here 
emerges a hardening of identities that are organised under the banner 
of a centralising authority or value system. It is such a process that can 
lead to what Guattari termed “subjugated groups: groups that receive 
their law from the outside” (2015: 64 emphasis original). An example 
of such a group could be said to be found in the phenomenon of social 
and psychic subjugation explored by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White 
Masks (2008), where “[t]he colonizer’s violent and cruel super-ego is 
forced onto the colonized to produce an inferiority complex” (Oliver 
2017: 293). Here, “the super-ego of racist imperialist ideology” (ibid) 
5 “It is in the name of the father that we must recognize the basis of the sym-
bolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has identified his person 
with the figure of the law.” (Lacan 2006: 230 emphasis original)
162
becomes a principle of authoritative organisation through the floating 
signifier of race (Hall 1997) and blackness becomes subordinated and 
inferior to whiteness, the latter violently structuring the system of dif-
ferences. In this way, whiteness assumes the place of the super-egoic 
name of the father as the transcendental ideal which all fail to attain, and 
which imposes its principles of judgement upon the system of racial 
classification (Seshadri-Crooks 2000). Such subjugated groups, how-
ever, are equally found in other processes of subjectification that are 
structured around unitary and normative hierarchies of value that be-
come transcendent in their injunctions and prohibitions such as those 
produced through patriarchy. The produced groups and subjectivities 
are ones that “remain locked into pre-established identities, types of 
speech and sets of desires.” (Eng 2015: 455). Such a group is one that 
does not speak for itself and cannot determine its own identity as it 
is caught in a refrain hardened by the past and by the judgement of 
normative authority.
 As opposed to subjugated group, a group bound by pre-de-
termined normative identities, Guattari introduces the term ‘group-
subject’—a group able to determine its own needs and desires and 
speak with its own voice. Such a group-subject is future orientated, 
rather than bound to the traumas of the past, it “is a group whose 
libidinal investments are themselves revolutionary; it causes desire 
to penetrate into the social field” (Deleuze & Guattari 2011: 382). The 
group-subject is one that is capable of degrees of self-organisation, of 
positing and expressing their own needs and desires independently of 
the regulatory ideals of the super-ego and the name of the father, it is 
a “subject-group (of transversality), a group that carries within itself 
the law of its own end” (Guattari 2006: 92).6 It is here that the dimen-
sion of transversality emerges. For Guattari, such groups require high 
“coefficients of transversality” (Guattari 2015: 113), they require the 
instituting of certain forms of openness that allow them to disrupt the 
rigid and hardened structures of identity. Crucially, however, it is not 
6 I am here assuming (perhaps wrongly) that the reversal of ‘group-subject’ 
to ‘subject-group’ in this quote is not significant and that they refer to the same 
concept as the context suggests.
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a simple flattening of identity, the ‘as if’ that Fraser critiqued. Rather, 
“[t]ransversality is a dimension that tries to overcome 
both the impasse of pure verticality and that of mere hori-
zontality: it tends to be achieved when there is maximum 
communication among different levels, and above all, in 
different meanings” 
(ibid).
The practice of transversality is one that engages difference in 
such a way as to not homogenise it, unify it or assume its equality, but 
attempts to establish modes of communication that do not require a 
meta code.
 This, characteristically of Guattari’s concepts, has become quite 
abstract. To attempt to clarify how transversality emerges as a practice 
it may be useful to examine how the notion was applied in the thera-
peutic community at La Borde clinic, before linking this practice ex-
plicitly to The Field. One of the practices that was introduced in 1957 
at La Borde was the use of what was referred to as ‘the grid.’ (Dosse 
2010: 56). The grid was a mechanism for distributing work and rotat-
ing roles in such a way as to undo rigid specialised hierarchies and 
roles. Through the grid, tasks were assigned across all members of the 
community—doctors, nurses, patients, cleaners, administrative staff, 
etc. Doctors would be assigned to dishwashing and housekeeping, 
cleaners to aid in the distribution of drugs and other medical tasks. 
The grid functioned as “a tool for heightening and maximising an in-
stitution’s therapeutic coefficient – which exists in its bureaucracy and 
officialdom, structures, roles and hierarchies”, allowing members of 
the community at La Borde to “traverse different levels, segments and 
roles” (Genosko 2002: 55). This mechanism sought to prevent overly 
fixed hierarchies of specialisation, opening a field of practice attempt-
ing to respond to one of the questions Guattari asked in his inquiries 
into institutional therapeutics—“is it possible to operate a transfer of 
responsibility, of replacing bureaucracy with institutional creativity?” 
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(Guattari 2015: 62). The practice was one that sought to open addition-
al ‘coefficients of transversality,’ through the traversing and intersec-
tion of different positions within the clinic. 
 A similar practice was found in one of the organisational mech-
anisms of The Field. For a long time there operated a system of rotat-
ing roles that sought to distribute work on a monthly basis. These roles 
came under the headings of finance, bookings, info, communications, 
maintenance, and meetings. The aim was to include the different daily 
tasks that were required to keep The Field running under these roles, 
and to rotate them amongst members of the collective to allow differ-
ent people to learn different skills, and to prevent fixed hierarchies of 
power emerging. Similar to the way ‘the grid’ was initially practiced 
at La Borde, the rotation of roles occurred during regular meetings, 
based on people’s availability and willingness to take on work. Such 
rotation introduces a component of transversality through the rotating 
identities. It aimed to prevent such identities from becoming fixed and 
opened each member of the group to new dimensions of the group-
subject.
 This practice was not about absolute openness, but about 
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avoiding the pitfalls of rigid identification under a normative prin-
ciple of judgement, it is about the shifting fluidity of group identity, 
about finding modes of practicing politics that are open to transfor-
mation and not bound to essentialist identities. Identities were recog-
nised, but efforts were made that they did not become overly static, 
overly fixed. There is here a clear resonance with the notion of radi-
cal democracy introduced above through the question of openness, 
and through Rancière. As was said above, the commencing of politics 
emerges as the displacement of any absolute right to govern, and fix-
ity of the name of the father. This is what Rancière takes democracy 
to mean, namely “anarchic ‘government’, one based on nothing other 
than the absence of every title to govern.” (2006: 41).  Thus, for demo-
cratic spaces to emerge, it is not enough to act ‘as if’ all can participate 
equally, the specificities and historical formation and manifestation 
of transcendental titles to govern such as whiteness and masculinity 
need to be challenged, acknowledged and worked upon rather than 
merely ignored or wished away. As with the drawing of lots that 
opens the ground of radical democracy, the instituting of transversal 
practices, or at least practices that aim towards a degree of transversal-
ity, seek to dislocate fixed positions of authority, opening up the possi-
bility for new modes of group identification and organisation outside 
of the structuring powers of normative super-egoic determinations. 
Thus, the ANYONE, that is the utopian horizon of the gesture towards 
openness, refers not only to the empirical invitation open to any indi-
vidual, but also to the absence of every title to govern, the dismantling 
of the transcendental position of super-egoic determinations. In such 
a field, then, politics is not the exercise of power (Rancière 2010: 27) 
but is the ground of dissensus and difference, the coming together of 
heterogenous terms, relations and identities in a manner that resists 
the subordination of differences under a normative signifier.
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FIELD TWO: CONSTITUTIVE OUTSIDES: 
WE/ThEY | FRIEND/ENEMY
The second field of politics that I would like to sketch is a field 
which orients itself around we/they distinctions. It is a field that con-
structs of the space of dissensus, the commencing of politics, a site of 
conflict between positions and values.  It is a field in which the open-
ing towards ANYONE closes, and the limit of the commons emerges 
at the point at which reconstructing the commons around an altered 
value system appears to become an impossibility. Commons, in such 
a mode, assert identities which necessarily produces exclusions. In a 
sense, this field concerns the relationship to the outside, but through 
a gesture of partial closure, it concerns a relationship to ANYONE in 
which not-ANYONE can become part of a commons. It is a limit of 
commoning practice, in the sense of attempting to rearticulate a col-
lective around an altered value practice, but it is also an establishment 
of autonomy, the delimitation of a space that can resist external deter-
minations, that allows for the formation of the collective identity of a 
group-subject. It is then, both a limit and constitutive possibility for 
commoning. 
Around eighteen months after detaching from my engagement 
with The Field, I was sat with Lilly in a park in Southwark. We sat, eat-
ing lunch, and discussing times at which The Field had encountered 
moments of friction or tension. 
I suppose the difficulty was in trying to be more open 
to the community and trying to say, hey we’re not just a group 
of friends, we’re also open to people coming and using the 
space and then doing—I know that Jane and Matt did a lot 
of outreach type work, where they would find groups that 
they thought fit the values and then invite them into the 
space.
Matt and Jane, as well as others, had spent a significant amount 
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of time attempting to seek out groups who could diversify the collec-
tives using The Field, particularly focusing on black groups. A num-
ber of groups, such as London Black Atheists, Fruitvale Film Club, the 
London African Gospel Choir and Yoga for Women of Colour, were 
encouraged to use the Field in an effort to better incorporate the needs 
and desires of the local non-white communities that were not engag-
ing with the project. For the most part, this was welcomed by mem-
bers of the collective, but there were instances when tensions arose 
from the introduction of new people and groups. Lilly continues,
But maybe they didn’t make the right call on some of 
the people, and there was definitely someone who joined 
and started trying to encourage us to have leaders and 
kindly offered to do workshops, but the workshops were 
all about basically how we could become more like some 
kind of top down work place with a boss who would be 
the one calling the shots, and a lot of us were very resistant 
to this as you can imagine, but there was definitely at that 
time a tension between inviting new people in who might 
have differing viewpoints but then also trying to stay true 
to our original values, and not trying to let the whole thing 
get ruined just because we were trying to be so welcoming 
and nice to people. Yeah, it’s like when you tell someone ac-
tually that’s just not what we’re trying to do here and may-
be you’ve come here with the wrong, maybe you haven’t 
understood the premise of what we’re trying to do, I don’t 
know how specific you want to get.
 Lilly kept who she was referring to vague, and in respect of 
that, although we did later explicitly state who it was, I will not identi-
fy the person, even using a pseudonym. Nevertheless, the significance 
of what is being discussed is clear without individual identification. 
There were moments in the formation of The Field, where the collec-
tive encountered practices, ways of thinking and ways of speaking 
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that held the potential to undermine the value practices and systems 
that had been developed. She continued,
 I don’t know, we didn’t obviously have the structures 
in place to say you can do x, y and z, and therefore you 
can continue using The Field or if you are exhibiting these 
behaviours then you can’t be at The Field. We didn’t have 
clear boundaries about, this is the structure and you’re in it 
but you can’t try and make changes within it, but you can’t 
try and change our entire value system 
 Here, the tension point between the gesture of opening, and the 
possibility of maintaining and reproducing a value system is clearly 
stated. There are practices that are not compatible with other prac-
tices, values that do not co-exist well together. The gesture towards 
ANYONE closes as a dimension of not-ANYONE emerges. As De 
Angelis clearly expresses—commoning is an attempt to re-articulate 
a group around a set of values and value practices that are other than 
those of the dominant hegemonic structures, they in this sense emerge 
as an outside of capital, a Beginning of History (2007). As such, this 
outside of capital that is found in the commons relates to the hegem-
onic regime as its own constitutive outside, it is the point of exclusion 
that make possible the exploration of an alternative identity. Here, we 
see expressed Laclau’s proposal that exclusion and antagonism are 
necessary components in the formation of identity (2007: 52); it is an 
articulation of “the power of exteriority as constitutive of interiority” 
(Derrida 1995: 313). The outside of the commons, as expressed in the 
understanding of commoning as a practice antagonistic to state and 
capital,7  is a negative space of exclusion which, in part, allows for the 
positive formation of the commons. But this negative space of exclu-
sion is also the very possibility of autonomy, of the attempt to form a 
group-subject, it is 
7 See Chapter 2: On What Commons?
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“first of all the establishment of an autonomy in re-
lation to heteronymous pressures coming from outside in 
terms of measures, in terms of cultures, in terms of what 
and how production processes and ways of life should be.” 
(De Angelis 2017: 226).
 The possibility of autonomy requires constitutive exclusions.
 Lilly and I continued to discuss this one particular example, 
that of a series of workshops discussing The Field’s organisational 
structures. This series of workshops were experienced by some mem-
bers of the collective as antagonistic to the values, aims and practices 
that The Field sought to embody.
… he was the one that was sort of, ‘taking time out 
of his busy schedule’ to do this workshop about leadership 
and how we needed to change our structure. And actually, 
there was quite a lot of sense in a lot of what he was saying 
because it was in a complete mess but we were very resist-
ant to the type, his terminology. Maybe if he’d said you can 
have rotating leaders or, people can be leaders in different 
ways then it’d be like yeah, sure, ok, great but the way he was 
talking about it was there’s one leader and he was always im-
plicitly saying, and that’s Matt, and Matt obviously didn’t 
really want to be seen like that, he still doesn’t, well he’s 
not really involved anymore to be honest. And yeah, so it’s 
also about the terminology, he was, he is a neo-liberal in 
essence, that man; and he’s worked for—he’s headed big 
departments in councils and things and he’s, we’re just too 
scatty and ridiculous for him, he just wanted to shape us 
all up. It wasn’t through malice that he was trying to help 
us, he was just coming from a completely different political 
spectrum to us. 
 Commoning at The Field and for the New Cross Commoners 
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was understood as a practice antagonistic to the hegemonic structures 
of state and capital. In the conversation above, the person being dis-
cussed is identified as a representative of the hegemonic structures of 
neoliberalism. The value systems, and value practices, he is proposing 
are not compatible with those of The Field—he comes from a complete-
ly different political spectrum. The hierarchical models being proposed 
at these workshops were seen to be incompatible with the value prac-
tices The Field was attempting to construct. 
 We here approach a field of politics in which antagonism and 
conflict are central, but in a different modality to that of the dissensus 
of radical transversal democracy. A far clearer boundary is asserted—
he is neo-liberal in essence. This dimension, however, is not as extreme 
as the friend/enemy distinction that Carl Schmitt presents as the nec-
essary horizon of the political. For Schmitt, the friend/enemy distinc-
tion is “[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced” (2007: 26). The ever-present horizon for such 
a mode of politics is war (ibid: 34-5). Such a characterisation of the 
political leads to a place where the validity of the other, here reduced 
to the figure of the enemy, is not recognised. In contrast, the situation 
described above is marked with recognition of the validity of the other 
who is nevertheless excluded from the common—there was quite a lot 
of sense in a lot of what he was saying; it wasn’t through malice that he was 
trying to help us. Such a field of politics is structured around a far less 
extreme polarisation than the one presented by Schmitt, but it is nev-
ertheless a field that is conflictual.
 One of the questions asked by Chantal Mouffe (2005) is the ex-
tent to which we can conceive of modes of politics that escape the 
reductive and totalising Schmittian formula, and consider ways of en-
gaging in politics that retain the conflictual nature of certain political 
fields (for Mouffe all politics) without arriving at a situation where 
the validity of the other is discounted as ‘enemy.’ In an effort to both 
account for the political field of friend/enemy as a possible horizon 
for politics, and to find other ways of conceiving of politics that do 
not have war as their potential end-point, Mouffe proposes the no-
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tion of agonism. The political field of agonism is one which recognises 
antagonistic modes of politics but rather than making the opposing 
position that of the enemy, the relational horizon of which is marked 
by war, agonism focuses on the figure of the adversary—the one with 
whom we disagree, but who’s perspective and right to speak is never-
theless recognised. This is not, however, a Habermasian model of ra-
tional communication (2007) in which politics unfolds as a practice of 
rational discussion which can ultimately be rationally unified. Rather, 
this is a political field which, like Arendt’s characterisation of the polis, 
is “permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit.” (Arendt 1998: 41). It is a field 
of politics in which conflicts emerge, but conflicts that resist the reduc-
tion of the other to the figure of the enemy against whom the violence 
of war is justified.
 Such a field of politics is important to not lose sight of. It re-
minds us that the common is not a sphere of absolute inclusion, it is 
open to not-ANYONE. As is regularly cited in various manifestations 
of the commons movements, there can be no common without com-
munity (Mies 2014), and for a community to exist there must be sys-
tems of interaction, conventions and accepted behaviours that char-
acterise inclusion with the boundary of that community. This strikes 
at the heart of Garrett Hardin’s misunderstanding of the commons 
(1968), in that the commons are integrally not unregulated or open to 
use by anyone, but are regulated, maintained and cared for by a de-
fined community. The boundaries of this community may be flexible 
and open to expansions and adjustments, but even in their flexibility 
they are boundaries. This boundary work, which was also the work of 
defining the practices of care that the project required, was expressed 
well in a document that was circulated in April 2015 proposing some 
basic rules and structures. The document read,
The Field is a resource
It needs to have a structure in place to allow it to be 
used by groups and individuals.
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The community that uses The Field can be understood 
as participants, users, members as individuals and groups. 
The community should have a say in the organisation of 
the resource.
There are rules for using the resources (principles) as 
there are for any common, and expectations on the commu-
nity in relation to the resource such as coming to meetings 
which will arrange the maintenance and organisation of the 
space, making financial contributions if appropriate (i.e. If 
it is a funded project),
Each proposal, if it happens, requires signing up to 
what it means to use the space—the expectations and prin-
ciples. You have to come to an admin meeting that will col-
lectively determine how groups and individuals contribute 
to the maintenance, care and running of the space. 
 This document outlines potential basic rules for the use of the 
commons. It draws a boundary which determines which value prac-
tices and behaviours are necessary for participation in the commons. 
It is not-ANYONE who can use The Field, but those who are willing 
to contribute to its maintenance and care, those who are willing to par-
ticipate in the formation of a group-subject. There is a boundary that 
is necessary for the formation of autonomy, and for the maintenance 
and continuation of The Field itself.
 Here, there are resonances with the conversation I had with 
Lilly in that park in Southwark. What that conversation makes clear 
is that there are certain values and value practices that are incompat-
ible with one another, contrary to the liberal utopia of public multicul-
turalism. The moments in which contradictory values encounter one 
another are moments characterised by “conflict among social forces and 
corresponding value practices running in different directions” (De Angelis 
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2007: 71 emphasis original). Such conflict cannot be ignored, but nei-
ther does it necessarily lead to absolute closure of the community. It 
is such moments of conflict that attempt to re-articulate the commons 
around an altered set of value practices, moments in which explora-
tions of the possibilities of transforming the values of the commons 
to extend their reach occur. Inevitably, such exploration is sometimes 
successful, and sometimes fails. This practice of rearticulating the 
commons around altered value practices, and its potential failure will 
be returned to in the following chapter.8 
FIELD ThREE: FUTURES: BETWEEN WhAT-IS AND 
WhAT-ShOULD-BE
The third field emerges through orientations towards the future 
that manifest and project desires entangled with a rejection of the ex-
istent state of affairs. In order to sketch the outlines of this field I would 
like to refer to one of the early attempts to produce a document outlin-
ing the principles of The Field. This document, which is reproduced 
in its entirety in the appendix,9 was the result of a collective process 
which attempted to establish a set of principles to communicate the 
aims of The Field. It may be useful to turn to this appendix first, or to 
read it alongside what I sketch below. As the website stated at the time 
at which the document was first published, it was “written collectively 
by the group and represents our shared hopes and vision for this pro-
ject.” Already the dimension of the future is clear—the document rep-
resents hopes and visions. As the website continues the document at-
tempts to map out “the starting points from which we hope to begin.” 
 The document speaks of six interlinked areas under the head-
ings Local, Direct Participation, Transversality, Un-work/De-money, 
Commoning and Creativity. In this document, the language of de-
sire recurs repeatedly. Numerous sentences begin with the word “we 
want,” “we hope” or “we aim”, creating the discursive conditions for 
8  See Chapter 5: Commoning Beyond the Commons
9 See Appendix 1: The Field Principles
174
desire to be articulated. Through phrases such as these, the will to-
wards an alternate situation and a series of possibilities becomes ex-
pressed.  Under each of these principles the language of desire can be 
identified through the simple phrases which orient the entire docu-
ment towards the creation of conditions and futures other than those 
that are understood as currently existing.
 Alongside the production of this document, ran a series of 
workshops inquiring into needs and desires. From early on The Field 
was framed as an attempt to interrogate and find alternative ways to 
provide for the needs and desires not only of the members of the col-
lective, but also of the local area. The needs and desires workshops in-
terrogated the relationship between individual desires and collective 
situations, blurring the boundaries between individuality and collec-
tivity in the process. Asking participants to identify desires that were 
and weren’t being met by The Field at the time, the workshops inter-
rogated the possibility of using the building and collective to allow 
the creative impulses of desires to be realised. The desires expressed 
were numerous—working less; the creation of supportive emotional 
networks; the development of relationships with others; the creation 
of alternative spaces, economies and practices; the exploration of dif-
ferent possibilities for life. 
 Desire was articulated as a creative orientation towards the fu-
ture, the will to alter, to change, to move beyond, and to bring about 
a different set of conditions. In this way the mode of desire expressed 
was one that opened towards real and active creation, reiterating the 
influential recharacterisation of desire by Deleuze and Guattari in An-
ti-Oedipus where they write that “to desire is to produce, to produce 
within the realm of the real.” (2011: 29). This domain of the real does 
not exclude the possible, for, as they continue, “within the real every-
thing is possible, everything becomes possible.” (ibid). This ground-
ing in the real, this “passion for the real” (Badiou 2007: 47), found clear 
expression in Jane’s desires to not explore the whys but the hows, to 
get started; in Dave’s focus on the physicality of space, the architecture 
and process of building; in Matt’s will to build relationships and learn 
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skills.
 The expression of desire as an active force of creation was ar-
ticulated again clearly in the principles document under the heading 
of the Creativity principle which states, “[w]e think creative practice 
holds within it the potential to build new worlds and shatter old ones, 
to learn to see new possibilities and work through old traumas.” In 
this statement the place of creativity as a temporal orientation towards 
the future is outlined. Creation is expressed as the emergence of the 
new, the constitution of difference. The desire for the creation of a new 
world, of new conditions is expressed clearly. In this way one of the 
movements that opens the contested space of politics is found—the 
articulation of an imperative. This temporal orientation of desire to-
wards the future, towards creation as the emergence of the new, is one 
component of the dual gesture that opens the contested spaces of poli-
tics. It is the expression of desire in the form of the will for an alterna-
tive future, to open “the future as an opening onto the radically new.” 
(Augé 2014: 6).  It manifests injunctions and imperatives to engage in 
the construction of alternative futures, that is it operates in the deontic 
mode of what should be.
 But the text includes a second temporal dimension that forms a 
counterpart to that of the futural imperative. It is a gesture that estab-
lishes the reciprocal possibility of the imperative or injunction, of the 
demand or forward orientations of desire in a deontic mode. Not only 
does it speak of the potential to build new worlds but also the need to 
shatter old ones, it does not only speak of the need to learn of new pos-
sibilities, but also the necessity of working through old traumas. It is 
this movement that grounds the political in the present reality, and the 
historical formation of that reality.  This is the gesture of analysis and 
recognition, the moment of establishing the current state of affairs. 
This gesture does not belong to the deontic domain of the imperative 
or injunction, but to the realist mode of the statement, of that which is. 
 It is the expression of the statement that feeds the imperative, 
and likewise it is the expression of the imperative that feeds the state-
ment. Whilst of different orders, they are endlessly intertwined. What 
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should be feeds that which is. That which is feeds what should be. The mo-
ment of the statement is one of recognition, of experience, of something 
being seen, exposed or discovered. This is the moment of analysis—it 
is the moment of identification, the moment of facing the old world 
and traumas. In this way it is the gesture that belongs to the order of 
‘apophantic’ discourse, that is to the domain of discourse to which 
truth and falsity may be applied. Such a gesture acts to uncover a real-
ity that can be hidden or exposed, that can be masked or revealed; it is 
“to take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν [legein/discoursing] 
as ἀποφαίνεσυαι [apophainesthai/apophantic] out of their concealment; to 
let them be seen as something unconcealed (ἀληυέϛ); to discover them.” 
(Heidegger 2010: 31 emphasis original). Through confronting beings, 
through the experience of coming face to face with actualised realities, 
a process of recognising the collective conditions of existence occurs. 
The collective and individual identifies components of reality as they 
are revealed to them.
 Such moments may bring forth experiences of anomie and al-
ienation, experiences of dissatisfaction with the world as it is found. 
They hold temporal dimensions. As Derrida writes in his discussion of 
the spectre of Hamlet in the writings of Marx, and quoting Hamlet ad-
dressing the spectral presence of that which is but should not be—“‘Time 
is out of joint’: time is disarticulated, dislocated, dislodged, time is run 
down, on the run and run down [traqué et détraqué], deranged, both out 
of order and mad. Time is off its hinges, time is off course, beside itself, 
disadjusted.” (2006: 20 emphasis original). There is something wrong 
in the state of affairs as they are experienced in the present. As Derrida 
continues, “‘The time is out of joint’: something in the present is not 
going well, it is not going as it ought to go.” (ibid: 27 emphasis original). 
In this latter expression, the movement from the statement (time is out 
of joint) to the imperative (it is not going as it ought to) is clearly articu-
lated. 
 The moment that reveals the ‘old world,’ the moment of anal-
ysis and the statement, does not occur in isolation. The coming out 
of concealment of beings, the recognition of conditions that classical 
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Marxism might have called the formation of class consciousness, the 
recognition of the prominence of work, the endless accumulation of 
capital, the withdrawal of the public sphere through privatisation, oc-
curs alongside a non-apophantic moment. There is not only the state-
ment, here the analysis of political and economic conditions, but also 
the imperative, the identification of what-should-be against what-is. It is 
alongside the statement that the imperative is articulated. There is a 
dual movement of contradiction and paradox by which the statement 
has always already been realised in relation to the imperative, but 
equally by which the imperative is always already at work in delimit-
ing of the statement, in the confronting of conditions, in becoming-
unconcealed. 
 Neither the statement not the imperative is prior to the other. 
Both are operative in the formation of the other. As Giorgio Agamben 
puts it, 
“Western ontology is in this sense a double or bi-polar 
machine. We must [accustom ourselves to] the idea that the 
ontology, not simply, doesn’t have only the form of “is”. 
This is like this. There is another ontology which has the 
form of the imperative.” 
(2011). 
On the one hand there is the ontology of being, of ‘is’, of the 
apophantic statement. The ontology of the imperative on the other 
hand, rather than speaking of truth speaks in a different manner—it 
concerns potentiality and utopian horizons. This potentiality that is 
found in the imperative is no less real, but rather concerns a different 
ontology. Whereas the apophantic ontology of the statement would 
be that of science, analysis, empiricism and traditional philosophy, the 
non-apophantic ontology of the imperative would be that of the com-
mandment, injunction, and moral or ethical imperative, an ontology 
of the potentials for the creative projection of desire, the domain of 
“law and religion—and we can add magic too.” (ibid). This ontology 
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is the domain of what could-be, what should-be, what must-become, 
a deontic ontology. 
 It is in the attempt to traverse the chasm that emerges between 
these two ontological orders that this field of politics can be thought. 
Between that which is, and that which could- or should-be, a conflict-
ual space emerges whereby the spacetime of the statement does not 
match up to the spacetime of the imperative. It is precisely this un-
canny space of uncertainty, disjunction, contradiction and ontological 
confusion that continually opens up between what-is and what-ought-
to-be. The Field sought to “create new worlds and shatter old ones 
to learn to see new possibilities and work through old traumas”. It 
is these old worlds and residual traumas that are the sediments of 
historical materialism that Walter Benjamin’s angel of history finds 
colliding at its feet in the form of a storm (1999: 249). Situated in the 
present, and always facing the past the catastrophe that falls at his feet 
inescapably forces him forward towards the future in an effort to put 
right the catastrophic storm that propels him onwards. In this way it is 
the analysis of the current condition, the domain of the statement, that 
when compared to the domain of possibility and desire, tears open the 
chasm between what-is and what-could-be. It is this chasm that holds 
the storm at the angel’s feet and that endlessly recreates these fields 
of futural politics. It is the effort to traverse this space, to weather the 
storm, that marks the shifting horizons of this field of politics.  
 Such a political field is characterised by John Holloway phoni-
cally, in terms of the scream. He writes, 
“[t]he scream is ecstatic, in the literal sense of standing 
out ahead of itself towards an open future. We who scream 
exist ecstatically. We stand out beyond ourselves, we exist 
in two dimensions. The scream implies a tension between 
that which exists and that which might conceivably exist, 
between the indicative (that which is) and the subjunctive 
(that which might be).” 
(2002: 6). 
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It was this ecstatic movement that The Field engaged in the ex-
pressions of desire as a creative force, a movement from what was 
seen to be, what was stated to exist, to what could- or should-be. And 
it was this ecstatic orientation towards the future that opened an ever-
transformative space of politics through the disjunction between the 
ontology of what-is, the ontology of the apophantic statement, and the 
ontology for what-should-be, the ontology of the non-apophantic com-
mandment. This scream is the reflection of the commandment upon 
the statement, the negation of reality as it is, “the rejection of a world 
that we feel to be wrong, negation of a world we feel to be negative.” 
(ibid: 2). In this way this field of politics is opened through the dis-
junction of what-is and what-should-be, through the dissonance of two 
orders facing one another in conflict. 
 We can here return once again to Rancière’s characterisation 
of politics as the disjoining of governance from natural and unques-
tioned rights and hierarchies, the moment of uncovering that what-is 
could be otherwise. This political field which is opened in the gap be-
tween the apophantic and non-apophantic, between the statement and 
imperative, creates itself in the very act of declaring it to be other than 
the existent social or so-called ‘natural’ order. It emerges in the very 
act of declaring the possibility that something could be otherwise, it 
is the striving for that otherwise—thus it is a space that is continually 
remade and opened whenever someone claims that something could 
be different, its boundaries are not predefined—it is the disjunction of 
the way things are, and what they could be, it is the disjunction of the 
apophantic and non-apophantic ontologies, the space in between the 
statement and the commandment, the attempt to move the command-
ment into statement. Ethics and politics here begin when we abandon 
notion that what is good is predetermined or transcendental, and ac-
cept that the attempt to define and bring about the good is itself politi-
cal, not only the striving towards a good that is already established 
as a metaphysical idea, form or essence, as a gift of some modality of 
divinity or nature. Such a political field emerges in the space opened 
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up by the very contestation of any natural good or right to govern, of 
any one path, it is a space opened up by the conflict of competing on-
tologies and utopian projections, it is a space that emerges through the 
absence of the title to govern in that there is contestation, uncertainty 
or ambiguity over the place of sovereignty.
FIELD FOUR: COSMOPOLITICS
In January 2016 a course of reiki training was run at The Field. 
Francis, a founding member of the New Cross Commoners who had 
been engaged with The Field from the beginning, had recently met a 
reiki master and had a long conversation with her about setting up 
a community reiki practice. Part of the idea was to experiment with 
forms of mutual care that could be self-sustaining, and through which 
knowledge about practices of care and associated skills could be 
shared. It was conceived of as having the potential of also opening 
new ways of thinking, producing new subjectivities, as well as decom-
modifying a practice of care that was generally based on monetary ex-
change. The reiki master, Katie, agreed to train a group of people at a 
highly reduced rate which would 
be obtained through donations. 
Those who could afford to would 
pay more, opening the possibility 
for those who could not afford to 
pay to participate. The aim was 
also to establish an ongoing prac-
tice of reiki, and other forms of 
mutual care at The Field. 
The first event was attended 
by around ten people of mixed 
backgrounds, genders and eth-
nicities. Francis and I were the 
only Field regulars who attend-
ed. As we sat in a circle, Katie in-
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troduced us to the ideas underpinning reiki, and asked each of us to 
share what had drawn us here. The responses ranged from interests in 
witchcraft, shamanism and alternative practices of healing to personal 
experiences that had introduced them previously to reiki at different 
points of their lives. Katie went on to introduce various aspects of reiki 
in more depth. She explained the shakras and the way the practice of 
reiki channelled universal energy through the body of the healer and 
into the shakras of the person receiving the healing. She brought out 
a series of crystals and explained their relations to different parts of 
the body and the shakras. Following this, a number of crystal pen-
dants were produced and people held them whilst asking questions—
a circular movement indicated a positive response, and a horizontal 
movement a negative one. At one point, Ninon, burst out laughing 
and grabbed the pendant as it moved. After a momentary pause, she 
explained that she had heard the voice of her mother—a strong Afri-
can Christian—telling her this was witchcraft.
Following this, we sat and chatted, whilst individual people 
went with Katie into the greenhouse for one on one taster sessions. 
As we chatted everyone agreed that they would like to do this again. 
E-mail addresses were taken and the intention was set that the group 
would meet again over the next coming months to complete the level 
one training. 
Throughout this evening I had a strong conflictual inner dialogue 
underway. One the one hand, I sympathised with Francis’s aims with 
this project, to explore new paths of subjectivity and mutual care, and 
strived to keep an opening mind. On the other hand, there persisted a 
forceful voice of rationalisation, one that looked at these practices as 
dangerously non-scientific and making claims that could not be veri-
fied and could be potentially politically obfuscatory. This latter inter-
nal voice sought to disqualify the entire system of meaning, the entire 
practice. Chatting with Francis about this internal conflict afterwards 
he agreed with me in part, but said that he had learnt from Starhawk 
at a workshop at Grow Heathrow that even if the method was ‘crazy’, 
what comes out of it could still be interesting and politically effec-
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tive. Francis told me that there had been some rumblings of discontent 
among some people around the fact that it was not a political practice 
and so not in line with The Field. Francis had found this frustrating, as 
a close reader of Félix Guattari and Silvia Federici, the collective prac-
tice of reiki was not only a way of opening new passages of subjectiv-
ity, but also constructing a politics of care that was decommodified 
and collectivised. 
The conflict between the two internal dialogues I experienced 
reveals the field of politics that I am here discussing as cosmopoliti-
cal. The term cosmopolitics, I take from the work of Isabelle Stengers 
(2005; 2010; 2011). There are various aspects to this cosmopolitical 
field, and I will not have space here to discuss them all, but I would 
like to focus on the tension between these two inner dialogues—that 
of disqualification, and that of an opening of subjectivity. One of the 
problems that Stengers identifies with modern science is its tendency 
to disqualify all other modes of knowledge, to discount them as er-
roneous, non-empirical and simply false. In so doing it adopts an au-
thoritative stance, one which seeks to establish itself as the ultimate 
and sole bearer of truth, it attempts to adopt the place of the super-
ego. It is this stance that I suggest was found in the inner dialogue 
that sought to disqualify reiki as a valid form of political practice, and 
even as a valid practice at all. Such a stance is not entirely dissimilar 
to those found in the writings of early anthropologists, ethnologists 
and ethnographers who turned their attention to magic. As Ernesto de 
Martino writes of Edward Tylor, 
“he soon begins to pass judgement upon all animistic 
and magical ideology, calling it ‘subjective’, ‘superstitious’ 
and ‘savage’, and then proceeds to discredit modern spir-
itualistic ideology, saying that it is merely a derivation of 
the former.” 
(1972: 180). 
In short, Tylor disqualifies magic as a way of knowing and expe-
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riencing the world.
In an attempt to avoid such disqualifications that would exclude 
certain forms of knowledge and certain beings from participation in 
the production of knowledge, and also in politics, Stengers proposes 
that we develop an ecology of practices which “requires that we do not 
view ‘value’ as that ‘in whose name’ something can be imposed or 
must be accepted” (2010: 37). Such an ecology of practices seeks to 
open means of creating systems of meaning, knowledges and forms of 
practice that do not relate to one another in such a way as to disqualify 
them and are not antagonistically oppositional to one another. But it 
is not merely a matter of tolerance, as she writes elsewhere the impli-
cation of tolerance is that a form of knowledge is deemed to be false, 
but tolerated nonetheless—“[w]hoever is endowed with ‘tact’ knows, 
or thinks she knows, what the other’s problem is, but she also knows 
that this knowledge will be worthless if it is delivered to the other.” 
(Stengers 2011: 307). Tolerance maintains the relation of disqualifica-
tion to other forms of knowledge, or other practices, but conceals it 
under the guise of tact. An ecology of practices, on the other hand, 
would seek to find ways of opening practices to one another, of asking 
questions of and with one another, in a way that does not presume to 
know the truth of the other. 
Cosmopolitics then, is a matter of resisting the premature closure 
of the polis. It is a matter of attempting to keep politics open to the 
cosmos and the cosmos open to politics, as Latour writes of the con-
joining of cosmos and politics, “[c]osmos protects against the prema-
ture closure of politics, and politics against the premature closure of 
cosmos.” (Latour 2004: 454). Politics transforms and remains open to 
transformation. It is not an established and delimited domain reduc-
ible to a friend/enemy opposition as with Carl Schmitt, or the progres-
sive development of class war as in traditional forms of Marxism. As 
Stengers writes in The Cosmopolitical Proposal, “[p]olitics is then disen-
tangled from any reference to some universal human truth it would 
make manifest…. Politics is an art, and an art has no ground to de-
mand compliance from what it deals with.” (2005: 1001). Politics is a 
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matter of opening to the creation of new and unexpected values, it is 
a matter of fabricating systems of meaning and value practices. Such 
a form of politics requires that quick resolutions or judgments are re-
sisted. It requires that we slow down.
 To draw out this element of cosmopolitics that requires slow-
ing down Stengers draws on the psychosocial type of ‘the idiot’, devel-
oped from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Dosoyevsky’s The Idiot 
(2013) which is discussed in What is Philosophy? (1994). Here Deleuze 
and Guattari contrast Descartes conceptual personae of the idiot, the 
one who doubts everything and submits all these doubts to processes 
of reason, to Dostoyevsky’s idiot who “wants to turn the absurd into 
the highest power of thought—in other words, to create” (ibid: 62). 
This figure of the idiot, which is not here a derogatory term, is the one 
who “will never accept the truths of History” (ibid: 63), they remain 
opening to a questioning that is not reductive and essentialist in its 
relation to rationality, but constructive and creative in its relation to 
the absurd. Thus, its orientation towards other practices is not one 
of disqualification, but one of an open inquiry. The speculative, crea-
tive dimension remains open. This cosmopolitical attitude is one that 
remains open to as wide a range of practices as possible, attempting 
to locate the possibilities of interaction between them, rather than dis-
qualifying them as irrational, non-scientific, or false. 
In this way, cosmopolitics concerns an idiotic encounter with 
difference-writ-large. In its political practice it does not delimit what 
beings—people, animals, plants, minerals, tools, technologies, ideas, 
facts—are permitted to partake in the polis. It seeks to open a dimen-
sion of possibility that Guattari referred to as “axiological creationism” 
(2006: 28). Here, the axioms of a polis are not determined in advance, 
and do not become fixed or static, but remain open ended—they re-
main questions rather than statements. They are continually recreated 
as they encounter other beings and other practices. 
My inner dialogue concerning the validity of reiki expresses the 
problematic of cosmopolitics—a part of me sought to disqualify it as 
a practice, whereas another sought to remain open to the possibilities 
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that it might open. These possibilities could be numerous including, 
but not limited to, the emergence of communities of care and the es-
tablishment of new forms of interaction with others. It is this latter 
attitude, that of remaining open to possibility, to questioning, explora-
tory and open attitudes, an attitude that does not discount other ways 
of knowing and experiencing the world and other forms of being, that 
characterises cosmopolitics as it here manifests. Such a problematic 
was also found in the discontent among some members of the col-
lective that the reiki classes were not political, as well as the spectral 
voice of the mother who declared the practice to be witchcraft—such 
an attitude has the effect of closing the possibilities of the polis, of 
delimiting them, and thus excluding other forms of participation in 
politics. 
Through this field of politics, the practice of attempting to find 
modes of communication with difference-writ-large that may facilitate 
the construction of common worlds emerges again. The cosmopoliti-
cal attitude, and it does often appear as an attitude or stance, requires 
means of locating mechanisms of communication across difference, 
communication with other kinds of beings, practices and knowledges. 
It is a field of politics that attempts to maintain openings to possibilities 
other than those that can be predetermined, predicted or expected, it 
requires a loosening of identity in a manner that intersects with trans-
versality. Identities of individuals, collectives, knowledges, practices, 
must remain open to recomposition, realignment and transformation 
through communication.
ThE INTERSECTION OF FIELDS
The four fields of politics I have outlined here are by no means 
intended to be exhaustive, or to offer any kind of definitive definition 
of what politics is. They are rather four fields that I have found use-
ful to think politics at The Field with. They are not meant to define all 
political worlds, for perhaps if political worlds were as simple as four-
fold, we would have no need for politics in the first place. And neither 
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are they intended to be understood as four domains that are bounded 
and separated from one another. Each of these fields fold into one an-
other, become entangled with one another, and come together in vary-
ing ways that enact transformative articulations upon one another. At 
times the accent may be more heavily on the dynamics of openness 
and radical transversal democracy, at others they may shift towards 
closure and agonism, all of the while maintaining relations to both and 
being transformed by orientations towards the future and varying de-
grees of idiotic cosmopolitical attitudes. Nevertheless, these four fields 
have proven useful tools for thinking politics and thinking politically, 
provided they do not become static, absolute or definitive. 
In the two chapters which follow, Commoning Beyond the Com-
mons and Affective Activity and Careful Collectivity, we will see these 
four fields intersecting in a variety of ways—cosmopolitical attitudes 
overspill into agonisms, agonisms are rearticulated around attempted 
openings onto spaces of transversal radical democracy, and the gap 
between the apophantic and non-apophantic which reveals a time out 
of joint remains ever present. I will not continually refer back to these 
terms throughout these coming chapters but would ask the reader to 
take them forward with them. However, they must be taken forward 
gently, for as has already been stated, they cannot by any means en-
capsulate the complexities of politics and attempts to force their im-
position will undoubtedly fail. They are, as the common paraphrase 
of Lévi-Strauss (1963) goes, good to think with but, like Wittgensiten’s 
ladder (1974: 74), they must be discarded when they are no longer 
of use, when they restrain thought rather than enable it. For where 
their limits are reached, or where they intersect in innovative ways, 
it is likely they must be discarded in order to facilitate the expression 
and emergence of other fields. In short, they open fields, they do not 
delimit them. 
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Date: 2014-12-09 13:32 GMT+00:00
Subject: Re: Communized library
To: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Hey x,
Attached is the list. I look forward to hearing your ideas 
on how the library could work and if you’d like to fill your 
shelves with any of the books listed.
 
I can deliver all the books to you. They will come with my 
ex libris and I do expect them back at some stage, possibly 
when I decide to make a common library in Glasgow :)
xx
p.s. Your site is lovely, but if I can offer a word of criticism: 
using terms like “transversality” and “commoning” really 
means nothing to most people and can be off putting. Par-
adoxically, I think the practice of transversality and com-
moning involves rethinking those terms and how they are 
used.
x
TRANSVERSALITY BEYOND ThE COMMONS
 As the post-script indicates, the practices of transversality and 
commoning involve rethinking those terms and how they are used. 
It is paradoxical. Or at least seemingly so. The very terms designate 
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modes of political practice that entail their own deconstruction, their 
own abandonment. These terms, central to various formulations of 
The Field’s aims and principles during the time which I spent there, 
include within them their own deconstructive principle. It is as though 
some parasitic kernel at the core of these notions sought to consume 
them from the inside out. The practice of commoning requires a ges-
ture beyond the signifier commoning. The practice of transversality 
requires a mode of speaking that does not utter its own name.
 This e-mail was sent by an outsider. The sender was, by no ac-
count, part of the core collective that formed The Field. But that does 
not mean they were not part of it. They certainly contributed. As the 
e-mail makes clear—they donated on loan a selection of books that 
formed a large part of The Field’s library. Books that themselves one 
day became the subject of a brief and minor controversy concerning 
the boundary work of commoning. 
 I was sat inside with Horatio one day, someone we will hear 
more of later in this chapter. We had been discussing some of the prob-
lems that Horatio identified as existing at The Field. He was, at that 
time, a strong critic of many of the practices and boundaries of the 
project. We were discussing how The Field was, in many ways, sepa-
rate from many local communities, how it was not offering events or 
activities that would be of interest or use to those who lived in the 
poorer areas at the foot of Telegraph Hill. Two passers-by came in, 
middle aged women who we learnt had been in New Cross their en-
tire lives and now lived in one of the council estates behind the build-
ing. We were both talking to them about what The Field did. One of 
them was drawn to the library that covered part of the wall and I told 
her she was free to borrow any of the books. In response she asked if 
there were any novels—I’m always looking for new novels. Immedi-
ately embarrassed, I gestured towards a small corner at the bottom of 
the shelves where a mix of mass market paperbacks that people had 
left on the door step were sitting neglected—books like The Da Vinci 
Code, and The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo. Horatio looked at me smirk-
ing. This is what I’m talking about, he laughed at me, what’s anyone 
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going to with this kind of stuff. His hand reached out to the prominent 
middle shelf and drew out a copy of Alain Badiou’s The Theory of the 
Subject. No one round here’s got any use for this, he laughed.
 I tried to offer a justification: we try to get books that aren’t eas-
ily accessible at New Cross Learning, or the public library; and look, 
I pleaded, a lot of them are about practical stuff, gesturing towards 
the skills section including a motley assortment of how-to and DIY 
books. But I could see the knee-jerk justification was futile. His point 
was clear enough. What good would The Theory of the Subject do in this 
particular interaction with two women who had grown up in New 
Cross and had wandered into the building for the first time simply out 
of curiosity. As he said—what’s anyone going to do with that. 
 The books had been selected for a number of reasons. There 
were conflicting thoughts regarding what should be included in the 
library, but regularly it was expressed that it would be good to keep 
books that were not easily accessible elsewhere. There were also a 
number of more thematic criteria—books to do with politics, alterna-
tive economies, and various forms of self-organised learning or DIY 
manuals were considered to resonate well with the aims of The Field. 
In some senses, these thematic selections set a certain boundary to the 
community that was imagined by The Field. They were markers of 
what could or could not be included within its polis. Equally, the se-
lection of books that were not easily accessible elsewhere marked a 
certain preference for alternativeness and forms of political counter-
culture. They asserted a series of (political) positionings.
 What do moments like these have to tell us about practices of 
commoning and transversality, those practices which require their 
own deconstruction? Apropos commoning, in The Beginning of History 
Massimo de Angelis writes, 
“The production of commons occurs at the point of 
division within the struggling body, precisely because it is 
a proactive creation to resist the division of the social body 
on the basis of immediate material interests. The produc-
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tion of commons can overcome these divisions not by ig-
noring them, but by rearticulating them around new value 
practices. Indeed the production of commons to recompose 
a divided struggling body coincides with what might be 
called articulation, that is the production of new meanings.”
(2007: 239)
The practice of commoning occurs not at the point of a coming 
together of similarities, that is of articulations that are in agreement 
with one another, but rather at the moment of their disjunction. The 
work of commoning unfolds on the ground of the uncommons. It is 
the attempt to bring into conversation value practices that are not im-
mediately reconcilable. Commoning occurs at the point of division. 
 It is here that commoning and transversality fold into one an-
other at the point where they possess a comparable modality of im-
manent parasitic deconstruction. Their practice is their own undoing. 
Transversality is not a coming together that would unite multiplicities 
or monads, here understood in the Tardian sense as composite (Tarde 
2012; Marrero-Guillamón 2014), under a unifying identity, or bring 
articulations into a univocality that is homogenous. It is rather an in-
terfacing of difference in such a way as to retain their specificity and 
multiplicity. It is, as defined by Francis— difference coming together 
without being flattened out. This sentiment is also expressed, anthro-
pologically, by Viveiros de Castro in his description of transversal sha-
manism where he characterises transversality as 
“The relation between points of view (the relation 
that is a point of view qua multiplicity) is of the order of 
disjunctive synthesis or immanent exclusion, and not of a 
transcendent inclusion. In sum, the perspectivist system is 
in perpetual disequilibrium” 
(2014: 158).
 The transversal component of the practices of shamanism de-
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scribed by Viveiros de Castro are those of “communication that oc-
curs between heterogeneous terms” (ibid). It is a practice of commu-
nicating across difference without translating, and thus transforming 
or destroying, those differences into a transcendent code or meta-
language. Transversal communication remains in disequilibrium, for 
the incommunicable remainder continually displaces the possibility 
of entirely transparent communication. The practice of rearticulating 
around new value practices remains ongoing and displaced. And it 
is this ongoing displacement and tension that commoning practices 
continually attempt to overcome, not in the sense of reaching a tele-
ological unification but rather in the sense of ongoing rearticulation, 
negotiation and communication. As de Angelis writes, “[d]ifference 
within a struggling movement is also the condition for the production 
of new common values” (2007: 32). The disjunctive synthesis of differ-
ence is the very possibility of commoning, the uncommons the ground 
of commons. 
 To illustrate this further it is useful to return to Viverios de Cas-
tro’s discussions of transversality. Elsewhere in Cannibal Metaphysics 
he quotes from François Zourabichvili’s work on Deleuze where he 
writes, “‘common” does not have the sense of a generic identity, but 
of a transversal, nonhierarchical communication between beings that 
are only different.” (Zourabichvili in Viverios de Castro 2014: 105f.58). 
Commons, then, are not the site of a shared self-same identity, or of 
unification of difference under a univocal articulation, but are the site 
of the encounter of differences and the transversal site of communica-
tion between these differences. 
 In what follows I would like to examine a number of moments 
where The Field encountered certain limits to its collectivity, that is 
where it encountered divisions and disjunctions. These are moments 
at which commoning was attempted, but in some senses failed. They 
are attempts at commoning beyond the commons, in the sense that the 
body of the commons sought to or was pushed to recompose and 
rearticulate itself around conflicting value practices. They are, I be-
lieve, some of the moments at which commoning reveals its ground of 
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practice to be the uncommon. These points of difference are complex 
and overlapping. There is no simple way to resolve them, and that is 
not the aim here. Rather, I am hoping to draw out a few of the complex 
entanglements that were not overcome during my time at The Field, 
and equally cannot be overcome in the medium of the text.
COLLABORATION WITh ThE ENEMY?
 The first instance revolves around a conflict that emerged re-
garding whether or not a particular project, and with it a particular in-
dividual, should be allowed to use The Field. On the recommendation 
of one of the early members of the collective who had since left, the 
UK chapter of the Regional Alliance Forging Organisation (RAFO) ap-
proached The Field to use the building as office space and for hosting 
workshops. RAFO is an international organisation which works on 
issues around identity and difference. They host workshops on diver-
sity and inclusion, gender and sexuality, contemporary masculinity, 
faith and belief, income, wealth and class, mental health and identity, 
and difference. Harlow, the director of RAFO London, is a black man 
who migrated from Grenada to London in his 20s. He is now in his 
early 60s and has worked with a vast range of organisations including 
local government, probation service, crown prosecution service, po-
lice, NHS trusts, and the voluntary and private sector, including large 
financial organisations in the City of London. His work often focuses 
on understanding identity and difference, and how we perceive others 
and ourselves, and the power relations at work in the inter-relation of 
identities. Often the work focuses around ideas of leadership and em-
powerment through raised awareness and self-esteem. The request to 
use The Field as an office was presented flexibly, stating that they were 
open to sharing the space with others in a co-working space arrange-
ment, and that they were willing to participate in the organisation and 
life of The Field, as well as offering free or reduced cost workshops, or 
other activities organised and run by them.
 Following his request to use The Field as office space during the 
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week many questions were raised by those who were on The Field’s 
e-mail list, which was at the time the main collective decision-making 
platform aside from meetings. Various questions were raised. The re-
lationship of RAFO to the state and large corporate organisations was 
one issue. They had worked with the Home Office, the probation ser-
vice, Vodafone and with the London Metropolitan Police force offering 
workshops and training on identity, difference and racism. For some 
people, this was a problematic issue. As expressed in the commoning 
principle, an aim of The Field was to experiment with alternatives to 
state and market, and some found this direct interaction with the state 
and private sector potentially problematic. Some were concerned that 
they might be receiving funding from the Home Office for the Prevent 
anti-terrorism program which was described as ‘essentially racist.’ Re-
ceiving such funding was seen as an endorsement of these State appa-
ratuses and indicated complicity. In addition, the question was raised 
as to ‘the politics of it,’ and if the “purpose is to turn people into ‘good 
citizens’? From whose point of view?” reiterating the aversion to the 
state apparatus of good citizenship and “the disciplinary order of the 
citizen” (Hardt & Negri 2003: 95). This position was articulated by sev-
eral people at The Field in the concerns regarding the extent to which 
RAFO was engaged with the disciplinary apparatus of the state, the 
apparatus that moulded people to become functional citizens. As one 
person put it, “I mean it’s still encouraging, y’know, work and that 
sort of participation in capitalism.” The concern was expressed that 
RAFO functioned within the apparatuses of the state and capital, it 
was neither explicitly anti-capitalist or anti-state, which would poten-
tially put them at odds with the aim towards “experimenting with the 
commons as an alternative to the institutions of both the market and 
the state” that was a component of the commoning principle. 
 Further, the question was raised as to whether they were or-
ganised collectively or hierarchically. Harlow fully assumed the role 
of the director of the company, and the website was read as indicat-
ing a preference for hierarchical forms of leadership that sat within 
this structure. It was also asked if they always charged for their work-
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shops, and what it meant for them to explore contemporary masculin-
ity and “their approach towards gay, bisex, queer etc “men”, how do 
they deal with this, what do they mean by “men” and so on.” Consist-
ent charging for workshops was deemed, by some, unacceptable as it 
functioned as a clear barrier to participation. The focus of some of their 
workshops on masculinity was also deemed problematic, as it could 
potentially reinforce dominant, patriarchal gender roles. Several of 
the key words, such as ‘celebrating masculinity’ and ‘discussing what 
it means to be men’, were seen as problematic. Questions were also 
raised about their involvement with the New Cross/Deptford area, in 
accordance with the ‘Local’ principle of The Field, and the extent to 
which they were led by groups ‘facing oppression or injustice’.  
 All these concerns outlined a political position that was occu-
pied collectively by The Field. Although the boundaries and limits of 
the political position were flexible and ambiguous, they none the less 
marked a political position that could potentially exclude RAFO and 
others from becoming part of The Field. And this very flexibility and 
ambiguity wrote into the position a barrier to the encounter of differ-
ence because as it was not clearly defined it was necessary for those 
who would be able to occupy it, and so join The Field, to already have 
a certain kind of unspoken knowledge of what that position entailed, 
to be able to recognise it and occupy it without the presence of a clear-
ly defined, publicly available discourse that set its parameters. So, it 
was marked by what could be described in terms of a certain political 
habitus (Mauss 1973; Bourdieu 2010), in that it revolved around a set 
of behaviours and embodied knowledges that were not always clearly 
and immediately available in discursive form. 
 This ambiguity that became particularly apparent when con-
fronted with an external difference, was expressed by one person 
through the statement “I’ve had dealings with Harlow and RAFO and 
couldn’t work out exactly why I didn’t like what they do, but I just 
didn’t, not a strong feeling but just a discomfort.” What it was about 
RAFO that did not fit perfectly with The Field was not entirely clear, it 
was more part of an entire constellation of approaches, world views, 
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knowledges and practices. The aim of The Field to create radical po-
litical alternatives became clear at the moment when it was confronted 
with what one person described as, in direct reference to RAFO, “the 
hegemonic political model.” This hegemonic political model was con-
structed of an array of components including, but by no means reduc-
ible to, complicit working with state and market institutions, service 
provision, charity, hierarchical working arrangements and a focus on 
masculinity that could potentially lead towards the perpetuation of 
patriarchy. In contrast, the political position articulated by The Field 
favoured participation, horizontal working arrangements, localism, 
immediacy, and non-capitalistic modes of exchange. In many senses 
the political position that The Field articulated overlapped with com-
ponents of what has been described as the folk political common sense 
of today’s left (Srnicek & Williams 2015) which favours horizontalism, 
local and immediate relations, and participation rather than represen-
tation. 
 The proposal was discussed over a couple of projects meetings. 
Many of the objections and concerns were raised across the course of 
these two meetings and following this it was requested that Harlow at-
tend a projects meeting to discuss these issues in person. At this point, 
Matt and Jane, who had been talking to Harlow personally up until 
that point said that they felt uncomfortable brining him to a projects 
meeting to be ‘interrogated’ by the entire group, expressing instead 
a preference for more personal interaction outside a formal meeting 
setting which might allow a more flexible form of communication that 
could take place “in an environment slightly less intimidating and 
conducive to dynamic conversation as is often the case in a typical 
meeting.” A number of people objected, as this would ultimately by-
pass the collective decision-making processes. Harlow was asked to 
attend a projects meeting, but could not make the date of the next one 
set and asked for a representative of the collective to meet him instead. 
 Jane and Matt met him and reported back to the group with his 
responses to the questions raised. Concerning the relationship with 
the Met, he said that his engagement with them came from a long 
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experience of being a black man in London, and that he hoped to be 
able to offer training programs to them as a means of reducing oppres-
sion towards communities, adding the addendum—‘still a long way 
to go.’ In relation to the concerns regarding masculinity and how it 
related to LGBTQ, he said that many of his workshops explored these 
issues extensively, saying ‘several of our primary leaders hold that 
identity and sexual orientation is a key feature of all our workshops.’ 
Matt and Jane made clear that they thought that it would be great to 
have his project using The Field, as well as the suggestion of running 
a co-working space that could be used by other groups—Jane saying 
“I see it as more important to get people using the space, to make it a 
genuinely useful place for people in the area than a bastion of political 
purity.” There were very few replies to the e-mail that reported back 
and proposed that RAFO begin to use the space during the week, the 
two that did reply responded affirmatively, but many of those who 
had expressed concerns and had asked for Harlow to attend a projects 
meeting remained silent. Shortly after RAFO began to use the space 
three days a week as part of a co-working space which was open to use 
by others.
 Talking to Harlow around a year later in a cafe in Tottenham, 
it became clear that he had never fully been aware of the controversy 
that had surrounded his introduction to The Field.
When you first encountered The Field what under-
standing did you have of its aims or what it was trying to 
achieve?
My understanding was that it was aiming to be an in-
clusive place for the community and a place that would be 
predominantly free or at not much cost for the community 
and it is a great model the truth is that there are so many 
people in the community and/or groups in the community 
with nowhere to go and nowhere to take what it is they 
need to take to go forward 
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…
Did you find the process of entering into The Field 
fairly easy?
For me it was easy. I think because I’ve been through 
and understand the dynamic of bureaucracy top-down, 
bottom-up, etc. so actually the gateway into The Field was 
easy I think in trying to create an infrastructure that is en-
abling what we’ve arrived at is something that becomes 
more and more complex particularly as there is almost a 
an unspoken place where part of the strategy is, how do 
we keep that lot out and no one being brave enough to say 
well, actually we don’t like you or we don’t like the look of 
you therefore, you can’t use it so we, and that’s what gov-
ernments do we legislate and we legislate to exclude rather 
than have a straight conversation.
When you joined, were you aware of any level of con-
troversy about different groups using the space?
I think because of what I do I got an automatic pass in 
terms of what I do and it’s a demonstration of what I’m do-
ing is being inclusive to people etc. so, there was no ques-
tion about my intentions if you like and how I can put into 
The Field so, I get an automatic pass because of what I do 
even today I think I would still get an automatic pass be-
cause of what I do.
 
 As far as Harlow was concerned there was no controversy about 
him joining The Field. He got a free pass, because of what he did. But 
the story above shows that was far from the case. The free pass he got 
was given by the action of Matt and Jane who, from their perspective, 
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engaged in a more flexible process of negotiation with him in order 
to bring him into The Field. But, from the perspective of many other 
members of the collective who were more uncertain of RAFO and ‘its 
shaky liberal politics,’ Matt and Jane bypassed the collective decision-
making process. This divergence caused elements of division and mis-
trust to continue within the group, something that will be returned to 
in the next chapter.
 Harlow also describes how, in relation to other people or groups 
joining The Field, there was an unwillingness to tell them directly that 
they could not join. This also manifested in Harlow’s introduction to 
The Field. The controversy remained, as far as Harlow was concerned, 
within that ‘unspoken place’ of ‘how do we keep that lot out’ that he men-
tions above. A series of divisions and concealments occur here in this 
attempt to common beyond the commons, that is to rearticulate the 
commons around altered values. These divisions and concealments 
were only partially overcome, and here transversality and common-
ing approached certain limits, certain boundaries where the recompo-
sition of the commons faltered. The uncommonalities persisted, shift-
ing in and out of unspoken places depending on who was speaking 
and who was listening. The unspoken haunted the spoken as the back-
ground static that both made communication possible and obstructed 
it.
 In that same conversation with Harlow we moved onto the 
topic of another area of conflict and controversy, part of which will be 
discussed in the following two sections.
I think now, If I’m really candid, I think there’s some 
passive-aggressive racism going on which is specifically di-
rected at Mmandu and more and more people don’t like 
her and a lot of people don’t like her because they don’t 
understand her and it’s a place where through her hurt and 
her experience she hasn’t learnt how to win friends and in-
fluence people and there’s a place where I can talk to you 
in a really straight way and you won’t like me but because 
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I have learnt how to be inclusive I can talk to you in a way 
that allows you to feel part of my conversation and my 
agenda quite simply Mmandu hasn’t learnt that it almost 
comes from or my surmisation or guess is if you’ve given 
if someone’s had a brutal upbringing it’s hard for them to 
be loving or enduring because they can still feel their pain 
in a way that  I’ll say ‘middle class Britain’ don’t have those 
experiences and pain.
UNSPOKEN PLACES
 Before moving onto the conflicts pointed to above concerning 
Mmandu’s engagement with The Field, I would like to momentarily 
think with the notion of the unspoken place which emerged in conversa-
tion with Harlow that day. The aim here is to give this idea the status 
of a concept, that is to put it on the same plane as anthropological 
theory and the other forms of conceptual work that run through this 
text. In doing this I am following Viverios de Castro’s proposal for 
an anthropology that treats the ideas of our participants as concepts 
(2014: 187-196). This would be an anthropology that thinks with and 
alongside our participants. Such an approach would start from the 
possibility of equality between anthropological theories and “the in-
tellectual pragmatics of the collectives such theories take as their ob-
ject.” (ibid: 189). The claim is not to think like Harlow in this instance, 
to claim to be able to have access to the reality of his thought or mean-
ing, but to think with him, that is to take the concepts emerging from 
our conversation as precisely that—concepts, and to place them into 
conversation and interaction with other conceptual planes. It is an as-
sumption of the possibility of reason between equals (Rancière 1991). It 
is to accept the invitation of the other to think with them, to attempt to 
open to “the Other as the expression of a possible world.” (Deleuze 2011: 
261 emphasis original).  In doing this, the hope is that we can take 
forward the notion of the unspoken place as a concept that helps us to 
think alongside the following conflicts. 
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 The unspoken place, that Harlow speaks of is one that has a strat-
egy, and a strategy that asks how do we keep that lot out? The unspoken 
is a place, a place with a strategic positioning of exclusion. But it is a 
strategy of exclusion that is not brave enough to speak itself. It legis-
lates to exclude, rather than having a straight conversation. As a place, 
the unspoken takes on a spatial reality. One that marks out a series 
of co-ordinates, that draws a boundary of identity. It is one means 
of defining group limits and horizons. It is spatial for the boundary 
“defend[s] against external and internal threats to ensure that the lan-
guage of identity retains a meaning.” (Augé 2008: 45). The place marks 
a position, a position with a boundary that perpetuates a spatial iden-
tity. It is then, the marking of a territory.
 But the place is unspoken. There are refrains1 that marks this 
territory, that rearticulate and recomposes its boundaries, but  they 
are unspoken ones. It is a refrain as “any aggregate of matters of expres-
sion that draws a territory” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 356 emphasis 
original). That they are unspoken refrains perhaps reveals that they 
could be spoken but are not, or alternatively that they are of a differ-
ent order of expression to speech. As Harlow says, they are unspoken 
through a lack of bravery to state you can’t use it. Common transversal-
ity approaches an impasse where effort is made to communicate with 
the other but falters.  Here, the lack of bravery could be understood 
as the fear of the collapse of the territory, the fear that a particular 
opening to the other, that is to difference, may fail “to ward off chaos” 
(Zourabichvili 2012: 205), that a particular opening may be so severe 
as to result in the collapse of identity. It is not that a clearly defined 
identity meets non-identity (chaos), and is thus threatened, but that 
the interstice of encounter between identities may trigger one of them 
1 Whilst the concept of the ‘refrain’ is initially drawn from music, the use of 
the concept by Deleuze and Guattari is expanded beyond an audible context and 
instead, as the write in A Thousand Plateaus, applies to “any aggregate of matters of 
expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes (there 
are optical, gestural, motor, etc., refrains) (2004: 356). The refrain refers to repetitive 
expressions, such as gestures, rituals, images or sounds (Young, Genosko & Watson 
2013: 254), that delimit and maintain a territory. This expansion of the refrain be-
yond the musical and auditory is furthered developed by Guattari in The Machinic 
Unconcious (2011) and Chaosmosis (2006).
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to deterritorialise to such an extent that all territory is lost and cannot 
be recomposed. And with this collapse of identity would also come 
the collapse of the possibility both of commoning and transversality 
in that the communication between heterogeneous terms (Viverios de 
Castro 2014: 158) may fail to persist as terms. But this fear fails to be 
spoken for to be spoken would appear to undermine the motives of 
transversality and commoning—it would admit defeat and limit, the 
failure to recompose around common values. 
 So there is a strategy, it is a strategy to keep that lot out, to keep 
out those who would undermine the territorial principles that both 
make commoning and transversality possible, and obstruct it. It is a 
strategy of “[d]rawing up and inhabiting the territory that filters cha-
os” (Zourabichvili 2012: 205). Again, the chaos that threatens and is 
filtered out is not that of non-identity but is emergent of the encounter 
of identities. The chaos would be not that which is encountered, a non-
identity of chaos in distinction to the order of identity, but rather the 
potential state of extreme deterritorialisation that could be emergent of 
encounter. Thus, the unspoken place legislates to exclude.  But it legis-
lates to exclude in as much as it fears that it cannot make the leap “out 
of the territory or deterritorializing oneself towards a cosmos distinct 
from chaos” (ibid). This cosmos distinct from chaos would here be the 
possibility of rearticulating around an altered set of common values, 
of bringing into being another composition of a common world. At 
times though, the fear is too great, the bravery is lacking, for there is 
always the risk that the common world will falter, decomposing back 
into the background static of the uncommons, the uncommon static of 
chaos as “the primary matter of virtuality, the inexhaustible reserve of 
an infinite determinability” (Guattari 2013: 103). The chaos will not be 
filtered, and the leap towards a cosmos will fall short. The identity of 
the commons, and with it the possibility of articulation, will collapse. 
 Here comes the strategy of the unspoken place, which “assumes 
a place that can be circumscribed as proper (propre) and thus serve as 
the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it” (de 
Certeau 1988: xix emphasis original). The unspoken place, in its lack of 
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bravery to speak straight, devises a strategy the goal of which is to 
keep that lot out. It is a place which constitutes a relation to the other 
in which transversality cannot be achieved due to the potential of col-
lapse, that is of the values being so entirely deterritorialised as to lose 
all consistency and continuity with their former state. It is this ges-
ture that reveals a limit and impasse on the part of commoning, a mo-
ment where the attempt to rearticulate around common values falters, 
reaches too far, or does not even have the bravery to start for fear of 
total loss of territory.
WhO ARE ThESE PEOPLE?
 Mmandu initially approached Matt wanting to set up a cafe in 
the building during the week. She wanted to run it as regularly as pos-
sible. Having run various catering projects before, she was looking for 
an affordable place to set one up again, and owning  a  large amount 
of catering equipment, she was ready to start as soon as possible. Her 
focus was very much on running the catering—she said she could take 
care of the food herself. She said she wanted to sell good quality food 
in a nice environment. The issue of money was never properly re-
solved. Although approached several times it was never engaged with 
in any kind of depth or with any kind of clarity. When the possibil-
ity of offering food by donation was approached, Mmandu appeared 
agreeable in principle, but would pass over the issue finishing with 
statements such as, ‘we’ll I’ve got to get paid somehow.’ It was implicit 
that Mmandu was not happy with a blanket food by donation policy 
for everyone. Yet at this point no one involved in the process clearly 
stated that food by donation was a key necessity for The Field, or that 
running a business was not an appropriate activity for The Field, one 
that had in fact been turned down on a number occasion previously 
through the collective decision-making processes. She was very eager 
to start immediately and had a lack of interest in collective decision 
making concerning her project—she could not see how it was justified 
or why it was necessary.
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 Mmandu’s project did not fit comfortably with the political ter-
ritory marked out by The Field. For many people attending the project 
meetings it was too close to a business. She wanted to charge money, 
pay herself and was unclear about if she would give any money to The 
Field and also unclear about how things would be priced. She was also 
seen to demonstrate unwillingness in working with other people, or 
having her project bent, changed or shifted to fit with the positions 
marked out by The Field. Her main engagement with The Field was 
through Matt, myself and Jane as we were the ones who were primari-
ly there during the day when she would pass by. She had met very few 
of the other people who attended meetings or contributed to the deci-
sion-making processes. She showed little interest to become involved 
in other elements of the project such as meetings, decision making 
processes or contributing to the everyday life and maintenance of the 
space—all of which were considered central to the possibility of par-
ticipating in The Field, and key to collaborative working methods and 
principles of self-organisation. Yet she also wanted to make significant 
changes that would affect the entire project. She spoke of painting the 
walls, redecorating entirely and installing equipment permanently, all 
of which would require the collaborative decision-making processes 
and discussions that she did not want to participate in. When it was 
stated to her that in order to make decisions like this, they would need 
to be discussed and engaged with by the wider collective using the 
space, she would respond saying—‘who are these people, who I never 
see when I’m here, but are able to make a decision about my project?’ 
As far as she was concerned it was myself, Matt and Jane who she 
saw there every day and so we should be the ones to who she should 
address her proposals to. The unspoken place of potential exclusion 
converged with an unseen collective of people. 
 In the course of these discussions she had also raised many con-
cerns that were difficult and uncomfortable facts, concerns that several 
of us had also been worrying about and which we had been trying to 
address for a while. She pointed to the fact that the space was always 
closed during the day, that this resource was just another community 
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centre that was locked up and inaccessible to those who needed it, 
that the local community couldn’t get in there, and that an elite group 
of white folks were holding it to ransom. She made clear that there 
were not enough people of colour using the space, that it was a space 
for ‘white people and their posh mates,’ that she had heard people 
refer to it as ‘that weird white people place,’ and that if we were seri-
ous about the project being in anyway community focused, this could 
not continue. As far as money was concerned, she made it clear that 
she was someone who was economically excluded, and so she should 
have access to the space for business purposes. She did not have access 
to resources elsewhere which was supposed to be a criteria for people 
using the space.  
 A clear and constructive course of action did not emerge, al-
though many of us agreed fundamentally with the points that had 
been raised. Matt had said that if she wanted to make a proposal for 
running a cafe from The Field on a regular basis, outside of a process 
of collaboration, she would need to put together a proposal and bring 
it to one of the Monday meetings in order that a collective decision-
making process could take place through the meetings, e-mails and 
the online decision making platform that formed components of the 
collective processes The Field had established at that point. But she 
quite simply did not see why anyone else should have a say on wheth-
er or not her project could happen. No proposal was ever received. 
 Mmandu was asked to engage with The Field in a particular 
way, a way which also demanded that she communicate in a certain 
way by participating in a consensus-oriented meeting, engage in a 
collaborative process, respond extensively over e-mail, and write and 
present proposals. These channels of communicative practice were es-
tablished by those operating within a culture of activism, one which 
has an entire constellation of practices and modes of behaviour associ-
ated with it. Such insistence on these means of communication can be 
seen as one manifestation of a failure to find means of enacting trans-
versality, they formed markers of the unspoken space of exclusion, 
the space that demanded people act, speak and relate to The Field in 
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certain ways. The commons could not extend to Mmandu, because 
she could not communicate in the modalities that it required, and, in 
spite of efforts, the channels of communication failed to transform to 
accommodate her. The unspoken place marked a territory through ex-
clusion that required people speak in a certain way and fit within its 
territorial modes of expression.
 It is here that part of the problematic of passive-aggressive rac-
ism candidly spoken of by Harlow emerges. Mmandu had not, in Har-
low’s words, learnt how to make friends and influence people. Her 
communicative style was often experienced as aggressive and violent, 
confrontational and challenging. This was, at times, seen as an unwill-
ingness to engaging in collaborative or cooperative processes, a prin-
ciple which underpinned the processes and structures of The Field. 
This clash of communicative practices brought about an impasse. Peo-
ple did not understand her, and the more she was misunderstood, the 
greater the unspoken space of exclusion operated in such a way as to 
perpetuate the polarisation which cast her as an external threat to The 
Field. 
 In such moments, stumbling blocks to transversality and com-
moning were approached. The commons could not be reformed 
around a new set of value practices that could incorporate Mman-
du, her needs and desires, or her communicative modalities. There 
are echoes here which resonate with Nancy Fraser’s critique of the 
Habermasian conception of the public sphere. This would be a sphere 
which fails to recognise “informal impediments to participatory par-
ity” (Fraser 1990: 63), that is it would fail to become attuned to the 
unspoken places which legislate to exclude, that form discourses and 
behaviours in such a way as to allow some to speak and be heard, and 
force others into silence or miscomprehension. One such echo can be 
discerned in the conflict between the individual needs and desires of 
Mmandu, the need to “get paid somehow,” and the demand for col-
laborative working practices as well as alternative economic models 
that harbour aversions to commercial activity. 
 Chatting with Horatio one day, the question of why he thought 
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The Field wasn’t more useful to the local communities arose.
The way politics are rolling here it’s a barrier I think 
the way the place is being run you know the politics that 
people are applying to this place its being a barrier. That’s 
what I think.
What do you mean by the way it is run for example 
or the way that politics are actioned here do you have any 
examples?
Yes, I think you guys have this idea of trying to keep 
money away of everything and I don’t think that that’s be-
ing helpful. I think if you had money involved it could be, 
maybe if people here also made the other things like I said 
before. Ok, so I think money could help but because you 
guys are from the party of I don’t believe in money or, like I 
don’t want to work with money in this place or you believe in 
that for this place and you have this belief and people don’t 
want to give it up you know. So even like other things, like 
the way we talk to people and the way people talk to us and 
that’s politics so we are in a party, you guys are in a party 
that okay we talk in this manner and we believe in this but 
actually to help the society or to help the poor community 
we have to give up some of our ideas in order to help them 
and I don’t think that that has been done successfully.
 The way we talk to people and the way people talk to us — that’s 
politics. Horatio makes clear that communicative modalities are part of 
politics, they are integral to encounters with difference, of the experi-
ence of the other, of both attempting to listen and attempting to speak. 
Communication as the attempt to attend to and care for gatherings of 
heterogenous entities and agencies is politics, a process of bringing to-
gether differences without acting ‘as if’ those differences do not exist. 
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Continuing, he starts to speak of society, but corrects himself, replac-
ing it with more specific designation ‘the poor community.’ That is, as 
we had been discussing previously, the primarily black communities 
that live at the bottom of Telegraph Hill rather than the students of 
Goldsmiths or the rich, predominantly white, communities that popu-
late the Hill. To aid these communities, we have to give up some of our 
ideas.
 The resonance with Fraser’s critique of Habermas is powerful. 
“What is at stake here is the autonomy of specifically political institu-
tions vis-á-vis the surrounding societal context” (1990: 65). The sur-
rounding societal context in which The Field finds itself enmeshed, 
is not a homogenous one, it is not one that has only one modality of 
communication, only one public. The sphere of community invoked is 
not one that can act as if they were equals in the common space of ne-
gotiation and deliberation, but must take account for the way we talk to 
people and the way people talk to us. It is not a matter of addressing soci-
ety, as a singular, univocal discourse or mode of communication, but a 
matter of engaging with the specificities of difference on the terms im-
manent to those differences. The aggression that some experienced in 
Mmandu’s communicative practices, that lead to the unspoken place 
of passive aggressive racism, was also a practice of making a poten-
tially marginalised voice heard. 
 This is, itself, a component of the problematic of commoning 
and transversality—how to bring difference together without erasing 
them under a banner of universality. How can communication oc-
cur through a practice of controlled equivocation (Viverios de Cas-
tro 2004), in which communication occurs in such a way as to retain 
the differences of the webs of meaning and worlds that are brought 
into relation; it must acknowledge that “[n]othing comes without its 
world, so trying to know these worlds is crucial” (Haraway 1997: 37). 
There is a component of commoning and transversality, two notions 
which become deeply entangled in their practice, that remains tenta-
tive. There is a not-quite-yet, an only-partly-seen, remainder in the 
attempt to transversally understand others. In short, transversal com-
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moning remains a continually deferred process of becoming-with. 
 As a tentative experimental practice, failures, stumblings, block-
ages and impasses are inevitable. Moments where the part glimpsed 
is taken for the full picture, or moments where the practice becomes 
too much to bear, the chaos too hard to ward off, the fear too great, the 
bravery lacking. At these moments, the plunge into the “cosmos dis-
tinct from chaos” (Zourabichvili 2012: 205) falters, and the recomposi-
tion of common value systems cannot be fully achieved. Such frictions 
can be painful. Misunderstandings of other worlds proliferate, and 
exclusion becomes the unspoken legislative practice. Sometimes, giv-
ing up some of our ideas, leads to a territory undesired, or threatens the 
hard-made common world at its very core. 
VEGANISM OR ChICKEN?
 I would now like to turn to one further instance of what I am 
here seeking to outline as commoning beyond the commons, that is those 
moments where commons attempt to reform themselves through ten-
tative practices of commoning that remain in ongoing composition. 
These tentative practices are the moments whereby attempts are made 
to reform commons around altered value systems in order to become-
with differences that were previously outside the commons. Such mo-
ments and processes have the dual status of collective boundary-mak-
ing and boundary-collapsing. Far from being exceptional moments, 
they are the possibility and limit of commons and commoning. I am 
here focusing on moments where such recomposition faltered, as it is 
at such moments of failure that the modalities of these practices are 
clearest, in a certain Heideggerian fashion—it is when a tool breaks 
that we become most aware of what it enabled us to do. 
 The moment I would like to now turn to is a brief conflict re-
garding whether or not meat should be served at the Wednesday 
night kitchen. As it became clear that there was a significant amount 
of resistance to Mmandu establishing Well Being Kitchen at The Field, 
she sought other means of engaging with the project and influencing 
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its direction.  The Wednesday Kitchen was one of the routes that she 
chose. Generally, the cook at the Wednesday kitchen changed each 
week—people would sign up to lead the preparation of food each 
week. It was framed as a collaborative process, in which food could 
be used as a gathering device and people who might not attend spe-
cific events or projects or admin meetings, could contribute to the life 
of The Field. Eschewing the unspoken expectation that the cook each 
week would change, Mmandu put her name down for every slot that 
had not yet been taken. Fragments of discussions I had with her dur-
ing this period are scattered across the final entries in my notebooks.
Black folk like chicken.
   You need something for the chicken heads. 
Black people don’t want chickpeas and flavourless mush, they ain’t 
going to come in here for that.
Black folk ain’t going to come here if you don’t have something for them.
Mmandu was very clear about the fact that, as she put it, black 
folk want chicken. The rule for the Wednesday kitchen up until that 
point had been that food would be vegetarian, and where possible 
within the budget and capacities of the relevant cook, with a vegan 
option. Mmandu challenged this rule, refusing to not serve meat. She 
prepared vegetarian food, but not exclusively. This sparked a brief 
controversy in the extended collective around The Field. Some took 
the position that vegan food did not exclude meat eaters, whereas con-
versely the presence of meat at the kitchen did exclude vegans and 
vegetarians—“there’s the smell and ethics behind it,” as one person 
put it in the e-mail thread. 
Vegan and vegetarian meals were here assumed to be more inclu-
sive. “Vegetarian/vegan food is more inclusive and cooking the food 
at the Field promotes collaboration - all values that the Field wants 
to promote.” The introduction of meat was then seen as a potential 
248
mechanism of exclusion, as well as a ground of ethical transgression. 
Vegetarian/vegan food on the other hand was cast as a mechanism 
of inclusion, a gathering device, and an assertion of ethical solidarity 
with nonhuman entities—both animal, and environmental. But a more 
complex sentiment that was shared by several members of The Field 
collective was encapsulated by the line: “Food politics are a lot more 
complicated than simple ethics unfortunately - and for me (this is my 
personal position), it’s more important that a more diverse group of 
people come together on the Wednesday dinner, than it is adhering 
to an ethical standard shared by some.” The problematic, then, partly 
unfolded as a question of which specific communities, should be ca-
tered for by The Field.
Mmandu’s claim was that black folk ain’t going to come here if 
you don’t have something for them. The first night that she cooked at 
the Wednesday kitchen seemed to give weight to her statement. The 
building was packed with a more diverse mix of people than had, at 
times, previously been present at the event. That evening I met many 
people who were attending the kitchen for the first time, who had 
been specifically invited by Mmandu. The promise of having a more 
diverse group of people come together seemed to have been realised. Sub-
sequent nights on which she cooked did not maintain this diversity. 
At the next kitchen I attended at which she cooked, Mmandu herself 
observed, the crowd tonight is more of the… well—you know. The unspo-
ken rose its head again in this observation, the implicit meaning which 
I understood from this unspoken place of well—you know, and which 
was communicated by the mutual look of recognition that we shared, 
was that this kitchen was, for the most part, attended by young, white, 
middle class people, many of whom had connections to Goldsmiths.
This question of the politics of food and the community which it 
is capable of gathering around it is, however, far more complex than 
the simple question of Veganism or Chicken which titles this section. 
On the one hand, Mmandu’s belief that you’ve got to have something for 
the chicken heads did, at times, appear to ring true—the kind of food 
that was served did facilitate different gatherings. As Williams-For-
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son explores in her study of African American women’s experiences 
and stories of chicken, this food “has served as a tool of self-expres-
sion, self-actualization, resistance, even accommodation and power.” 
(2006:2). But the story is not so simple, for just as chicken functioned 
as a gathering device for power and resistance, so too did it function 
in the discourses of white racism, through the stereotypical portrayal 
of black people as chicken lovers as “one of the linchpins with which 
white racists claimed black inferiority” (ibid). Food politics are a lot more 
complicated.
Whilst there are instances in which Mmandu’s claim appears to 
ring true, we should resist easy, stereotypical, and potentially racist 
characterisations. The other side of this potentially simplifying and 
essentialising discourse would be the association of veganism exclu-
sively with white middle classes. Rather, it is perhaps more useful to 
accept, with no need for paradox, that both veganism and chicken can 
be intersectional gathering devices and potentially exclusive and divi-
sive. Whilst Mmandu’s claim that black people don’t want chickpeas and 
flavourless mush, may hold truth in specific instances, there are oth-
ers in which veganism unfolds as a practice of decolonisation (Harper 
2010). Again, food politics are a lot more complicated. Neither chicken, nor 
veganism, is essentially associated to race. 
WhAT IS IT ThAT (UN)SPEAKS?
The question of how certain practices, certain foods, certain 
modes of speech, intersect, reject, or become drawn to one anoth-
er cannot take place on a plane that would draw generic equations 
(vegan=white; chicken=black) which would ascribe identities inescap-
ably to causes, and would understand identities as bound universals. 
Rather, the planes on which such interactions occur remain as tentative 
exploratory planes, ones which seek mechanisms of inclusion/exclu-
sion around common value systems. It is this seeking of mechanisms 
of inclusion/exclusion that draw the boundaries of the commons, be-
fore once again decomposing them, taking the plunge towards the 
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other as an invitation to another possible world.
 Sometimes, in this effort there are moments where the politi-
cal field of transversal commoning overspills into political fields that 
structure themselves according to the territorial opposition of friend/
enemy.  This field of friend/enemy2 politics is not external to that of 
transversal commoning, but rather a matter of its very formation, that 
is of its boundary-limit, for it is an integral component of the distinc-
tion that forms the commoning community and that is integral to the 
proposal that there can be no commons without community (Mies 
2014). Commons require a specific community, including its boundary, 
that cares for and is cared for by the commons with which it gath-
ers. Such boundary work requires exclusion as much as inclusion. To 
deny the boundary of the commons, even if it is a tentative boundary 
would be to fall into the same conceptual traps that Fraser located in 
the Habermasian conception of the public sphere. It would be to con-
fuse the common with the public.
 Fields of politics intersect and overlap,3 the transversal encoun-
ters of commoning falter, overspill into territories in which they must 
deploy the field of friend/enemy. It is a matter of how others are con-
stituted, how they are experienced, how they are cared for or neglect-
ed, how they are communicated with and the extent to which their 
invitation is responded to. The formation of the polis, around food or 
otherwise, is never a simple process. And identities are not secondary 
to these processes. Intersections of race, gender, class and sexuality are 
not merely secondary entities in the emergence of political realities, 
they do not only add a particular tone or accent to encounters but are 
inextricably implicated in the formation of realities and encounters. 
As Mills writes on the role of race in social contract theory, “race is 
in no way an “afterthought,” a “deviation” from ostensibly raceless 
Western ideals, but rather a central shaping constituent of those ide-
als” (2011: 14); and in a similar vein Bhambra writes that “[c]lass is 
not the operation of a race-neutral economic system, but part of an 
2 See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
3 See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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economic system which is deeply racialised” (2017: s227). Identities do 
not merely constitute a ‘subjective’ domain of self-identification but 
are fundamental components of the ‘objective’ construction of politi-
cal and economic communities, and their force is observable in very 
concrete manifestations of inequality that are the result of specific his-
torical trajectories, as well as in specific modes of speech and com-
munication that carry with them the layered poetics of these historical 
trajectories. 
 Commoning attempts to attend to these differences that make a 
difference, but it is not always successful. These falterings and failures 
of the processes of commoning, are both its limit and its ground of 
possibility, they are the unspoken places that form the background from 
which the territory of the commons emerge, they are the exclusions 
and distinctions which make possible the emergence of community, 
the forgettings that give form (Kohn 2013), the parasitic static from 
which the articulation of the system emerges (Serres 2007) before it 
falls back into itself and new systems emerge. In short, they are the un-
commons that make commoning possible, the moments of difference 
that open the possibility of communication. But it is never as simple as 
the privileging of one mode of identity over the others. Intersections of 
identities are intersections of identities in contradiction internally and 
externally.
 The problematics that emerged around Mmandu and Harlow’s 
engagements with The Field were remembered very differently by 
others involved. Speaking to Lilly a year or so after these events un-
folded, she gave a very different account to the one above.
It was very emotionally draining. I remember crying 
about it once because it just felt like this whole project was 
just sort of being destroyed by this one, by this character 
who kind of shed the light on all our flaws as an organisa-
tion; but who also wasn’t really wanting to help us in any 
way or help the organisation. It was more just deciding – 
burn it down and then it will maybe be mine – type thing. That 
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seemed to be her objective. I’m sure she even threatened to 
burn it down once
 For many members of the field collective, who had been work-
ing there for a long time, this conflict was intensely emotionally drain-
ing, myself included.4 The common world that had been difficultly 
constructed was under threat. I also recall Mmandu expressing senti-
ments along the lines of burn it down in several of the many e-mails 
sent to the group, often written in ALL CAPS, and confronting many 
difficult issues that, whilst many efforts had been made to address 
them, remained areas of worry and concern. The well-meaning inten-
tions of creating a diverse community appeared to have reached a lim-
it, and it often felt as though the effort to maintain a level of openness, 
to avoid rigid structure, had led to the possibility of its manipulation. 
What structure there was, seemed incapable of providing any sup-
port to help engage with the conflict. The already over-worked and 
tired group of people who had been working hard and poured a lot 
of themselves into the project felt as though all that work could be for 
nothing, could disappear, through this one conflict.
People were quite up in arms about it because there 
had been a Loomio poll where people had said: no I don’t 
want Mmandu doing things at The Field. We’ve met her and we 
don’t think she’s a very nice person. She’s not going to work. We 
think she’s manipulative. And she’s not going to work well with 
us. So people had literally said that.
People had voted against Mmandu using The Field. But the real-
ity of being there day to day did not reflect the simplicity of an out-
come of a majority vote. Several people, myself included, who spent 
most days at The Field felt that Mmandu was already part of the pro-
ject—she was there, she was coming to open events, and it was not 
feasible to attempt to block her from entering. There was a gap be-
4 This emotional and affective dimension will be explored further in the fol-
lowing chapter
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tween the everyday relations, of which Mmandu was already a part, 
and the decision-making process which could vote against her using 
the space. It did not seem possible to simply say—this meeting or this 
event is open, but not to you.
Then she was like: right, well I’m in, And Mmandu is 
a very strange character. Because she could be extremely 
friendly and pleasant to you one minute. she would do it 
to me all the time. She would, she’d say like—Lilly you’re 
so beautiful. I’d be like you’re weird. She’d just like try and 
butter me up in different ways, you know. And she’d say 
things like—I’m just talking to you right now Lilly Because 
I know that you’re so intelligent. Just things like this where 
you’d be like, oh what does she want from me why is she do-
ing this. It wasn’t particularly subtle. But at the same time, 
sometimes the way she would talk to you, you’d forget, oh 
yeah, she’s trying to get people on board. I don’t know, I 
would forget. 
 I also experienced these potential shifts in attitude and stance 
on the part of Mmandu. But considering this afterwards, I also think 
that there was a sense in which this ambiguity was mirrored by The 
Field and its decision-making processes. At some points, Mmandu 
would come and we would welcome her and talk openly with her, on 
an interpersonal level, encouraging her to become involved in the pro-
ject, whereas at other she would come and encounter certain block-
ages to engagement—the need to submit proposals, decision making 
processes that were not entirely transparent even to those directly en-
gaged in them. This shifting of positions and stances, that Mmandu 
manifested, was also manifested by The Field. Such shifts are crucial 
to commoning as a process of negotiation, and that is clear for some-
one engaged in those notions and discussion, but for someone who 
has no way of relating to those concepts, who has not engaged in ex-
tensive discussion of these ideas, the shifts and instabilities may have 
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appeared peculiar, dishonest, unclear. 
She just sort of started doing her dinner. It wasn’t very 
popular. People would arrive at the dinner, and they would 
be told that they needed to pay for the diner if they were 
white, and anyone else who she deemed as being ‘from 
the community’—in inverted commas. So, she had a very 
set idea of what being from the community was, and that 
seemed to be you had to be black.
 Again there is a manifestation of Frasers critique of the pub-
lic sphere—which community, which polis? Mmandu had a specific 
community in mind when she spoke of ‘the community’, and it was 
not the same community as that imagined by others, it appeared to be 
associated closely to race. 
And you had to be maybe like born in New Cross or 
something.  But we weren’t really sure exactly what it was. 
But she decided, for example, that the poetry group that are 
very New Cross-esque, like they’ve been around for years 
and years and years. And they’re not even particularly sort 
of middle class, but they, I’d say they’re a big mixture. But 
a few of them are quite sort of working class and, not that 
we can talk about class in such a binary thing, but basically 
she decided that they needed to pay for their dinner, they 
didn’t even think it was a very good lunch, what she was 
making. She was charging them but she wasn’t charging 
other people, and they took offence at this, as you might.
The poetry group had for a long time been engaged with the 
New Cross Commoners. It was a group that often seemed to serve 
both as a collective interested in poetry, and as a support group. Many 
of the members had difficult challenges in their lives, related to family 
or mental health or the transformations of New Cross they had wit-
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nessed. But for Mmandu it did not fall within the limits of what she 
considered to be the community in need, the community she sought to 
reach, and she made an individual judgement to ask them to pay for 
food whereas others were fed for free or by donation.
And there were just lots of issues where she would 
rile people up at meetings. But, because she was black, and 
because she would talk about being black and the fact that 
we were mostly white, we just felt really, really uncomfort-
able I guess, because we weren’t used to being hit with that 
kind of accusation, you know. You’re a racist institution she 
was basically saying to us, and she would often say things 
like—oh, at the Wednesday dinners you’re all white—which 
just weren’t true.
 There was an immense sense of discomfort, in being confront-
ed with the race politics that had long been a subject of discussion in 
the group but remained a persistent issue. Many people wanted to do 
something to increase the racial diversity of the collective, and sev-
eral groups, such as London Black Atheists, the African Gospel Choir 
and Yoga for Women of Colour had been encouraged to engage with 
The Field by Jane and Matt in particular in an effort to aid the emer-
gence of a more heterogeneous collective. But the problem persisted, 
and whilst Mmandu often made points that were true, they often also 
seemed to spill into generalisations. 
She was right about the fact that there were more white 
people on the, you know, the people coming to meetings, 
they were a lot more white people. And we were in an area 
that’s very racially diverse. So she sort of shed some light 
on that as a failing of ours because she didn’t seem to want 
to sort of, she was just very destructive I guess, In terms of 
people’s relationships. And even Harlow didn’t think she 
was, like Harlow’s also black, and Harlow once described 
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here as: a boulder coming down the hill, and we all just have to 
get out of her way. And so Harlow was not a fan of Mmandu, 
even though she would have thought that she was, she had 
sort of decided it was an us and them situation. It just was 
really really horrible. 
 The perspective given here, by Lilly, is very different from the 
one given by Harlow, or Horatio, or by Mmandu herself. Again, the 
point is not to decide on one perspective as correct, but to illustrate 
the complexity of conflicts such as these, and how they are inescap-
ably entangled with affective and emotional contents which speak and 
remain unspoken yet still communicate, push the conflict into differ-
ent directions, transform its experiential and interpersonal dimension. 
Others become constructed in varying ways, in ways that are them-
selves not simple or stable, that are run through with affects and un-
spoken places. 
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These notes have taken me a long time to return to. They were 
written in the closing period of my full-time engagement with The 
Field which lasted around two and a half years. During this final pe-
riod many of the conflicts and tensions that had been existing within 
the collective for a while reached a point at which, for me and several 
others, they became unbearable. For many months after, around 11 
in total, I was unable to return to these notes and this period of field-
work. Attempting to turn my back on the affects that swell from these 
notes, the violent surges of force and intensity that rest between the 
words, letters and lines has been a dissociative process, one that has 
created distance. Not only a spatial or temporal distance, but more 
significantly, an affective one.
In this chapter I will start from my own personal experience in 
order to attempt to bring to the surface the “quality and intensity” 
(Rosaldo 1989: 11) of the affective experience that ran through this pe-
riod. The aim is to draw upon and emphasise the results of one of 
the strengths of anthropological methods, that is the extended engage-
ment of the practitioner with their field sites that makes its positive 
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condition the inescapable entanglement of participation and observa-
tion (Ingold 2013: 5).  Far from being an analytic weakness, the pres-
ence of personal experience within anthropological methods and the 
intense affective engagement this demands can be seen as one of the 
discipline’s strengths. To draw on this strength, parts of this chapter 
attempts forms of “ethno-self-analysis” (Augé 2008: 32). Such methods 
toy with the already unclear boundary between ethnography and au-
to-ethnography, particularly when dealing with a collectivity to which 
the anthropologist is ‘indigenous,’ and draws on the strength of being 
able to make the affective, emotional and experiential components of 
collective experience “more readily accessible to readers than certain 
more detached modes of composition” (Rosaldo 1989: 11). It is an at-
tempt to attend to individual affective experiences ethnographically.   
But personal experience and analysis is here only a starting point 
to begin to speak about a collective situation in which care, neglect, 
affect and value became organised in such a way as to produce the 
phenomenon that is commonly called burnout. After outlining my 
own experience, I will seek to sketch some of the intersections be-
tween care, value and affect through a discussion of some theoretical 
models for understanding these terms. It is hoped that this discus-
sion will aid in opening interfaces between my own experiences and 
those of others. Finally, the conclusion of this chapter will attempt to 
reconfigure what is commonly called burnout as an emergent result of 
specific relations, rather than the depletion of a pre-existent source of 
energy. My experience then, is only a starting point to discuss a series 
of experiences which extended well beyond me but in which I was 
inescapably entangled. In beginning with my own experiences in this 
manner I am attempting use them as thresholds through which to talk 
of collective experiences. 
It is, in some sense, a question of shifting scales, but scales that 
are not vertically or hierarchically organised, that is where the smaller, 
individual, or psychological, scale is encompassed by a broader, and 
hierarchically higher, social or collective scale. Rather the movement 
between scales here seeks to unfold in a horizontal manner, one that 
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sees “every part containing information about the whole and informa-
tion about the whole being enfolded into each part” (Strathern 1995: 
17-8). It is less, then, focusing on the individual as a privilege site 
of analysis that might be considered self-same and bound and then 
moving outwards and upwards to a collective level of analysis, that 
is moving up scales. Rather it is a matter attending to the affective 
flows and forces that traverse individuals as sites of intensive contrac-
tion and concentration of monadic entanglements. It is perhaps better 
phrased as a matter of position and perspective than one of scale.  This 
is a further means of pursuing a Tardian monadic ethnography (Mar-
rero-Guillamón 2015) which does not separate the ‘social’ from other 
forms of relation, in this instance the psychological and affective, do-
mains that Tarde consistently refused to separate out from others (so-
cial, physical, biological, economic, political, religious, etc.). Position 
then, in this instance, is less a matter of traveling up and down along 
vertically organised nested hierarchies, but more a matter of shifting 
perspectives “at perpendicular angles” (Corsín Jiménez 2013: 24), that 
is of shifting what it is possible to see from a given point within a net-
work.
It should also be said, that this affective, experiential and emo-
tional strength of ethnographic method that is described above, how-
ever, requires its counterpoint—that of detachment (Yarrow et al 2015). 
Far from being exclusive binary opposites, distance and engagement, 
participation and observation, are tendencies which require one an-
other in a continuum that is far more nebulous, unfinished and com-
plex than a choice of either/or. 
The notes that open this chapter were written during a period 
which preceded a process of detachment. It was not only the detach-
ment that separated the field site from the place of writing, but impor-
tantly it was a process of affective detachment, one which allowed me 
to become disentangled from The Field. These notes speak of various 
stances and processes: feeling trapped, powerless, stuck; feeling as 
though I had become the face of a situation over which I had little con-
trol; feeling helpless, unhelped and unhelpful. Many of these stances 
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speak of situations caught in flux between forms of over identification 
and loss of identity. Being at The Field every day and being various 
people’s points of contact at The Field meant that I increasingly began 
to identify with the project. What were perceived as failures of The 
Field would verge on becoming personal failures and it would often 
be to me that complaints would be addressed. I felt as though, at times 
and for certain people, I was the face of The Field as I was the one who 
they would see there every day. I was over-identified with the project. 
My own position, perspective and identity became engulfed by the 
nebulous and unstable positions of The Field.
In The Divided Self, R.D. Laing speaks of engulfment as a source 
and form of ontological insecurity. He writes, 
“A firm sense of one’s own autonomous identity is re-
quired in order that one may be related as one human being 
to another. Otherwise, any and every relationship threatens 
the individual with loss of identity. One form this takes can 
be called engulfment.” 
(Laing 1970: 44). 
To put this in the language of monadic ethnography, for a monad 
to interface with another without becoming its subordinate, or vassal, 
it must have a certain level of self-possession. There is an important les-
son here for commoning practices which is partly encapsulated in the 
description of transversality given by Francis. In an e-mail which was 
written in response to a conflict resolution meeting which occurred 
at around the time the notes which opened this chapter were written, 
transversality was described as “difference coming together without 
being flattened out.” What both Laing’s outline of engulfment, and 
Francis’s description of transversality point to is the way in which, at 
times, forms of detachment are required in order for sustainable forms 
of attachment to be maintained. Put differently, the common world is 
not a homogenous world in which difference is reduced to a unifying 
identity. Commons are entangled with uncommons, networks are run 
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through with breakages. 
This distance opens as a counterpart to the methodological ap-
proach I outlined in the first chapter as commoning anthropologically. 
This is a point I will return to in the conclusion of this chapter. Briefly 
however, it is, in a sense, a signal of the limit of such a method, the 
point where the awkwardness of the relationship (Strathern 1987) be-
came too much. If commoning anthropologically is a process of par-
ticipating in the construction of common worlds, that is engaging in 
a collective exploration of the possibilities for anthropos and relations 
to the other and difference, there may come a time when this partic-
ipation, for whatever reason, must desist; if it is about the ongoing 
and exploratory construction of networks, relations and associations, 
there may come a time when it is necessary for the network to be cut 
(Strathern 1996), but in this instance not only for the interpretation of 
relations to end, but more for their construction to cease.
BEFORE DETAChMENT
The notes which opened this chapter come from a particularly 
intense period at the Field. I would spend every day there. The roles 
I had adopted were many. I was effectively managing all administra-
tive processes, and with that all financial processes. I was regularly 
cleaning and attempting to organise the place. I was working on sev-
eral of the building projects in the garden—finishing the workshop, 
unblocking the drain, building the shelter for the rear platform. I was 
meeting the people who would come to the space on a daily basis, 
the passers-by. I was supporting the other roles when they needed 
help. I was managing, attempting to improve, and encouraging others 
to use the digital platforms that I had helped to set up in an effort to 
share information more effectively. I was, with Matthew, attempting 
to initiate Solidarity Kitchen—a project which due to its very nature 
attempted to intervene in the way the whole of The Field was organ-
ised and structured, opening it up to wider engagement but running 
a regular cafe and social space from the building during the weekdays 
272
when it was often closed. 
Above my desk at home, directly opposite my bed, a piece of 
string hung from two picture hooks. Along this string various bulldog 
clips and clothes pegs hung sheets of paper to do with The Field—
mind maps, flyers, reminders, notes, unfinished projects, unpaid bills, 
letters requiring a response or action, meeting minutes. Each night and 
morning as I sat up in bed in the minutes just before I slept and just af-
ter I woke, I would be sat opposite this clothesline of unfinished work. 
Letters from Companies House warning us of the upcoming annual 
accounts deadline. Another letter from HMRC telling us when the tax 
return was due. A bill from Virgin Media. An e-mail about the drains. 
Some bullet points scrawled on a scrap torn from a notebook. Henry 
Miller’s 11 Commandments of Writing—no. 8: ‘don’t be a draught-horse! 
Work with pleasure only’—scrawled on another page torn from one 
of my notebooks.
At The Field I was the only person who knew where the HMRC 
reference numbers were kept as well as other irritating but inescapa-
ble bureaucratic identifiers, or at least how to find them. I was the only 
person who could refund someone for expenses made with their own 
money. I was the only person who would regularly make deposits in 
the bank. I knew all the logins for the digital platforms, how to edit 
the website, how to send out the newsletter, how to add people to the 
Google Group, how to edit the wiki which had in itself been set up to 
provide people access to information about these organisational pro-
cesses but was primarily used by me.  I knew the processes for book-
keeping, where the receipts should go, how the annual report should 
be created, where the monthly statements should be kept in case of 
inspection, the relationship between the accounts, the pin numbers for 
the Alto cards, where the cheque book was kept. I knew the laws con-
cerning the CIC report, the time it needed to be filed, and what needed 
to be included in it as well as the difference between the CIC34 report, 
the annual accounts and the annual return. I knew what building pro-
jects underway, which tools were needed, and which lengths of timber 
or other materials were reserved for certain projects, what materials or 
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tools we were lacking and how much they would cost. I knew where 
groups of us had decided the chairs should be kept in order to max-
imise the use of space, where the heaters should be put away, what 
each of the underground storage boxes were meant to contain, how 
the kitchen had been organised, how to refill the gas canisters, how 
to connect the hobs to the canister, how to connect the canisters to 
the heater, the fact that having these canisters violated any possible 
insurance.  I knew the nuances of the legal grey areas which we toyed 
with the edges of, the limit on the regularity with which food could 
be served before we would have to comply with FSA regulations as 
specific, and for us unworkable, as the temperature the fridge would 
need to be kept at and the regularity with which this would have to be 
checked. I knew the code for the key safe each time it was changed and 
how to change the code itself and when it was agreed that it should be 
changed and how it should be changed. I knew what items in building 
and garden were used regularly and would be sorely missed if they 
were to go and what items were rarely if ever used. I regularly found 
myself called upon to resolve some impasse someone had reached or 
to find some vital piece of information for someone, information as 
simple as the code for the door or whether or not there was a meeting 
occurring that night. Some people who were relatively new to the pro-
ject would at times send me updates on what they were working on or 
the role they had been assigned at the monthly meeting or would for-
ward me on problems that they had encountered in the organisational 
processes or elsewhere. Several major conflicts that were playing out 
at that time became mediated through me.
To me, all these positions, practices and forms of knowledge con-
stituted some of the means by which I sought to care for the project, 
to help it grow, to sustain and nourish it. The regularity with which I 
was able to be at The Field, having the privilege of an AHRC grant to 
support me, meant that I was able to immediately experience the ne-
cessity of what might appear like the most minor piece of knowledge. 
This could be knowledge as prosaic as the fact that Virgin Media had 
when we first set up the account mistakenly charged us £800 mean-
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ing that every month we received a first bill telling us we owed this 
amount, and then a second one with the correct amount on it a day or 
two later. For someone not knowing about this and opening the let-
ter, the day between receiving the first bill for £800 and the second for 
£30 would be a stress filled day of phone calls to unhelpful customer 
service departments. 
Equally however, the fact that I knew all of this and had at my 
disposal the time to engage with it made it difficult for me to commu-
nicate to others, who had less time and less immediate engagement 
with these day to day issues, why a certain issue was urgent or im-
portant, why something needed to be done a certain way, or precisely 
how I thought or had decided something should be done. And equal-
ly it became very frustrating having to explain once again something 
that I had written out on the wiki, e-mailed round the group, or ex-
plained in several other instances to several other people or at several 
other meetings. When self-organisation appeared to me to be failing, 
it was far easier to step in and do something myself. In addition, the 
injunctive component of how something should be done grew in mag-
nitude the longer I spent time in such a central organisational position. 
I felt with a powerful affective force, the implications of the leading 
question that Gregory Bateson’s metalogical father-figure makes to 
his metalogical daughter, that “[i]t’s the same for all the things, isn’t 
it, that each thing has only a very, very few places which are “tidy” 
for that thing?” (2000: 5). And It was not only because doing things a 
certain way made other tasks simpler and easier for me and others, 
but also because through this process of becoming so entangled in the 
organisational processes of The Field the image of what I thought the 
project was, what it could be, and how we could get there intensified. 
Additionally, being there every day and being various people’s 
points of contact at The Field meant that I increasingly began to iden-
tify with the project. What were perceived as failures of The Field 
would verge on becoming personal failures and it would often be to 
me that complaints would be addressed. I felt as though, at times and 
for certain people, I was the face of The Field as I was the one who they 
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would see there every day. I was over-identified with the project. My 
own position, perspective and identity became engulfed (Laing 1970: 
43-5) by the nebulous and unstable positions of The Field. My efforts 
to care for The Field began to enter an injunctive zone, a zone that bor-
dered upon a normative morality defining what mattered, what was 
valued, and what should be prioritised for collective attention. 
It was a result of an excess in a certain modality of care. It is not 
only that I was caring too much in my over-identification with the pro-
ject, with its failures, its successes, even its most bland and mundane 
organisational deficiencies, but it was equally a result of a particular 
modality of care, a particular embodiment, one based on excessive at-
tachment and normative injunctions as to how things should be.
AFFECT, VALUE, ACTION, AND CARE
The role of care in commoning has emerged across the preceding 
chapters. I would now like to draw attention to some intersections and 
entanglements between concepts of care, value(s), affect and action 
that might open the way to the conclusion. It is already clear above 
how my own attachment to a certain image of The Field led towards 
normative injunctions concerning how things should be done. I cared 
excessively for a particular image of The Field. I was caught in a rela-
tion of Cruel Optimism (Berlant 2011), an optimistic attachment to a 
particular thing, here a particular gathering of relations,1 that is main-
tained at the expense of the experiential well-being of self and others. 
I cared about a particular image of The Field, and in an effort to realise 
this image enacted various modalities of caring for it. 
I am taking ‘caring about’ to be a signalling of intention, a stance 
that may or may not also be articulated in the form of practice. This is 
care as “affective concern” (de la Bellacasa 2017: 162 emphasis original). 
If caring about is manifest as caring for, if care as affective concern is 
expressed as a doing, it is a shift from a stance to a practice.  Caring 
for manifests as practice, it is contingent and shifting in its attending 
1 See Chapter 4: Commonication for a discussion of things as gatherings.
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to bodies, and an affective practice that aims towards the nurturing, 
flourishing and maintenance of bodies. Care is then relational.  Due 
to this relational nature of caring for, its status as a practice concern-
ing the engagement and entanglement of bodies, it is an open-ended, 
speculative and experimental practice (Mol et al. 2010). It must shift 
according to the needs, desires and dispositions of the bodies towards 
which it is oriented. This is also a matter of affect, understood as the 
transformation of bodies in the broadest sense, “human bodies, dis-
cursive bodies, bodies of thought, bodies of water” (Stewart 2007: 128). 
Caring for unfolds as a practice of transforming, attending to and nur-
turing bodies in various forms. 
Caring for, then, is an action. It is an attempt to enact practices 
aligned with what is cared about, what is valued. It is through prac-
tices of caring for that values are created through action.  It is a form 
of work, a practice of attempting to create the conditions under which 
bodies can flourish. When this fails, when the practice of caring enters 
a deficient mode, we speak of neglect. Neglecting is the failure of a 
practice to facilitate the flourishing of bodies. 
What is cared about is valued and this evaluation is made mani-
fest in the practice of caring for. This practice of evaluation is what 
Deleuze’s Nietzsche sees as the ground of values, evaluations are 
“ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evalu-
ate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they 
judge” (2006: 1). Here, the practice of evaluation precedes values. The 
embodied practice of caring for, comes prior to the existence of meta-
physical or abstract values or principles that manifest in caring about. 
The ways of being and modes of existence of a body create values 
through action.  The orientations of a body, collective or individual, 
form its capacities for affection, that is its capacities for transforming 
itself and other bodies. A body is repulsed, attracted, compelled, dis-
gusted through certain affections, and through these affects it is able 
to produce evaluations from which are drawn values. Such evalua-
tions and the systems of meaning they create open the possibilities of 
inter-action between bodies in the practices of caring for. In this way, 
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“[v]alue emerges in action” (Graeber 2001: 45). And further, values 
as “systems of categories, or knowledge, are really just one side of a 
system of action” (ibid: 254), but they are systems of categories and 
meanings that are cyclically created by action and in turn give mean-
ing to those actions. It is the actions and dispositions of bodies that 
create systems of value and systems of value that in turn communicate 
the meaning and value of action inter-relationally. 
Commoning, particularly as it is conceived of by the New Cross 
Commoners and The Field, is an attempt to expand the possibilities of 
value beyond the structure of state and capital,2 it is also an attempt 
to establish practices that might create novel values that can facilitate 
new contexts for inter-action. It is an attempt to constitute new sys-
tems of meaning and categories, new common senses, that can rec-
ognise other values in action. In order to illustrate the significance of 
this, and how this creation of novel values emerges as a practice, it will 
be instructive here to briefly discuss some of the conceptions of value 
that emerge from political economy and how commoning practices 
diverge from these conceptions of value and turn against them.
For capitalist political economy, the determiner of value in the 
singular is the market economy. Value is ascribed in terms of exchange-
ability. For classical Marxian theories, value emerges as the symbolic 
measurement of labour embedded in objects. As Mandel puts it, “[f]or 
Marx, labour is value” (1990 emphasis original). Labour is the domain 
of action through which capital attributes value judgements, it is the 
capitalistic mode of evaluation. Such value produced through labour 
is ascribed to the products of that labour through the cipher of general 
equivalency which finds its highest, and most abstract, embodiment 
in “the germ of the money form” (Marx 1986: 163). However, labour 
is objectified and ascribed the abstract symbolic measure of value that 
it has itself produced. Thus, the source of the evaluation that is the 
action of labour becomes concealed through a form of fetishism that 
treats value as metaphysically independent to its process of produc-
tion, as a virtual, symbolic entity that claims to pre-exist and prefigure 
2 see Chapter 2: On What Commons?
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its own process of production.  Capital relies on bodies that create 
value through action, but it conceals their role in the creation of this 
value and subordinates them to a metaphysical determiner of general 
equivalency. This constitutes the domain of the market economy as a 
domain that seeks to hold a monopoly on value, as the domain of a 
unitary and universalising cipher of exchangeability. And as has been 
discussed, this domain of value is limited to what is determined as the 
productive sphere, consigning reproductive action, that is the action 
necessary for the continuation of human life (Federici 2012b), to a po-
sition of exclusion in relation to the metaphysical determiner of value. 
Capital, then, enacts a kind of double vision or strabismus, “the 
effect of each eye looking in different directions” (Corsín Jiménez 
2013: 52), concerning value and action. It holds one domain of val-
ue clearly in sight, that of the traditionally masculine domain of la-
bour and production, whilst other domains of human activity become 
blurred and pushed outside of clear purview. Caring action is con-
cealed and presented as independent to the metaphysical determiner 
of value that is capital, and thus outside the system of value. Those 
areas of work which Federici describes as reproductive, are excluded 
from the domain of unitary value attribution. In Caliban and the Witch, 
Federici shows how this gendered separation between the productive 
and reproductive ran alongside the enclosure of the common land in 
England, and how “the separation of commodity production from the 
reproduction of labour-power also made possible the development of 
a specifically capitalist use of the wage and of the markets as a means 
for the accumulation of unpaid labour.” (2014: 75). This double vision 
then holds the domain of capital accumulation in clear view, under 
the heading of value, whilst pushing other activities and actions into 
blurry, and unclear domains, and “it is precisely here that one hears 
about “values” in the plural sense” (Graeber 2001: 56). The sight that 
clearly perceives homo æconomicus can only do so by obfuscating all 
other systems of evaluation and activity. It must obscure the fact that 
beneath metaphysical value in the singular, is the domain of action 
and care. 
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In his Economic Psychology, Gabriel Tarde points to one of the 
mechanisms of how this perspectival illusion is maintained, that is 
“[i]n conceiving of the homo æconomicus economists 
have engaged in a double abstraction. First, the unwarrant-
ed one of having conceived of a man with nothing human 
in his heart; second, of having represented this individual 
as detached from any group, corporation, sect, party, home-
land, or association of any sort.”
 (2007: 631).
 At first sight, we may want to challenge Tarde’s use of the term 
‘man’ in this description as an outdated use of gendered language. 
However, bearing in mind Federici’s observations concerning the 
marginalisation of women in the constitution of the strabismic illusion 
that splits production from reproduction, it is precisely the mascu-
line domain which has been conceived of with no heart, whereas the 
feminine has been assigned to the practices of caring, nurturing and 
affective work. Whilst this is probably not how Tarde intended it, this 
is a useful retrospective addition. There is a dual effect pointed to here 
by Tarde, that of excluding the work of the heart, and the conjoined 
movement of dislocating the heartless from their community, shifting 
them onto the market as atomised individuals competing against one 
another. These two gestures are parallel because it is in the spaces of 
collectivity, that is in the constitution of common worlds, that the do-
mains of the heart and affective care are most called for. And it is these 
domains that become devalued and marginalised by capital leading 
to the situation described by Graeber (2018) in which those caring do-
mains that produce the most social value receive the lowest evalua-
tion, and monetary compensation in the form of wages.  
In order to sustain and propagate this fetishised and strabismic 
monopoly on the production of value the market must also continu-
ally subsume that which lies beyond the limits of its symbolic order. 
The enclosure of the commons is itself one such mode of expansion, a 
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mode of primitive accumulation which draws into the domain of com-
modified general equivalency that which operated outside of its logics 
and excludes or, in the language of caring action, neglects that which 
it must conceal in order to maintain the unitary rule of value. This pro-
cess of continual expansion seeks to expand the remit of the market’s 
monopoly on the symbolic attribution of value. It is this expansion of 
the interpretative apparatus of capital that constitutes economism, the 
attempt to interpret as much as can be interpreted, with an unbound-
ed horizon, through a narrowly constituted economic lens of general 
equivalency. As such, the economic reason of the market constitutes 
a specific form of value program that is unable to tolerate systems of 
value that lie beyond the limits of its perspective. In its universalising 
attempt to ascribe value and determine what is valid action, economic 
reason seeks to define the limits of what is important, what is desired 
and desirable, of where human activity should focus its attention, of 
what people should care about. In so doing, other value systems, that 
is other modalities of determining what is desired or desirable, what 
should be cared about and for, are diminished and marginalised, of-
ten under the categorical figure of the economic externality, the non-
productive or, we can now add, the Tardian domain of heart. 
 Massimo De Angelis puts it as follows, 
“While the general term ‘value’ is something that we 
consider important, desirable, a priority or valuable (and 
that in our economic life we measure in terms of money), 
when values are joined together into an overall structure 
of thinking, they give rise to value systems. A value system 
thus is a conceptual grid through which we see the world; it 
defines (even unconsciously) what is good and what is bad, 
what is normal and what is abnormal, what we must resign 
ourselves to, and what it is possible to change… it provides 
the grid, the principles of selection of what is ‘good’ and 
what is ‘bad’, within which singularities measure and order 
things, and, consequently give a reference point to their ac-
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tion. A value programme, on the other hand, is a value sys-
tem that cannot conceive an outside beyond itself.” 
(2007: 26)
Capital constitutes such a value programme, a system of evalua-
tion that cannot tolerate, or at least seeks to marginalise, that which is 
beyond it. It is a normative modality of evaluation that seeks totalisa-
tion. Thus, commoning understood as a gesture seeking to move be-
yond the limits of economism is a struggle for the possibility of other 
value systems, other values. It is a struggle to allow for the self deter-
mination of what is important, what is significant and meaningful, 
what is cared about and for, beyond the unitary lens of general equiv-
alency. It is an attempt to expand possibilities of recognising value 
producing action, a struggle at the level of bodies concerning the pos-
sibilities of care. 
Commoning, then, is an attempt to expand the possibilities of 
taking care, of opening up the remit of what is cared for and about, of 
what can be valued. The action of evaluation is no longer limited to the 
domain of labour, the domain of action narrowly defined by capital as 
valuable but is expanded across the spectrum of possibilities of taking 
care of the reproduction of human life. Thus, the propositions that all 
commons require care takes on a new dimension. Not only is a matter 
of caring for an objective entity or resource labelled ‘the commons’, 
nor even of caring for one another in the process of commoning, but 
more crucially it is an exploratory process that seeks new modalities 
of taking care, that opens up new value systems that determine what 
is cared about and for, and how this care can be enacted and practiced. 
Commoning then is not a matter of caring for something preexistent, 
but of creating new evaluations and modes of care. This returns us to 
the dilemma of the excess of a certain modality of care that manifested 
itself through the detrimental affective states that led me and others to 
withdraw from The Field, but it does so with an altered perspective. 
In the effort to practice commoning as an exploratory process of 
locating new modes of taking care The Field required the constitution 
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of alternative value systems, that is alternative lenses and contexts for 
inter-action through which we could mutually support and aid one 
another beyond the cipher of capital. This especially included a focus 
on what Federici called reproduction, those practices which were ob-
fuscated and hidden by the strabismus of capital.  Thus, there was no 
preordained set of rules governing the process of commoning. Various 
processes at The Field sought to establish common ground in the form 
of shared ‘principles’ or ‘aims’, as anchors through which new value 
systems could emerge and through which we could come to a shared 
understanding of what we sought to achieve. These processes were 
often understood as modes of self-organisation. However, they often 
ran up against significant differences in perspective. They created pro-
liferations of new value system which were not always shared or com-
municated; they had their own ocular illusions. It is these differences 
in perspective, that are also differences in orientations of values and 
evaluation, that I will now turn to.
  
KNOTS
Around nine months after disengaging from The Field, I sent a 
piece of writing to a friend who had been involved at The Field early 
on but had stepped back from the project quite quickly. The writing 
was the first substantive piece of work I produced after leaving the 
project as a result of some of the issues I am now outlining. In this 
paper, I had made a case for a limit of horizontalism generally being 
its inability to create structures to distribute work fairly and appropri-
ately leaving most of the burden on the shoulders of a small few. In 
response to this rather critical and quite gloomy piece they responded,
“I understand that this is a short paper but i would 
firstly give a little more acknowledgment of its success 
and of people’s willingness to give their time, recognition 
of what is offered goes a long way. The other conflicting 
side to this narrative is that people end up holding/bur-
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dened with responsibility is not as a passive act done to 
them but as an active engagement in the process. I will just 
use a crude analogy of traditional old fashioned idea of the 
Mother who is burdened and suffers with all the house-
work cooking, cleaning etc but when someone attempts to 
‘help’ she struggles to let that go as responsibility however 
that relationship is complicated as she does not really have 
the power in the house as she receives money from the hus-
band and ultimately he will have the final say, this results 
in her controlling what she can and taking autonomy in 
ways that she can. So that domestic dance goes on and on, 
one which is actually an unrecognized power struggle. I 
don’t know if this makes sense I am not saying you did this 
however that was very much part of Matthew and Jane’s 
story at the same time as having the other stuff thrust upon 
them.”
(2017 Pers. Comm.)
There are multiple dimensions to the passage above, but three 
that I have chosen to draw attention to here: the manner in which this 
process constituted an active power struggle; the fact that this was not 
limited to my experience, but also at least Jane and Matthew’s; and the 
underlying problem of resentment, that is the lack of acknowledge-
ment of other people’s contribution and the tendency to seek external 
points for the attribution of blame. The first issue, that has been partly 
discussed above, is the way in which the modality of care that I was 
engaged in throughout these final months at The Field constituted 
an active engagement on my part. In this sense, it was not merely a 
case of me being over-burdened, but also of acting in such a way as 
produce the affects associated to this perceived over-burdening. I was 
not a passive actant in this burdening, but actively constructed and 
seized the burdens that I then felt to be imposed. What I experienced 
as burdens were taken as much as they were imposed or given. The 
action in which I was engaged led me to a situation in which I had 
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taken on responsibility to such an extent that it was difficult for oth-
ers to take on responsibilities, and yet I resented others for not taking 
on responsibilities.  But this does not go far enough, for it was not 
simply a process of me taking on something that was pre-existent, but 
an active process in which conditions were constituted in which the 
affects associated with what I perceived to be over-burdening could 
emerge. I was engaged in a power struggle, partly wittingly and partly 
unknowingly. A power struggle in which giving up my control over 
certain components of The Field would also constitute giving up what 
autonomy and power of action I had. 
In addition, this power struggle became repressed, or hidden. 
Not only for myself but for others. Within my own experience of self 
and body the fault lines of this power struggle were felt intensely, res-
onating with the notions of the self as a battleground, or site of strug-
gle between social forces (Laing 1970). And likewise, the body and self 
of The Field experienced these tensions and conflicts. Modes of shared 
affect, resonated through The Field’s bodies, and my experience was 
but one articulation of this shared inter-corporeal affect. Relationships 
became stretched and fractious, even with those with whom I had 
worked the closest. 
Inescapably, everyone understood this power struggle differ-
ently. In that moment, I experienced the lack of structure and failure 
of shared responsibility through a sense of frustration and exhaustion 
with others, senses conductive of modes of resentment. I felt caught 
and trapped in a situation that had been collectively constituted and 
yet was now weighing excessively on me. As I discovered later oth-
ers had a very different understanding. They saw the lack of struc-
ture that I, at that time, experienced and understood as a collectively 
constituted and imposed burden, one that restricted my ability to act 
whilst simultaneously placing the responsibility for action on me, as 
something that I had actively created. I had entered The Field with 
certain ideological presuppositions concerning commoning and its 
relationship to structure, ones which favoured continual recomposi-
tion, the avoidance of rigid group identification and boundaries, and 
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a continual engagement with experimental processes and structural 
organisations. The presuppositions acted as ideological nodal points 
(Laclau & Mouffe 2014), or quilting points (Žizek 2008a: 95-7) which 
fixed other ideological signifiers in place. 
What is more, I had close friendships with several key people 
in the collective, people who were so central to the process that their 
name was on all the official paperwork. These close friendships gave 
me, and those with whom I was close and likely to agree with or with 
whom I shared similar ideological dispositions based on extensive 
conversations, forms of additional ‘social power.’ And further, in 
supporting these friends and their positions in meetings, particularly 
those that would resist the formation of a clear, or in my view at the 
time ‘rigid’ and ‘inflexible’ structure, I would use white male privilege 
to direct, dominate and control the conversation. In meetings I would 
use an ‘authoritative male voice,’ one which presented things as com-
mon sense in such a way as to make arguing with the points I was 
presenting seem absurd.  Such an unconscious, or partly-conscious 
tonality to my speech and action, could be said to form components of 
my own habitus (Mauss 1973; Bourdieu 2010), which gave me particu-
lar privileges and powers of action and communication, ones which 
received their power from the hegemonic structures centred around 
masculinity and whiteness. I was told later, that with several of us in 
a meeting who communicated in this manner, resisting our opinions 
became difficult and people quickly gave up. I can recall, in a con-
flict resolution meeting, stating that I found structure to be oppressive 
and that I considered the experimental practices of commoning to be 
an attempt to remain fluid, the response came quickly from another 
member of the collective that this was, of course, because I was a “tall, 
blond, beautiful white man.” At the time I felt affronted but allowing 
the point to settle in gradually I could see how my own preference for 
a lack of structure resided partly in the fact that I possessed a habitus 
and identity that would allow me to operate successfully in such un-
structured environments. Empowerment would be easier for me in 
such situations, possessing the characteristics and identity markers 
286
which are already empowered.
The disjunctions between my own experience and the experience 
of others reveals the friction resultant of different value systems, that 
is different positions concerning what should be cared about, what 
should be considered important, what should be valued, different 
practices of evaluation. Both my experience of imposition, and the ex-
perience of others of my use of white male privilege did occur and 
cannot simply be ascribed to the internality of a bounded subject but 
rather operate across common affective spaces. And it is in part be-
cause both occurred simultaneously, and without full recognition or 
understanding on the part of the other that their simultaneous exist-
ence produced such detrimental and powerful affects.
Below are two narratives from two different members of The 
Field, both discussing what took place around the time during which 
the notes which opened this chapter were written.
We made a decision, there 
was a vote, and it is not respect-
ed as a group, and the trust is 
broken down. I mean there is 
not trust at that point that’s a 
problem because in breaking 
down these barriers you have 
to have some kind of trust, if 
you try to build some trust and 
then we explicitly don’t care 
about what we say as a group, 
even if we don’t agree person-
ally and then, you know, it 
becomes complicated. Trust is 
a very important thing in this 
project because, I think, as I was 
trying to say before, we are not 
trying to fight within The Field 
in some sense were trying to 
It generated resentment, 
on our part. And also, because 
we were in the middle of it, the 
only people who could have 
done that would have been us, 
really. Because we were in the 
middle of it, it was only us who 
were seeing the whole thing. At 
the beginning I’m talking about, 
us as in—you included. But 
we were so worn down by the 
realities of it: the relationships, 
the maintenance, the kind of 
business, that it was really diffi-
cult to also remain open to all of 
the nuanced stuff that was go-
ing on, to have a kind of more 
abstracted kind of relationship 
to it, to draw out some of the 
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themes and bring that into the 
collective conversation. In that 
sense, we were not structured 
in a way that allowed that to 
happen…
There’s still this difficulty 
about the tension between hav-
ing an idea, having a sense of 
where things could go and how 
you might get there, and then 
having a collective process. Like 
having, like the tension between 
strategy, forward thinking, 
planning and then the messi-
ness of people coming together 
sharing their, views and ideas, 
all with fluctuating degrees of 
interest, or involvement with 
the project. That was continu-
ally a frustrating thing. That 
was a frustration that I feel like 
if I was allowed to focus on this 
fully, get money, pay myself, do 
that with a core group of people 
who were on side this could 
have a direction and a clarity… 
But it felt like, because 
there was a need to be open, 
and allow people to have as 
much say, it was just frustrat-
ing because it felt like, that was, 
it’s partly inexperience, like 
make different groups working 
together and you need to build 
a sense of trust with that … 
You need trust in a struc-
ture that can work for everyone. 
Its’s important. Even if you 
don’t think the same, we don’t 
agree the same thing, but if we 
know that the decision we take 
influences everyone is going to 
be respected, I feel: ok actually 
my vote is counting. First, I’m 
more involved in the project. 
Secondly, if we have an agree-
ment me and you, I can trust 
that if you can’t do it at least 
you’ll tell me, or you’ll be ac-
countable. There is a communi-
cation in place. And the second 
problem that that we saw was 
that we couldn’t enact things to-
gether. But there was also some 
sort of competition. Also, in be-
ing part of the group, or feeling 
maybe we wanted to display 
that we were valuable enough 
to be part of the group, or, you 
know, all sorts of psychologi-
cal things that start happening 
when we form a new culture of 
the space or way of being in the 
space… 
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not knowing how to play this 
enabling, but also proactive role 
in the centre of a project like 
that. Like, that’s quite a hard 
role to play. You know? To feel 
like you can get on with things, 
but try to get people’s permis-
sion along the way and try and 
keep the speed up, not slow it 
down to the pace of whoever is 
least involved. So, the resent-
ment came out of that, trying to 
take on that role, not knowing 
how to do it, feeling like noth-
ing could ever happen, having 
ideas for things that we thought 
could happen but people not 
even understanding them. Re-
member the Office idea? To me 
that was an idea that potentially 
encapsulated what this place 
could be, this kind of unit, this 
responsive unit that engages 
outwardly and then comes back 
in and does stuff as a response 
to the stuff it finds out that as a 
kind of idea that encapsulates 
what The Field exists for is very 
close to what we felt it could be, 
and people didn’t even un-
derstand where it was coming 
from. You know, challenging 
the word office as if they’re not 
understanding that its playing 
but no there wasn’t a spe-
cific event, I mean that Harlow 
thing was quite visible in how 
it happened, but also explicit. 
I brought it up when we had 
the London Root Collective. I 
remember the mediation be-
cause it was so visible to say the 
way that Matt and maybe Jane 
did, took the decision without 
everyone else’s consent. Maybe 
they were feeling trapped in 
this consent thing we talked 
quite a lot about, you know they 
were there, part of the project, put-
ting a lot of work and then couldn’t 
do actions, basically. And that’s 
something that could happen 
again and I think it’s happen-
ing in some sort of ways, that 
people do more work, are more 
present even if they don’t think 
they are in some way. The 
co-op is run by members, each 
member has equal vote and so 
on and so on, but at the end of 
the day the people who have 
put more work, have put more 
time into it, either feel entitled 
or are given more power by 
other people, either social pow-
er or decision-making power. 
And therefore, they always 
and probably will always influ-
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around with being formal and 
informal. So that kind of thing. 
You know, you’ve put in lots of 
work, you’ve literally worked 
for a year to build a thing from 
scratch with these kind of like 
ideas that aren’t fully formed 
but they’re there in the back 
ground that are driving your 
actions and then you put a 
thing forward and then other 
people who maybe haven’t 
been involved,  have not had 
that kind of hunger to do that,  
have the power to be like—that 
thing doesn’t work, or I don’t get 
or like that thing so it can’t hap-
pen, or we’re not going to help you 
make that happen and if you do 
make it happen we’re going to be 
uncomfortable and that won’t be 
democratic. So that’s an example 
of a moment where a real deep 
frustrating would emerge.
ence the discussion, influence 
how we decide things. So that’s 
something that’s happened but 
that way, that time with Harlow 
it just happened in a conversa-
tion where everyone was try-
ing to ask us what we thought, 
and everyone said no clearly 
and they said: ok—its still go-
ing ahead,  after we were asked 
what we thought, and that was 
something unacceptable in 
some sense, you know
Action is constrained. The trust is gone. The trust was important. 
It was important precisely because the practices of ‘breaking down 
boundaries’ entails stepping into uncertainty, into the unknown, it en-
tails experimental attempts at composing common worlds. So, trust 
is needed, it is the trust that “tenses itself at the margins of an expand-
ing sociality,” the trust which “emerges as the forever self-eclipsing 
relationship through which people re-place themselves into new re-
lationships” (Corsín Jiménez 2011: 190 emphasis original). It is when 
stepping into the unknown, the uncertain, the unformed, that trust 
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tenses, becomes tightened, and so also becomes brittle, strained, possi-
bly broken. But this step into the unknown requires action. And action 
is constrained. 
The trust in the other to act a certain way involves a gamble, a 
risk that the other “may act contrary to my expectations” (Ingold 2011: 
70). Action requires trust. Action contrary to expectation breaks the 
brittle trust at the margins of expanding sociality.  The gamble fails. 
Participation is lost. Communication breaks down.
Disengagement and over-engagement mirror one another, mu-
tually reinforcing their positions. Detachment and attachment reflect 
one another. The more those at the centre engage, the more those on 
the periphery feel excluded, the more those in the centre feel they are 
not participating, the more they feel forced to take on work, the more 
they engage, the more those at the periphery feel excluded.
The more the centre formed, the more it pushed the periphery 
away, the more the periphery pushed in on the centre, forming it 
tighter, the more the centre continued to push the periphery away. 
Trust decreased. Resentment increased. Power and work centralised. 
Detachment and a sense of non-engagement increased at the periph-
ery.
There was an exercise conducted at the mediation meeting held 
by London Roots Collective pointed to in one of the narratives above. 
We were asked to organise ourselves according to who had power 
at The Field. Those with more power were asked to move towards 
the centre, those with less were asked to stand further out. The result 
looked something like this:
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In the centre stood, Matt, Jane, and myself everyone else organ-
ised themselves around the edges, forming a clear centre and periph-
ery.3 There were minor variations in this outer circle, and when asked 
if anyone would change anything, a few people moved others to ten-
tative halfway points between the two, but by and large the split into 
two power groups was apparent.  
The forming of the centre could be said to emerge through op-
posing yet reinforcing movements. The centre emerged through cen-
tripetal spirals accompanied by their centrifugal counterparts.
From the point of view of some of those in the centre, there was 
an inwards movement of constraint, and burden, and the need for 
action; this was accompanied by a centrifugal movement of exclu-
sion, detachment, and resistance to participation. As more action was 
taken on in the centre, the less people on the edges felt involved, the 
more they experienced resistance to participation. The centralisation 
of power in the centre had its parallel in the disempowerment of the 
periphery. The result could be seen as dual coils which mutually con-
stitute one another, and yet never fully come into contact. The two 
3 I am using the terms ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ tentatively and flexibly here. I 
do not mean to say that there was an essential and unchanging centre or periphery. 
It may be better to consider that these groups emerged around different issues and 
that they were shifting and flexible.
FORMATION OF CENTRE FORMATION OF PERIPhERY
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coils form parasites in relation to one another, that is sites of adjacency 
which interfere with one another’s communicative modalities.
These cyclically reinforcing entanglements bear structural re-
semblances to R.D. Laing’s Knots (1971). They are cycles of reinforcing 
affects whereby actions, attitudes, stances and positions begin to rein-
force their own origins. They become caught in an impasse, a cyclical 
reinforcement that is difficult to brake. Both the narratives running 
parallel above recognise that other see things differently, that those 
at the centre ‘see more’ or see something other than those at the pe-
riphery, that those who are given or who take on more work influence 
things more, and yet there is still an impasse when action/constraint 
becomes ‘too much’.  The additional influence leads to disempower-
ment, detachment, mistrust, which reinforces the need for those with 
additional influence to act more as others disengage. One acts beyond 
the expectation or trust of others, and simultaneously feels constrained 
by the need to be open to everyone. There is a form of transparency of 
action that is run through with mistrust—action must be transparent, 
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must be run through everyone, precisely due to the risk that the action 
may be contrary to expectation.
  There are many passages from Knots that reveals parts of these 
cyclical impasses, but one in particular that may be instructive here:
 Jack can see
1.   there is something Jill can’t see 
2.  and that she can see there is some thing she can’t see
3.  but that she can’t see what she can’t see
  although
 (Jack can see that)
4.  she can see Jack can see whatever it is
   she can see she can’t see
   but can’t see what.
(Laing 1971: 58)
 People at the periphery can see that those at the centre can see 
something they can’t see, but they can’t see what they can’t see, and 
even though those at the centre can see that those at the periphery 
can see that those at the centre can see whatever it is, that is that they 
know there is something they don’t know, they can’t see what it is. 
The reverse is also true: People at the centre can see that those at the 
periphery can see something they can’t see, but they can’t see what 
they can’t see, and even though those at the periphery can see that 
those at the centre can see that those at the periphery can see whatever 
it is, that is that they know there is something they don’t know, they 
can’t see what it is.  There is a cycle of static, of interference, of affects 
that cannot be transmitted and perspectives that cannot fully be com-
municated, that get caught and lost in  self-fulfilling cycles. Each per-
spective makes efforts “[t]o see one’s self seen by them” (Serres 2015: 
12), but something gets in the way. An uncommonality surges up, a 
divergence, a shift, one run through with back ground noises that pre-
vent clear articulation of what it is that can be seen. 
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A NOISY CLAMOUR OF PARALLAX ShIFTS
What can’t be seen by the other who also knows that they cannot 
see? It is not simply a failure of vision, of perspective, of the shortcom-
ings of a particular subject. It is rather something contained in gath-
erings and worlds themselves, something that creates shifts in such 
ways as to disrupt any neat separation between subject and object. It 
is not merely that the subject perceives differences in things due to the 
distortions of their own lens, but that the things that they perceive are 
different. It is not a result of the endless failure to reach the thing-in-
itself, the endless distortions of the biases of subjectivity that forbid 
access to a reality position behind a distorting vale. It is that things4 
are themselves different. 
 During my time at The Field, I helped to organise a reading 
group through the New Cross Commoners on a text by Gustavo Es-
teva entitled Commoning in the New Society (2014). In this text Esteva 
writes in polemic against the term ‘common pool resources’ used by 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) and other economic thinkers. Esteva argues that 
commons cannot be thought of as resources for this transforms them 
to the status of a good or commodity and so introduces them to the 
logics of economism with its public and private domains and laws of 
scarcity. In this process, he argues they lose the relational and process-
based characteristics that make them commons in the first place. As he 
writes, “resource is the opposite of commons…the transformation of 
commons into resources dissolves them” (2014: i148). To think of com-
mons as resources subjects them to the kind of economic determinism 
that reduces a series of social relations to instrumental, economic ones. 
It is to interpret a process that is antagonistic to economistic logic in 
economic terms. 
 Rather than considering commons in terms of resources Esteva 
4 it is important here to remember that ‘thing’ is not taken as a place holder 
for ‘object’, but rather refers to a gathering, or, in more Tardian language, a com-
posite monad.
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draws on the writings of Ivan Illich to suggest that we instead begin 
to think of them in terms of tools. In Tools for Conviviality (2009) Illich 
begins to call for the development of relationships between humans 
and tools that move beyond the economic logic of dominance, extrac-
tion and manipulation. He applies the term convivial to relationships 
between humans and tools rather than simply between humans.  At 
the reading group held at The Field, which was also attended by many 
of the people involved in Old Tidemill Wildlife Garden, a commu-
nity wildlife garden opened in the abandoned Tidemill School behind 
Deptford High Street, we sought to follow this suggestion. One of the 
outcomes was the consideration that one of the fundamental charac-
teristics of a tool is that they transform what it is possible to achieve. 
They enhance powers of action.
 This dimension of the commons, that of their tool-being (Har-
man 2002), can be drawn into the discussion of value, care and action 
above. If value is the importance of action, and a tool transforms our 
power of action, then commons, as tools, reflect back to us the trans-
formations that take place in the values ascribed to things and with 
it the possibilities of action and evaluation that they enable. What is 
more, they also expand the possibilities of action at the same time. 
They reflect back to us our value forming practices of taking care and 
the affective fields of care, neglect, resentment, empowerment and de-
tachment that these carry with them. Affective fields here are not only 
fields of experience. They are crucially not bounded to an individual 
experience but are caught and mediated in the reflective force of tools, 
those beings which encase and reflect back possible transformations in 
powers of action. In this way, they become enabling or constraining. 
If tools are broken, if they cannot fulfil their promise to enhance our 
power of action, we are constrained; when they can fulfil their prom-
ises, we are empowered. Commoning expands the capacity to trans-
form bodies whilst reflecting back the value practices that brought 
them into being. Commons change what it is possible to achieve and 
have these transformations inscribed within in them. 
 The value of action is in this way reflected back. The signifi-
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cance of David Graeber’s assertion that it is value that brings univers-
es into being (2013b) takes on a further dimension. The reflective force 
of tools creates a spiralling proliferation of novel possible common 
worlds and modes of evaluation. Powers of action swell or diminish 
in this hall of mirrors. Value, care, neglect and action, in their relation 
to things, are not simply projected onto things but are inscribed within 
them in a dizzying entanglement. The differences in caring about, when 
translated into different and contingent practices of caring for, are not 
external to ‘objects’, but inscribed within in them in such a way as to 
make untenable any firm attempt to maintain a split between them 
and ‘subjects’. This is the cycle of the parallax, which means that “an 
“epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects 
an “ontological” shift in the object itself.” (Žižek 2006: 17). It is not 
simply that things are seen differently but that things are different—the 
gathering has been transformed through different practices of evalu-
ation which create different values. The apprehension of something, 
in a certain way, transforms the thing itself.  What is cared about, the 
values that are created along with common worlds, are inscribed in 
things themselves through the specificities of caring for. This caring for 
constructs new affective fields and common worlds which, as tools, 
enable expansions of the possibilities of action.
 So, it is not that The Field was only seen or understood different-
ly, but that The Field itself and all the fields included in its gatherings 
(problematic fields, political fields, caring fields, etc.) were themselves 
different. The gatherings were evaluated, and so also cared for, differ-
ently. In this composition of common worlds there is then a continual 
oscillation between ground of commonality and uncommonality. Car-
ing for different gatherings is action, and that action transforms the 
gatherings themselves. The practice of caring for creates a prolifera-
tion of transformations, it is productive of differences in practices of 
care and so too in the values produced. At the moment when the emer-
gence of difference ceases, the practice of commoning has also. An on-
going component of the practice of commoning, then, is the attempt 
to establish means of communication between the diverging common 
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worlds that are in an ongoing process of composition through diver-
gent practices of care and evaluation, and so also divergent systems of 
value. At the point where this communication fails, the affective fields 
become run through with mistrust, experiences of neglect, disempow-
erment, exclusion, repulsion.
 Such failures in communication are inevitable. But one of the 
practices that is engaged with carefully in commoning is that of at-
tempting to listen, of attempting to attune oneself to others, constitut-
ing “listening together as itself an object/scene of desire” (Berlant 2011: 
224). It becomes of particular importance for commoning practices to 
carefully listen to the other precisely because of their hopeful, optimis-
tic and future-oriented effort to bring new common worlds into being 
through ongoing explorations of caring practices. But there must be 
a pragmatic dimension to this, a dimension which counters the opti-
mism of commoning with an acceptance of inevitable failure, that is 
of failing to hear or discern a voice amidst the clamour. As Bateson 
wrote at the conclusion of his essay on Cybernetic Explanation, “[a]ll 
that is not information, not redundancy, not form and not restraints—
is noise, the only possible source of new patterns.” (2000: 416 emphasis 
original). Commoning attempts to step forward into this noise, to find 
new means of communication, new possibilities for value and care, 
new possibilities for affective transformation and ecologies of life. 
 We have now left the ocular paradigms that have run through 
this chapter into a potentially deafening one. Static, after all, can be 
both audible and visual. But static, far from being an obstacle to be 
overcome in the composition of the common world leaving us with a 
final univocality, a total commonality, is in fact the positive possibil-
ity of commoning. But this does not make it any less of an obstacle. It 
has the dual role of condition and obstacle. It has the place of Michel 
Serres’s Parasite (2007), particularly in the sense of modes of static and 
noise, but also in the sense of sites of adjacency. The composition of 
the common world opens the attempt to engage positively with the 
double bind that “systems work because they do not work. Nonfunc-
tioning remains essential for functioning… Relation is nonrelation. 
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And that is what the parasite is.” (ibid: 79). What Serres paradoxical 
intervention reminds us of is that there is always at least a minimal 
tension that maintains relations, that were differences to be entirely 
related, they would disappear amidst unitary identity. Commoning 
does not strive for the unification of differences but attempts the dif-
ficult, unfinished practice of attempting to discern voices amidst the 
noise, of bringing into focus that which the parallax excluded, or stra-
bismus left blurry. 
 This is, of course, easier said than done, as the experiences run-
ning through this chapter show. By way of conclusion I would like to 
propose an altered understanding of the phenomenon of ‘burnout.’ 
Shortly after I detached from The Field there was a discussion on some 
of the problems the collective was currently facing. In one of the e-
mails that included in this discussion, the following was written,
“I don’t think the problem was self-organisation in 
itself but a lack of care in the way we self-organised or in 
other words a lack of collectivisation of the process. Also, 
I don’t think the problem has been simply that individual 
people have been working too much, I think the reasons 
for “burning out” are more complex than simply too much 
work, and they are different in each case.”
 Perhaps the resonance with what has been said so far is already 
clear. Burning out is framed as an event which is different in each case. 
It is not simply a matter of a quantitative mismatch, of working too 
much, or taking too much on. It is more a matter of a lack of care and 
collectivisation. It is the failure of care to be heard and seen amidst the 
clamour of noise, the noise that is the uncommon possibility of com-
mon worlds.
 The object/scene of desire (Berlant 2011) fails to match up to 
that which is cared about, the practice of caring for becomes caught 
in the knots and cycles of resentment, and as these practices of car-
ing for create values and in turn worlds this resentment, constraint, 
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hopelessness becomes mirrored back. The gathering itself becomes 
run through with modes of neglect. The dizzying hall of mirrors and 
clamour of noise becomes run through with resentment. It becomes 
overwhelming, and detachment follows. But this detachment is it-
self a painful process and further source of resentment for the object/
scene of desire, the attachment of which gave the desirer a purposeful 
orientation towards the future, is lost, or rather transformed through 
an endless series of reflections into something monstrous. The cruel 
paradox is that both attachment and detachment become a source of 
shame, a source of resentment, and both fail to offer the optimistic vi-
sion of the future once sought in the evaluative practices of caring for. 
 But it is not simply a case of an internalised, individual pathol-
ogy. In the endless cascade of reflections that emerge from the entan-
gled cycles of care-action-value-world, the resentment, neglect, blame, 
despair and hoplessness become entangled within the commons them-
selves. These affects then are not the preserve of a bound individual 
subject but manifest in cascades of ontological transformations which 
are entangled in things themselves. Bodies become strained, and what 
manages to articulate itself against the noise is signs of neglect, blame, 
mistrust and despair. It is an isolating and terrifying experience, one 
in which the optimistic practices of caring for become mirrored back 
as manifestations of neglect. What one perspective cared for in their 
action is mirrored back to them by another perspective as a form of 
neglect. 
 This experience has the potential to be particularly acute in 
commoning. As observed by Pines and Aronson burnout often man-
ifests in those who were “expecting their work to give their lives a 
sense of meaning” (1989: 10). The composition of common world, as 
the exploration of new modalities of care, of new value practices, en-
tails such a search for meaning as an intrinsic component. When this 
fails to occur or practices of caring for have had a detrimental effect, 
being mirrored back from an altered perspectival position as manifes-
tations of neglect, the experience is acutely painful. Such an experience 
is a forceful manifestation of cruel optimism (Berlant 2011), of a hopeful 
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vision of the future becoming reflected back as an image of despair. 
The potential for this experience becomes particularly acute in com-
moning practices due to the fact that the conditions for the produc-
tion of meaning and value are themselves in a process of composition 
and that difference itself is the foundational possibility of common-
ing. Care, action and value(s), as well as their counterparts such as ne-
glect, constraint, and worthlessness become inscribed in the commons 
themselves being mirrored back to participants through a cascade of 
transformational lenses.  Care then, as a process of negotiation which 
remains open-ended, becomes a central modality of the composition 
of common worlds, but one that is not without its potential failures 
and deficient modes of neglect.
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CONCLUSION
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ANThROPOLOGY AND ThE COMPOSITION OF 
(UN)COMMON WORLDS
 I would now like to open a series of problematic fields that 
emerge through the active engagement of anthropology in the com-
position of common worlds. One such problematic was glimpsed in 
the concluding words of the preceding chapter—the inclusion of my 
own presuppositions and assumption into the construction of the re-
alities that this thesis has engaged with. But this, in itself, is a prob-
lematic which could produce affects that could be identified positively 
or negatively. It is an ambivalent problematic. Anthropologists have 
known for a long time that the other perspectives that they describe 
are better considered as our perspectives on those perspectives, lead-
ing Roy Wagner to consider “we do not learn a “culture” or its re-
projection within the “given” or natural world of fact, or even learn 
about them, so much as we teach ourselves to them.” (2001: xiii). 
Anthropologists are not outside of the realities that they study, and 
participate in them—we teach ourselves to the world and often learn 
as much about ourselves as we do about others. This has certainly 
been my experience. I have learnt much about myself or have per-
haps taught myself to myself through teaching myself to others, I have 
transformed myself, as much as I have transformed the realities, tex-
tually and ontologically, in which I have participated. But I have not 
necessarily transformed myself in the ways that I hoped or intended, 
I have not necessarily realised what I thought possible. The collapse 
of the object/scene of desire that was a site of cruel optimism has led 
to affects which whilst they include growth and transformation, also 
include guilt, shame and failure to live up to the ideals and expecta-
tions I placed upon myself, upon anthropology, and upon The Field; 
or more appropriately, the multifaceted relationships between The 
Field, myself and anthropology.
 In what follows I would like to engage in a partial discussion 
of the long-standing debate of anthropology’s application and prac-
tice before continuing ethnographically with a few moments which 
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brought out these problematics. Early debates concerning applied 
anthropology often based themselves on the objective and distanced 
authority of a certain image of science. For instance, Evans-Pritchard 
marked a clear distinction between the scientific field of anthropology, 
which concerns itself with “the solution of scientific problems,” which 
would include “the nature of human society and of social develop-
ment.” (1946: 93). Within this field, it was necessary for the anthropol-
ogist to assume an objective distance in which their own personal pre-
suppositions were excluded. In contrast to this field, Evans-Pritchard 
speaks of “the non-scientific field of administration” including “the 
arts of politics” (ibid). Application could only occur in this latter, non-
scientific field, and would be based on the insights gained in the for-
mer anthropological field. There is a clear demarcation between the 
anthropological field, in which scientific insights about fundamental 
questions can be gained, and the outside of that field, in which those 
insight might be brought to bear on practical issues. The two domains 
are complementary, but clearly demarcated. 
 The non-scientific field including the arts of politics, for Evans-
Pritchard, primarily concerns colonial administrations, and the forma-
tion of the policies of those administrations. In this, he followed Her-
skovits who in his discussion of applied anthropology in the context 
of colonial administration also marked a distinction comparable to the 
one above, “between the scientist and the engineer, the thinker and the 
doer, the planner and the executive” (1936: 215). Again, Anthropolo-
gists fall sharply on the side of the scientist, for whom “the search for 
truth must come before all else.” (Ibid: 222). The figure of the anthro-
pologist here sits comfortably within the realm of the orthodox ‘im-
age of thought’ described in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 2011), 
which reaches honestly, transparently and straightforwardly towards 
reason and truth. Elsewhere, in his review of Montagu’s Man’s Most 
Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (1997), Herskovits warned against 
taking “the dim, treacherous path of what is coming to be termed the 
“social engineer.”” (1946: 268). The path into the non-scientific space 
of action, of politics, is clouded, turning away from the noble project 
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of the truth-speaking anthropologist. Ashley-Montagu’s response is 
illuminating: 
Should anthropologists contribute their special skills 
and knowledge to the betterment of the world in which they 
live, by actively participating in the process of building a 
new world, or should they leave that task to others, their 
own role, so far as the social scene is concerned, being lim-
ited, as Herskovits puts it, to making “known the testimony 
of the expert on the facts concerning” social problems?
 The question is usually posed in disjunctive form, 
“either/or,” as a choice between alternatives.  I think the 
disjunction a false and a harmful one, since it produces a 
false dichotomy. It should be remembered that a question 
can be so structured as to determine the answer which is 
made to it.
 (1946: 666)
 Much has of course changed within the discipline since these 
debates took place. Numerous reappraisals of the discipline have re-
considered the status of anthropology and its relationships to the re-
alities that it studies (e.g. Geertz 1973; Wagner 1975; Clifford and Mar-
cus 1986; Abu-Lughod 1996; Fabian 2002). And today, development of 
new methods and approaches appears to be one of the current trends 
of anthropological thought and practice, such as the current common-
ing anthropologically, A-N-T (Latour 2007), ethnographic conceptual-
ism (Ssorin-Chaikov 2013), art-based or influenced anthropology 
(Wright & Schnider 2006; 2010; Sansi 2015; Ingold 2013; 2017; 2018b), 
recursion (Holbraad 2012; Corsín Jiménez 2017), controlled equivoca-
tion (Viveiros de Castro 2004), experimental collaboration (Estalella 
& Sanchez-Criado 2015; 2018), ethnography as prototyping (Corsín 
Jiménez 2014b; Corsín Jiménez & Estalella 2016), para-ethnography 
(Holmes & Marcus 2008b) and collaborative anthropologies (Holmes 
& Marcus 2008a). Some questions, it seems, do not find resolutions but 
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proliferate productively into further lines of inquiry, further openings. 
 Anthropologists are increasingly concerned with how they 
contribute to the construction of the worlds in which they participate, 
not only textually, but beyond the representative practices of ethnog-
raphy. But for all this concern, my experience has presented further 
questions. The first experience, discussed below, resonates profound-
ly with the very debates of Evans-Pritchard, Herskovits and Ashley-
Montagu. It concerns the conflicts that The Field, and myself, had with 
Mmandu. 
 We had many long conversations together, Mmandu and I, and 
on a personal level were friendly towards one another. But the agonis-
tic dimension of our debates did not diminish. I recall one conversa-
tion in particular when we were sat outside in the garden of The Field 
one evening—the conversation was heated, but amicable. At one point 
I explained to her that I was a funded research student at Goldsmiths, 
and I was engaged with The Field partly in this capacity. She was 
shocked, and told me that it was fine for us, we’d do our experiment 
and go off, leaving all the people who had lived here in the same state 
as before. A friend of hers added in that they used to play football here 
as kids, gesturing beyond the garden to the newly built block of flats, 
but now there was nowhere left for their kids to go. It was unfair, they 
said, that I had access to all these resources when I clearly didn’t need 
them whereas those who had been living here for years had nothing. I 
could always go off back to the country side and have champagne and 
strawberries with grandma. 
 In moments such as these, I became aware of how I might ap-
pear to Mmandu. I recalled another conversation we had over the 
phone, where at the end she said that she always enjoyed talking to 
me, and then putting on an affected posh English voice—Master Toby, 
I always imagine you like one of those pictures you see in pubs of guys sur-
rounded by dogs and horses. I was taken a back. Laughing, I asked if 
that was really how she saw me. She assured me that she did. In this 
moment, I stood clearly in the position of an incoming class of gentrifi-
ers—white, educated at Goldsmiths, middle class, with high access to 
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a range of resources. In participating in the construction of The Field, 
the renovation of the building, caring for the project, I had embarked 
on the dim path of the social engineer, and in this dimension, in this 
relationship, it had proved treacherous—our experiment was here 
not well received or appreciated. I belonged to a class of profession-
als who had not grown up here, an incomer, a coloniser, meddling 
where it was not wanted. The problematic is not entirely beyond the 
terms of the debate amongst Evans-Pritchard, Herskovits and Ashley-
Montagu, I belonged “to a political entity which has taken away the 
right of self-direction from the very people he is studying” (Hersko-
vits 1936: 217). In another conversation I had with Mmandu, she stat-
ed this even more clearly—we had stolen this building from the com-
munity. I was taken aback: but the building was empty before, there 
was no one here, no one using it, it was collapsing. But for Mmandu, it 
had become what she told me people had described as another weird 
white people place, cut off from those who she identified as needing it.
 Sitting with Horatio one day, another friend of Mmandu’s, I 
asked him who he thought managed or ran The Field, hoping to open 
a route to a discussion about horizontal organising and self-organi-
sation—his response was disarming. Anthropologists from Goldsmiths, 
he laughed. Later in the conversation he asked me what anthropol-
ogy was—I tried my best to explain, but I felt fairly sure the message 
didn’t make it across. It fell to static. I received back an inquiring and 
searching look. 
 In moments such as these, I was reminded of Lucas Bessire’s 
introduction to fieldwork with the Ayoreo. Early on, he found that 
the abujá, the Ayoreo term for anthropologist, were considered Sa-
tana utocaidie—helpers of the Devil. These abujá were considered to be 
trickster figures, hard to spot, disguised, with unclear and dishonest 
intentions, only interested in capturing things, recording them, and 
“said to possess hidden stacks of money “as long as their beards” and 
nefarious powers of persuasion” (2014: 24). In these relationships, I 
occupied a similar space—I had money, from my research grant, and 
what I and The Field was doing, the experiment, was not immediately 
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clear. 
 It wasn’t only in relation to people such as Mmandu and Hora-
tio, that my position as anthropologist became problematic. A number 
of the members of the collective were uneasy with me conducting my 
PhD research at The Field. They were concerned about how being en-
gaged in a research project such as this put me in a different position 
to everyone else—I had another motive. And what is more, I wasn’t 
only a participant observer—I was actively changing the shape of the 
project through interventions. I was extracting and intervening. Tim 
Ingold has insisted there is no contradiction between participant and 
observer (2017), and I am inclined to agree. But these other members 
of the collective certainly saw potential problems. A while after de-
taching from The Field, I had an e-mail exchange with one of these 
people. Again, it was amicable but not without its agonistic dimen-
sion. They made it clear that the role of participant observer has al-
ways been problematic, but even more so if the participant observer 
is transforming the realities they’re studying. And, they went on, they 
did not like the prospect of a process of individual writing now taking 
place outside of the collective processes in which they were based—
there was too much demand to integrate it into frameworks to make it 
interesting to others, to extrapolate and generalise, to create facts that 
happened rather than events that were experienced. 
 A problematic is pointed to here, one that it seems to me partly 
stems from the central importance that institutional academia and an-
thropology places upon text. This problematic is not one that is un-
recognised by the discipline at large, but there is still a difficult prob-
lem—if we are to engage in the collaborative construction of common 
worlds, and call that anthropology, then should those common worlds 
not to some extent be valued in themselves without the authority of 
the text, or monograph, or article to justify them? Many practice-based 
disciplines (e.g. design, art, architecture), include within their mode 
of assessment the realities that have been fabricated through the re-
search. Anthropology, on the other hand, continue to primarily rely 
on modes of representation such as visual materials, exhibitions and 
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text as their primary means of attributing value to a project. The real-
ity itself, beyond its representation, is in this institutional sense, sec-
ondary—it becomes subordinate to the production of anthropological 
knowledge. So, in engaging in a project such as The Field that also 
became my PhD an imbalance was introduced whereby the institu-
tional demands of anthropology were very different from those of the 
life processes in which I participated. I, in the end, found meeting the 
demands of both too overwhelming. Others, in different places, work-
ing on different projects, and with different personal characteristics, 
may be better able to balance the vast multiplicity of demands that 
participating in the textually output-focused academy and the compo-
sition of common world beyond it, but I was not. The process of writ-
ing required a severance from the realities that I had participated in 
creating, and a turn towards the insular, introspective and centrifugal 
flow of the text. Producing a work of anthropology and continuing to 
partake in the construction of those common worlds was too much.
 Ingold has also asked us to stop “worry[ing] obsessively about 
what counts as ‘anthropological knowledge’, and what it means to 
produce it” (2018b), and to take our lead from artists rather than sci-
entists. In so doing, we might focus more on attending to correspond-
ences with others, rather than studies of others, and in so doing come 
closer to an anthropological art which joins “with the forces that give 
birth to ideas and things, rather than seeking to express what is al-
ready there” (2018a: 65 emphasis original). In the language of Donna 
Haraway, it would be an anthropology focused towards a practice of 
becoming-with (2008), a collaborative exploration of the possibilities 
of human life and its relationship to all kinds of others, all kinds of dif-
ference, a practice that I attempted to encapsulate here through the no-
tion of commoning anthropologically. I am again inclined to agree with 
this hopeful and romantic vision. Romanticism after all held close to 
the bright, sublime and beautiful. However, it is not without its fric-
tions that we might embark on this route, it is not without the possibil-
ity of agonism, friction and static, it is not without the affective surges 
of resentment, neglect and blame. For anthropologists to engage in 
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the construction of common worlds, to care for those worlds, we must 
also go forth knowing that sometimes we will get things very wrong, 
sometimes we will fail, sometimes our common worlds will collapse, 
or turn on us, or us on them. Sometimes, commoning will overspill too 
far into uncommoning, into static and noise. 
 In some senses, however, there is nothing so different about 
this and the rest of political life. Foucault once aptly remarked “peo-
ple know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they 
do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow 1983: 187). In commoning, in attempting to find new ways 
of living together, we do not know what we will find—the contin-
gency of the encounter, the proliferation of difference, will make sure 
of this. We can, however, attempt to remain open and honest and not 
close ourselves to the other. This stance, I have attempted to introduce 
through the cosmopolitical figure of the idiot—the one who does not 
know the answers, the one who stays with the question. For in the 
end, commoning, and anthropology, remain open questions, they re-
main open to transformation, open to difference—without that ques-
tioning, inquisitive openness, the common falls to the identity of the 
same, and fails to remain open to the other as a threshold to another 
possible world. 
 
MAKING-SENSE
 To remain open to the other in this way is an existentially con-
stitutive gesture. It constructs the other not as threat, or enemy, or 
as marked by absolute alterity, but as an invitation. Thus, the other 
emerges as an opening onto other values, other practices of care, other 
possibilities of communication, other ecologies of life. And it is not 
only the other who is existentially constituted in this gesture, for the 
relationship to the other is also implicated inextricably in the forma-
tion of self. To open to the other as invitation does not only existential-
ly construct that other, but also forms the self through a cosmopolitical 
attitude of openness to other possibilities. And further, this opening 
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towards other possible common worlds is also an opening towards 
other systems of sense, that is other systems of making-sense. Such 
making-sense does not only concern making-sense of the other, that is 
understanding their forms of expression and their needs and desires, 
but more crucially, concerns the creation of new systems of sense, new 
common senses. Without that creation of sense communication with 
others would remain an impossibility.
 It is this creation of new systems of sense that allows for the 
possibility to accept the invitation of the other, for to open to the sense 
of the other, to their modes of expression and needs and desires, re-
quires the constitution of new modes of communication. The sense 
of the other cannot be simply ‘translated’ into a pre-existent system 
but must be drawn into the creation of new systems that are capable 
of retaining the differences of expressions. It is here that commoning 
engages in practices bearing similarities to “controlled equivocation”, 
in as far as “[e]quivocation appears here as the mode of communica-
tion par excellence between different perspectival positions” (Viveiros 
de Castro 2004: 5) whereby the differences of those perspectival posi-
tions are retained and contribute to the constitution of new systems 
of making-sense. This strikes at the centrality of communication as a 
creative process to commoning. In his engagement with John Dewey’s 
discussion of the etymological links between community, communi-
cate and common, Ingold draws attention this creative process,
“having things in common is not a prerequisite for 
communication but its outcome; not what allows us to 
communicate but what it achieves.  To have in common is 
not to look inside ourselves, to regress to a set of baseline 
attributes with which we are similarly endowed from the 
start, but to reach out to others who are – at least initially 
– different from us. To communicate with people is then to 
common with them, in the participatory process of living 
together.” 
(2017: 14-15)
311
Common worlds are not pre-existent entities that simply expand 
as others enter into them, rather they are created through a process 
of reaching out towards difference; they are created through com-
munication and the construction of new systems of sense, they are 
created through sense-making practices. In this way communication 
is an existentially constitutive practice, one which transforms those 
who communicate in attempting to create novel correspondences. It 
is partly for this reason that commoning and communication, remain 
contingent practices, ones which cannot not know their destinations 
in advance, and ones which must be continually revised, revisited, 
recomposed. 
 I am drawn here to Horatio’s thought that we encountered in 
Commoning Beyond the Commons,  that the way we talk to people and the 
way people talk to us—that’s politics. That day we had been discussing 
why The Field, in his view, had failed to become more diverse and to 
engage with the needs and desires of the poorer, predominantly black, 
communities in New Cross. As he continued, you guys are in a party 
that okay we talk in this manner and we believe in this but actually to help the 
society or to help the poor community we have to give up some of our ideas. 
Certain modes of speech carry with them ideas that have not been 
given up and are creating a barrier. The way politics are rolling here it’s a 
barrier. Politics is the way we speak and the way we are spoken to, and 
the way that is rolling at The Field is a barrier. A blockage springs up, 
transversal commoning falters, and ideas and values are clung to too 
tightly to be recomposed through communicative encounters. And the 
greater they are clung to, the tighter the affective knots become. The 
possibility of creating new systems of sense is thwarted by an unwill-
ingness to give up ideas. The needs and desires of others cannot be at-
tended to without allowing for the recomposition of common worlds 
through encounter. 
 Modes of expression are not secondary to politics, they are its 
possibility. As was seen in the first field of politics, it is when any ti-
tle to govern, any overarching system of meaning and sense, is aban-
doned, that politics begins (Rancière 2006). It is only by allowing ideas, 
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values, principles, practices and modes of expression to become trans-
formed that politics can be practiced for to deny this transformation 
would be to deny the possibility of communication as a creative prac-
tice of sense-making. It is difference then, difference in ideas, values, 
modes of expression, identities, needs and desires, that makes pos-
sible communication and commoning. Attending to these differences 
is the practice of composing new systems of common sense that can 
facilitate correspondences without erasing the very differences that 
made them possible.
 The ideas that are not being given up and are becoming a bar-
rier are themselves not separate from their expression. They them-
selves come with their worlds. As stated in the lines of Difference and 
Repetition that precede one of the motifs that has run throughout this 
thesis, that of the other as an expression of a possible world, “the ex-
pressed has (for us) no existence apart from that which expresses it” 
(Deleuze 2011: 261). The expressed and expresser come with their own 
worlds, for “[n]othing comes without its world, so trying to know 
those worlds is crucial” (Haraway 1997: 37). To know the expressed, 
one must come to know also the expresser, for they are both continu-
ous components of the entangled gatherings that form their worlds. 
Ideas then, do not exist independently to their embodied expression, 
they are run through with affective dimensions that transform bodies, 
their dispositions and powers of action.
 That the expressed cannot be separated from the expresser 
attests to the importance of bodily dispositions in communica-
tive encounters. The way bodies express their needs and desires, 
their values, their ideas, is transformed in the expression. Com-
mon systems of sense, or common senses, cannot be created with-
out coming to know the bodies that are gathered with them. In 
Michel Serres’s The Five Senses, it is the skin that becomes the fig-
ure of a common sense, a sense that reveals the link between sense 
and sensation and the unity of the senses. He writes, “[t]he skin, 
multisensorial, can pass for our common sense” (2008: 81). The 
skin, the boundary of the body, the point of contact, of coming to-
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gether, of encountering difference, is where the field of a common 
sense emerges, a common sense that is not on a plane of meta-
physical knowledge, but one that is embodied, felt, experienced; 
a common sense that concerns affect and sensation as much as it 
does discourse and sense, a common sense that refuses to separate 
mind and body just as it refuses to separate the senses.  Making-
sense is not only a matter of the intellect, of a thought outside of 
bodies—rather, “[t]he thinking I quivers along the spine, I think 
everywhere.” (Serres 2008: 76). This is where thought emerges, 
in the contact of bodies, across the skin, becoming a matter of 
encounter, of bodies and sensations coming together revealing “a 
kind of original unity of the senses” (Deleuze 2012: 30). Making-
sense is a bodily encounter which compels thought in a range of 
affective tones, it compels a thinking that does not leave the en-
counter, but goes along with it. 
 Values, sense, concepts, bring with them affects, orienta-
tions, sensations. The anxiety, resentment, despair and depression 
that surged throughout Affective Activity and Careful Collectivity, 
and the refusal, neglect and care that run through the communi-
cative encounters with the building, with things as gatherings, 
in Communication are as much a part of the search for common 
worlds, as are concepts and discourses. Concepts run through 
bodies, they quiver along spines, surge as hope and despair, jolt 
as shock and fear. Bodies come together, attract one another, reso-
nate with one another, repulse one another via the inter-mingling 
of a common sense. 
 I am drawn here, once again, to the reiki classes that were 
briefly held at The Field, and through which we glimpsed the 
outlines, the skins and surfaces of cosmopolitics.1 The interest-
ing question is not—is reiki true or false? Does the healer channel 
universal energy through shakras or not? It is not a question of 
an apophantic attribution of falsity or truth. It is rather a ques-
tion of what it does, how it compels us, what its non-apophantic 
1 See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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commandment is. It is a question of magic.2  Reiki as a practice 
and an exploration of that recurrent Spinozan question of what 
a body can do manifests so many of the properties of the min-
gling of bodies in the creating of common senses through contacts 
with a common sense. Reiki, as in the tending to the building run 
through with years of neglect and the communication with the 
stubborn and wilful gravel in the concrete, brings bodies into con-
tact through practices of care. Through the exploration of a con-
tact zone of a common sense, common senses can be rethought, 
reimagined, opening other possibilities for being together.
 Taking care, once again here is an embodied practice, one that brings 
differences together in relations of co-flourishing. It is, like communication, 
an existentially constitutive gesture that orientates towards the other and 
so also forms the dispositions of self. It is an exploration of what values 
can be shared, nurtured and grown. And values again become embodied 
in the materialities themselves, in skins, gravel, walls andaffects, values 
become “collective ventures embodied and embedded in prosaic material 
everyday agencies, contingently becoming vital to situated relationalities 
that ground them in a living web of care” (de la Bellacasa 2017: 119). In 
some senses, reiki stands for so many of the practices of commoning that 
unfolded at The Field—the intermingling of bodies in a contingent explo-
ration of relationships of caring for; the encounter of bodies in the attempt 
to find correspondences through practices of taking care. Such encounters 
bring out modes of communication that do not only convey information, 
but create systems of sense and sensation, they create common worlds.
2 Magic here is certainly not a term of disqualification, a term that denotes 
a non-scientific and therefore false practice, a term that disqualifies. it is rather a 
signalling of the relationship to the non-apophantic that was discussed in chapter 
4, a dimension of the imperative, the commandemnt, a dimension that compels 
orientations towards unknown futures. In this regard the words of Felix Guattari 
may be useful:
“As far as I’m concerned, in principle I am not all hostile with regard to magic. I 
even think that, in many cases, it constitutes a mode of mapping of psychic Assem-
blages of great interest, sometimes capable – in the context of traditional medi-
cines – of setting up an opposition to the sterile and reductionist approaches of the 
shrinks in white smocks!” (2013: 32)
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CASCADES OF (UN)COMMON WORLDS
 At this point, we can state simply what has already been stated: 
commoning does not diminish difference but continues its prolifera-
tion. In the words of Marylin Strathern, “[d]ifferentation is not after 
all contained—it runs riot” (1991: xxi). The final chapter showed how 
different practices of evaluation and taking care created new value 
systems that became inscribed in the very gatherings that produced 
them3—the commons and the values they produce emerge through 
transformative practices of care and communication. These practices 
of care and communication do not care for something that pre-exists, 
or communicate information already held, but create new relations 
that are themselves creative. There is an ongoing process of variation 
by which commoning is always differentiated from itself, always pro-
ducing new value practices, new contexts for action, new systems of 
meaning. In reaching out towards difference, that which reaches can-
not itself remain the same.  Commoning is in this way, uncommon to 
itself.
 It is this process of continual variation that is the motor of com-
moning and was outlined previously as commoning beyond the com-
mons. Now, it is clear that the notion of commoning beyond the commons 
is already included in that of commoning. The process of ongoing 
variation creates a situation in which commoning is always beyond 
itself, always differentiated from itself, always uncommoning. As an 
exploratory field, commoning is continually establishing new systems 
of meaning and value, new practices of evaluation, which become dif-
ferentiated from the processes that created them and in turn reflect 
back upon and transform those very processes. Here, both care and 
communication return as contingent practices of attending to needs 
and desires. Bodies come together, mingle, attract one another, reso-
nate with one another, repulse one another in encounters. 
 Both resonance and repulsion are constitutive of difference. 
Bodies that are repulsed are not the same bodies that existed prior 
3 See Chapter 7: Affective Activity and Careful Collectivity
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to repulsion, they take on new stances, new attitudes, new positions. 
And likewise, the resonance between two or more bodies does not 
leave them unchanged but transforms them and introduces them to 
new constellations of sense. Difference, then, is both the possibility 
and limit of commoning; commoning remains with difference, it does 
not work through it to arrive at the unity of the same. Whether the 
encounter of difference triggers the creation of new common worlds, 
or the divergence of uncommon worlds, in both cases differentiation 
continues. 
 In this endless cascade of differentiation, sites of resonance 
or repulsion can come to function as nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe 
2014), or quilting points (Žižek 2008a: 95-7 ), that is points which come 
to retrospectively organise systems of sense and meaning and grant 
temporary consistency to common worlds. The importance placed 
upon a certain value or principle comes to transform the other values 
associated to it, thus acting as a nodal point which temporarily fixes 
other meanings in place. Such a moment can be found in one of the 
conflicts touched upon in the fourth chapter.4  A number of people 
committed themselves to attempting to diversify the community that 
participated in The Field by inviting groups such as London Black 
Atheists, London African Gospel Choir and RAFO, which was done 
on the basis of the transversality principle. During one meeting, how-
ever, it transpired that other people in the group considered that this 
focus on diversifying the collective had occurred at the expense of the 
other principles that were intended to guide decisions on who could 
use the space, resulting in the inclusion of a number of groups that 
were ’not political’, or who had politics complicit with the hegemony 
of state and market. An excess of focus on one principle had led to a 
lack of attention to the others, an excess of care at one point leads to 
neglect for others. The fixing of one nodal point transformed the oth-
ers associated to it, moving them into the background. 
 Here, we see a divergence of common worlds, a moment where 
an excess of a care for one principle leads to neglect for others. The re-
4 See Chapter 4: Four Fields of Politics
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sult is not simply a divergence on one particular issue, but a transfor-
mation of the entire value system, the entire common world. Different 
nodal points, different loci for the attribution of value, create variant 
common worlds which partly overlap and partly diverge. Transfor-
mation of one point of a gathering, brings about transformation in all 
other components of that gathering giving it a new sense. 
 Another such a moment was encountered in the controversy 
concerning chicken or veganism. For one side it was clear that [v]egete-
rian/vegan food is more inclusive and cooking the food at the Field promotes 
collaboration - all values we want to promote. But it was not so simple, as 
the response came: [f]ood politics are a lot more complicated than simple 
ethics unfortunately - and for me (this is my personal positions), it’s more 
important that a more diverse group of people come together on the Wednes-
day dinner, than it is adhering to an ethical standard shared by some. Dif-
ferences in what is cared about and for, in what is valued, bring about 
differences in action. And as was seen in chapter seven it is action itself 
that, being the source of values, transforms what is valued and brings 
worlds into being. Shifts in the attribution of value have corresponding 
shifts in action, and the temporary settlement that a common world 
may have arrived at is disrupted, differentiating itself from itself and 
bringing about a proliferating cascade of common worlds.
 So common worlds proliferate according to the nodal points 
which come to temporarily fix systems of common sense through the 
practice of evaluation. But this is not the only source of proliferation. 
The very practice of communication, as we have seen, produces dif-
ference as novel systems of sense are created, but it also results in dif-
ferentiation through the ongoing interference of static. In relation to 
one another, divergent common worlds become parasites, sites of ad-
jacency and otherness that intervene, overlap and interfere with one 
another. As these divergent common worlds come together, “[c]om-
munication is effective, the circuit so to speak operates, but the ‘mes-
sages’ are only partially transferred.” (Strathern 1991: 84). There are 
always components of the ‘messages,’ the constellations of meanings, 
values and practices, that fall to static, that cannot make sense when 
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interfaced with other systems of sense. Positions within a network 
established through the temporary settlement of a shared system of 
meaning also establish horizons—points beyond which it is not pos-
sible to see from a given perspective. The defining of a position in 
relation to a matter of care (de la Bellacasa 2011; 2012; 2017), of what 
should be cared about, or for, when brought into relation with another 
perspective creates friction and static. The two don’t always match up. 
An excess of care in one point of the network leads to an excess of ne-
glect in another. Matters of care emerge as partially connected. Some 
of the urgency, of the injunctive, is communicated, but a part falls to 
static, to noise. From one point of view reiki is unpolitical, for another 
it is; for one the book keeping is a matter of great urgency, for another 
it is a nuisance and obstruction to the real work of living otherwise.
 These are the moments of interruption, the moments of noise, 
clamour and static. Serres called these interruptive moments the para-
site. Para—beside, abnormal, other, adjacent. Site—a space, domain, 
area of distribution. A parasite is an other, a third, an unknown, uncer-
tain disruption. Momentarily, the system of differentiation becomes 
common. “The difference becomes static” (Serres 2007: 31). But is it 
static in the sense of stable, or static in the sense of white noise? The 
uncommons that can enable the possibility of commoning overspills, 
difference surges into noise. The difference is in the excess, in the con-
tingency of the encounter. The communication falters. There is only 
noise. But, “the parasite invents something new” (ibid: 36). The oth-
er-domain (parasite) brings something new into being. The site en-
counters its other through the emergent contingency of the encounter. 
Through commoning a new site, a new territory, a new common world 
emerges. But the distribution is once again disrupted, divided, split. It 
is back with the uncommons and commoning starts again, the ques-
tioning starts again, this time from a different and differing position. 
“Nothing seems to hold the configurations at the centre—there is no 
map, only endless kaleidoscopic permutations” (Strathern 1991: xvii). 
But the permutations and the division bring new possibilities, new 
questions. “The division surges up and makes a system very quickly” 
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before once again that system plunges into “[t]he noise of the world, 
the sounds of birth and of transformations” (Serres 2007: 37-8). In the 
shifting of scales, the oscillations between positions, paradox, contra-
diction abound. Common sense is interrupted by nonsense. 
 Sometimes the static and noise is deafening. This was what was 
found in the closing chapter. The experience and sense of neglect and 
ontological insecurity was in part a plunge too far towards chaos, too 
far towards clamour. The uncommons abounded. There is something 
of a little Clastrian machine at work in the continual recomposition 
of commoning, “a “machine” that operates according to its own me-
chanics” (Clastres 2007: 212). A machine that sets and continually reset 
its functioning, that jolts off towards the outside, turns back on itself, 
takes itself apart and puts it all back together. A machine that spills 
into nonsense in order to find sense and that has its own perpetual 
motion. A machine that sometimes deafens itself, sometimes speaks 
clearly. Sometimes it’s as though those celebrated two poles of gumsa 
and gumlao (Leach 1986) are at work at once, shifting between a clear 
domain with a set of rules for caring for the commons, and the flight 
towards the uncommons. But it is not a swinging between two poles, 
a dialectic, but more of a machinic fractalisation, a cascade of differen-
tiation. We are back with Bateson (2000: 416)—noise is the very possi-
bility of a new system and the background against which that system 
emerges. 
DIFFERENCES ThAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE
 Bateson’s systems theory, as well as Serres’s discussion of para-
sites, reminds us not to try and wish away the static, noise and inter-
ferences that are integral to communication. For whilst they become 
obstructions to communication it is this very obstruction and interfer-
ence which makes possible the formation of new systems. But there 
is also another problematic raised by an observation of Bateson’s that 
must be attended to here, and that is how, amidst this proliferation of 
differences, is it possible to identify “a difference which makes a differ-
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ence.” (2000: 459 emphasis original). Without doubt, the differences 
encountered across each of the preceding chapters are themselves dif-
ferent—the problematics and poetics of communication with differ-
ence-writ-large, with the gravel in the concrete, the rotting floorboards 
and the material manifestations of ruination are by no means the same 
as the encounters of differences that became structured around race 
and food. “[T]here are differences between differences” (ibid: 463), 
and the work of commoning cannot only be to remain open to dif-
ference generically but must also be to attend to these differences be-
tween differences. 
 For Bateson, once we enter the world of communication we en-
ter a world in which ““effects” […] are brought about by differences” 
(ibid: 458 emphasis original), and these differences that bring about 
differences, constitute ‘information.’ As such, Bateson’s theory of in-
formation “is fundamentally both contextual and causal in nature — a 
fact that can be shown to have widespread and profound implications 
for its application in the social world.” (Ali 2013: 101). The implication 
of this includes that differences both bring about transformation and 
change, something that we have already seen, and that they cannot be 
understood apart from the specificities of their formation and posi-
tion. In short, attending to differences requires attending to the dif-
ferences that constituted them as such as well as the effects that they 
bring about.  
 There is then, a reiteration of Nancy Fraser’s critique of the 
Habermasian conception of democracy—it is insufficient to act ‘as if’ 
participants in democracy are equal rather, the specificities of the bar-
riers different people face to participation in politics must be attended 
to, including variations in modes of expression and communication 
(Fraser 1990). There are layered and complex histories that lead to the 
formation of certain differences and the specificities of each difference 
cannot be understood apart from them. Modes of expression can also 
not be understood apart from the complex histories that contribute to 
their formation, that is neither expressed nor expresser can be under-
stood without attending to these histories. As Susan Lepselter writes 
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of the persistence of narrative poetics of colonisation in contemporary 
America, 
“[d]ifferent troubled American histories layer up in-
side the uncanny iterations, the implicit feelings of their 
parallelism between other histories of violation, transport, 
domination, colonization. They are unresolved injuries 
spewing back in a layered poetics, revealing the connec-
tions and parallels between many different histories of 
power and domination.” 
(2016: 67). 
Modes of expression are run through with the histories with 
which they resonate and from which they emerge, they manifest un-
resolved traumas, injustices and injuries in their poetics.
 Let us turn once again to the conflicts that we encountered in 
the latter half of this thesis. When discussing the controversy around 
Harlow and RAFO joining The Field with one long term member of 
the collective, the conversation turned to his mode of expression—he 
was extremely charming and could very much sort of make you change your 
mind in one conversation, or not change your mind necessarily but make you 
sort of come round to his way of thinking, I wouldn’t go so far as to say ma-
nipulative but he definitely had a lot of training in that form of diplomacy or 
how to get people to do what you want them to do. Which I guess, is manipu-
lating people. Harlow’s ability to be persuasive here emerges as a prob-
lem, it is a matter of manipulation. But this mode of communicative 
practice cannot be understood apart from the processes that formed it 
and with which it is continuous. Harlow himself acknowledged that 
he adapted his communicative style depending on who he was talk-
ing to—there’s a place where I can talk to you in a really straight way and 
you won’t like me but because I have learnt how to be inclusive I can talk to 
you in a way that allows you to feel part of my conversation and my agenda. 
In that conversation with Harlow he made it clear that to be inclusive 
meant adapting communicative styles—you won’t like me if I talk to you 
322
in a really straight way. 
 The practice of shifting communicative styles that Harlow used 
was part of the way in which he understood and sought to practice 
inclusivity— you have to communicate differently, you cannot simply 
act ‘as if’ we are all equal. Sitting with him one day I asked him if he 
saw it as a problem that he had to change his language all the time to 
communicate. The response came back: 
But I’ve had to do so all my life. The place I was 
clumsy was when I came to this country at 11 and some-
one called be a black bastard and I’d hit them, and I’d fight, 
because I didn’t have the words. But becoming an adult I 
learnt how to articulate and, you know, and actually I can 
beat you up with a smile on my face if I choose to but that’s 
not my heart’s desire so I won’t do it, but I could because 
I’ve learnt, I’ve worked 30 years in town halls yeah, so I 
have an infrastructure understanding that a lot of people 
like me don’t have.
 Harlow has come to possess an infrastructure understanding that 
a lot of people like him don’t have. This understanding facilitates his com-
municative practice, and cannot be separated from his experiences as 
a black child arriving in the UK from Granada and the racism this en-
tailed, as well as the thirty years of coming to learn the mechanisms of 
town halls and the infrastructure of the state 
 The story with Mmandu was, of course, different. Whilst also 
involving race as a difference that makes a difference, it is involved 
differently. Harlow himself touched on this in that conversation—
there’s some passive-aggressive racism going on which is specifically directed 
at Mmandu and more and more people don’t like her, and a lot of people don’t 
like her because they don’t understand her and it’s a place where through her 
hurt and her experience she hasn’t learnt how to win friends and influence 
people. 
 The encounter of The Field with Mmandu was also affected by 
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the floating signifier of race (Hall 1997), but it shifted its location. For 
all the declarations of anthropologists since Boas and Benedict that 
the system of differences that is race has no reality, the effects pro-
duced by race continue to manifest, race continues to be a difference 
that makes a difference. Race ran through the encounters with Mman-
du—they carried with them the long histories of British imperialism, 
colonialism, and economic dispossession and segregation. When she 
described me as Master Toby, one of those guys surrounded by dogs and 
horses, the parallels and resonances with specifically British race and 
class hierarchies are clear.  I assumed the position of a privileged white 
benefactor of The Racial Contract (Mills 2011), through the imagery of 
British aristocratic traditions, here fox hunting. It, as she said, was not 
my fault, some of those aristocratic guys were nice and they couldn’t 
help being born into that world. But not being a signatory to The Ra-
cial Contract and the system of white supremacy does not mean that I 
am not its benefactor (ibid: 11). Running through my encounters with 
Mamandu were layered poetics that resonated with long histories of 
colonisation, domination and dispossession which found parallels in 
the white-washing effects of urban gentrification.
 At times, this was clearer than others. I recall one day Mmandu 
specifically telling me that The Field was engaged in segregation—it 
wasn’t only happening here, or only in New Cross, she said, In Brix-
ton a black person can’t get anything because there are no so many 
white folks everywhere. Processes of segregation and dispossession 
driven by racialised urban economics carry forward resonant parallels 
with the history of British Imperialism and these racialised histories 
form the present down to its most basic components. As we saw, the 
very architecture of Goldsmiths and New Cross carries with it these 
imperialistic histories that persist in the structuring of political and 
economic hierarchies today.5 
 The work of commoning, then, cannot be content with a stance 
or attitude of remaining open to difference. Whilst this is a necessary 
starting point, it is not in itself sufficient. The practice of remaining 
5 See Chapter 2: On What Commons?
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open to difference remains contingent, for to truly attend to difference 
requires also attending to the differences that make a difference, that is 
attempting to attend to the specific histories, modes of expression and 
forms of practice that are encountered. Whilst a cosmopolitical atti-
tude of openness is the ground of this possibility, the true work begins 
when the specificities of each encounter are brought into the picture 
and attended to. Different beings require different modes of commu-
nication and care—opening to the needs and desires of the building, 
the neglectful manifestations of ruination, requires a quite different 
mode of practice than attempting to construct systems of sense that 
account for the long histories of racialised dispossession and domina-
tion. What both share, and start from, is a stance of attending to differ-
ences on their own terms, a stance of tentative uncertainty that reaches 
out towards the other as an invitation to the constitution of another 
possible world, an invitation to the construction of new values, senses 
and practices of care and communication.
AND NOW FOR SOMEThING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT… 
 Much has changed since my encounter with The Field began. 
In 2014 the Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition government re-
mained in power, the Labour Party was led by a centre-left epitome 
of a career politician—Ed Miliband, the idea of Brexit seemed to be 
only taken seriously by the right wing of the Tories and UKIP, and 
the concept of a Trump presidency only appeared to be conceivable in 
the context of a cartoon like The Simpsons. Mainstream party politics 
seemed stagnant, with a meaningless choice between parties that were 
barely distinguishable and continued to perpetuate neoliberal auster-
ity policy programs. At that time, the possibility of social transforma-
tion through mainstream political channels appeared a lost cause and 
many turned instead to anarchist and autonomist infused forms of 
political practices that sought to withdraw and recreate, “what Pao-
lo Virno has called “engaged withdrawal,” mass defection by those 
wishing to create new forms of community.” (Graeber 2004: 60-1). The 
325
protests against austerity and tuition fees, Occupy, the movement of 
the squares and the riots of 2011 all pointed towards a shift in politi-
cal practice away from stale and outdated institutional structures to-
wards immediate, participatory and spontaneous resistance.
 The Field fitted comfortably within this political moment, it 
was engaged in many practices that Srnicek and Williams have called 
part of the left-wing folk political common sense of the times (2015). 
This folk political common sense focused on immediate, authentic re-
lationships, forms of horizontal organising, direct action, participation 
in favour of representation, local engagement and grounding, tempo-
rary structural arrangements, and a deep distrust of hierarchies and 
formal institutions. All tendencies which were found on The Field.
 By 2015, the picture began to shift. After the Conservative Party 
obtained a majority in the 2015 election, giving them a strengthened 
mandate to continue and deepen the George Osbourne led austerity 
program, the Labour party began the process of electing a new leader. 
In September of that year, to much surprise, Jeremy Corbyn became 
the new leader of the opposition with campaign support from the 
newly formed organisation Momentum. Corbyn had spent most of his 
political career as a marginalised backbencher. His politics sat close to 
the radical Labour tradition of the likes of Tony Benn, a tradition that 
many had thought had been more or less expunged from the party 
since Blair. He was anti-austerity, anti-war, anti-nuclear weapons, and 
in favour of nationalisation, regulating financial markets and expand-
ing public services. Sat at his right-hand side was his shadow chancel-
lor John McDonell, someone who would over the course of the next 
couple of years publicly declare to the media that his job was over-
throwing capitalism (BBC 2018), and quote from Mao’s Red Book in 
the House of Commons (Mason 2015). It started to seem that “[t]here 
is a chance for radical politics to make an utterly unexpected rebirth” 
(Seymour 2016). But it was not only changes in the UK that seemed to 
mark a shift in the political terrain. 
 In Spain, Podemos became the third largest party only shortly 
after being founded in the aftermath of the 15-M movement standing 
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on a platform of anti-austerity, direct democracy and anti-corruption. 
In Greece Syriza became the largest party on the back of an anti-aus-
terity campaign and Yanis Varioufakis, a self-confessed ‘erratic marx-
ist’ (Varoufakis 2015) became the finance minister. Even in America, 
a country in which left-wing politics are excluded from mainstream 
discourse, a socialist was making waves as Bernie Sanders ran a strong 
campaign against Hilary Clinton for the leadership of the Democratic 
Party. The common sense of the left appeared to be shifting, as many 
of the movements that had turned their back upon the mainstream 
political institutions began to find their voices within those very struc-
tures.
 At The Field, several members of the collective became mem-
bers of the Labour Party and Momentum, shifting their political ac-
tivism to also engage with these new possibilities for bringing about 
social transformation. I recall sitting at The Field one day, idly chat-
ting, when one person jokingly said—now we’ve got Corbyn, your PhD 
is pretty much irrelevant, right. We laughed, but there was a kernel of 
truth in this statement: whilst it was certainly not entirely ‘irrelevant,’ 
from the renewed standpoint that we found ourselves in it no longer 
seemed sensible, or even feasible, to consider a social movement seek-
ing something akin to a post-capitalist society only operating through 
local, immediate, and horizontal forms of folk politics—radical politics 
had changed. But it was not so simple as a total shift from a participa-
tory and horizontal mode of practicing politics to a representative and 
vertical one—both forms of politics were, as Srnieck and Williams put 
it, “necessary but insufficient” (2015: 12). The picture had changed, 
complexified, opening onto the possibility of a more varied set of po-
litical strategies, it had become differentiated. 
 There is, peculiarly, a resonance with commoning here—the 
practices at work in the attempted composition of common worlds 
have shifted as they encounter a different set of demands, a different 
set of needs and desires, different forms of communication, a different 
political terrain and different channels for action. Rather than being 
a departure from the contingent and tentative work of commoning, 
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this shift towards mainstream institutional politics is its continuation, 
it is part of the adaptive and responsive practice of wayfaring. The 
expresser and expressed transform in the expression, common worlds 
are departed from and new possibilities emerge, the focus of caring 
practices shifts and at this moment, at this time, with these needs and 
desires to attend to, the tactics change. But still, the destination cannot 
be known in advance. 
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ThE FIELD 
PRINCIPLES
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A group of us have been meeting over the last few months to 
discuss how we can best use the space. Below is the first document 
to come out of these discussions. These were written collectively by 
the group and represent our shared hopes and vision for this project. 
They are to be read as starting points from which we hope to begin.
LOCAL:
The Field is an independent project that is created and run by 
people that live in the local area. We want the things that happen here 
to be relevant to the people who live, work and study in New Cross. 
We want to build a community around the field, as well as make con-
nections and alliances to other initiatives with the hope to work to-
gether on actions, projects and experiments both within The Field and 
the local area.
DIRECT PARTICIPATION:
We want anybody who comes to The Field to be able to contrib-
ute to what is created here. We welcome people joining in with deci-
sion-making, events, plans and ideas, physically building and shaping 
the space and asking questions of what is happening here. This project 
is not about charity or provision – where one group provides a service 
for another – but about working together to identify our own needs 
and provide solutions for ourselves. Our hope is that the Field can 
serve as an open public space, that we work together to maintain and 
manage.
TRANSVERSALITY:
We aim for this project to be a place that anyone can use, and an-
yone can participate in running, though we know that there are many 
barriers to people being able to participate equally. We aim to be an 
actively inclusive group, challenging discrimination of any kind, with 
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the hope to generate a space where differences can be recognised, re-
spected and explored. We also seek to encourage ways of working to-
gether that avoid rigid hierarchical structures, whilst remaining con-
scious of the power dynamics inherent to collective work.
UN-WORK/DE-MONEY:
We want to explore ways of lessening our dependency on mon-
ey and work, to give ourselves the time to work together to respond 
to our individual and collective needs and desires, and to the shared 
problems we face as a neighbourhood. We hope to establish an al-
ternative economy around The Field, based on relationships of soli-
darity, collaboration, interdependency and care, and for us to explore 
together ways of sustaining ourselves through the Field.
COMMONING:
We aim to build a social and economic environment of greater 
interdependence, controlled by ourselves. We are interested in experi-
menting with the commons as an alternative to the institutions of both 
the market and the state, and aspire towards The Field becoming a 
base and catalyst for commoning practices in the area.
CREATIVITY:
We’re interested in creativity as a collective, everyday activity, 
rather than something institutionalised and individualised. We think 
creative practice holds within it the potential to build new worlds and 
shatter old ones, to learn to see new possibilities and work through 
old traumas. We want to reclaim our ability and time to be creative, 
and use it as a means to experiment with and artistically reorganise 
our lives.
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PAGE
12
43
47
51
54
57
59
60
64
90
91
93
94
97
99
100
101
103
109
113
117
120
124
125
127
127
129
130
132
DESCRITPION OF IMAGE
Hate & War. No Future: writing on the walls of the building in 2014
Shed and rubbish in the garden in 2014
The back of the building in 2014
The front of the building in 2014
Walking tour of Hackney Wick with public works
Front of The Field during building work
Collective mindmap
Map of area
View out of back door during renovation
Front piece of Leviathan, engraving by Abraham Bosse
Drawing of Boyle’s air pump
New Cross Commoners at New Cross Learning (NXC website)
Map of New Cross (NXC website)
Visit to Deptford houseboat community (NXC website)
Mindmaps on housing and commoning (NXC website)
Visit to Burgess Food Project (NXC website)
Flyer for workshop on circulation of the commons (NXC website)
Model from workshop (NXC website)
Model from workshop (NXC website)
Black Panthers Free Breakfast Program (NXC website)
Visit to Deptford beach (NXC website)
Map of the relation between The Field and NXC
Workshop material: Plants; Animals; Structures; Events
Mapping New Cross (NXC website)
The fireplace during building work
The back of the building in 2014
Clearing the garden
Writing on the walls in 2014
The garden in 2014
Inside of front door in 2014
Writing on the walls in 2014
Building underfloor boxes
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Mixing cement
SketchUp model of lean to
Perma(nent) culture
Workshop materials: plants + animals
Mindmap of access to Field
Survey of uses for The Field
Organisation chart
Reiki hand positions
Back of building in 2014
Plastic bags
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Syringe
Fireplace during building work
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Clocks on the wall
writing on the wall in 2014
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Unidentified chemicals
The side gate
Xylene
Front of building in 2014
Front of building and skip
Writing on the walls in 2014 (x4)
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Back of front door
Front of building during renovation
Interior during renovation
Painting day
Interior during renovation
Painting day
Some timber
Interior during renovation (x2)
Front of building during renovation
Painting day
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Mixing cement
Rendering
Panelling
Tea break
Bathroom window during renovation
Timber store
Bathroom wall
Back of building during renovation
Stripping doors
Plan of The Field
Water collection tower
Document from structure discussion
Daily plans
Plan of kitchen
Plan of underfloor storage
Plan of kitchen
Film night
Under tarpaulin
Some mindmaps, bricks and a teapot
Underfloor boxes being built
Interior during renovation
Cutting timber
Items found in garden
What is New Cross? Map from People’s Kitchen
The Activist Institution
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Mindmap
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Document from structure meeting
Decision making mindmap
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Why have a core group?
People’s Kitchen (x2)
Map of New Cross
200
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Collage
Food stall at The Field
DIY Democracy at The Field
Regular events board
The garden with oven, greenhouse and workshop
Front of building
Fieldnotes
221
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267
